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Abstract
Sensor networks are innovative wireless networks consisting of a large number of low-
cost, resource-constrained sensor nodes that collect, process, and transmit data in a dis-
tributed and collaborative way. There are numerous applications for wireless sensor net-
works, and security is vital for many of them. However, sensor nodes suffer from many
constraints, including low computation capability, small memory, limited energy resources,
susceptibility to physical capture, and the lack of infrastructure, all of which impose
formidable security challenges and call for innovative approaches. In this thesis, we present
our research results on three important aspects of securing sensor networks: lightweight
entity authentication, distributed node clone detection, and secure data aggregation.
As the technical core of our lightweight authentication proposals, a special type of cir-
culant matrix named circulant-P2 matrix is introduced. We prove the linear independence
of matrix vectors, present efficient algorithms on matrix operations, and explore other im-
portant properties. By combining circulant-P2 matrix with the learning parity with noise
problem, we develop two one-way authentication protocols: the innovative LCMQ protocol,
which is provably secure against all probabilistic polynomial-time attacks and provides re-
markable performance on almost all metrics except one mild requirement for the verifier’s
computational capacity, and the HBC protocol, which utilizes the conventional HB-like
authentication structure to preserve the bit-operation only computation requirement for
both participants and consumes less key storage than previous HB-like protocols without
sacrificing other performance. Moreover, two enhancement mechanisms are provided to
protect the HB-like protocols from known attacks and to improve performance. For both
protocols, practical parameters for different security levels are recommended. In addition,
we build a framework to extend enhanced HB-like protocols to mutual authentication in a
communication-efficient fashion.
Node clone attack, that is, the attempt by adversaries to add one or more nodes to the
network by cloning captured nodes, imposes a severe threat to wireless sensor networks.
To cope with it, we propose two distributed detection protocols with difference tradeoffs
on network conditions and performance. The first one is based on distributed hash table,
by which a fully decentralized, key-based caching and checking system is constructed to
deterministically catch cloned nodes in general sensor networks. The protocol performance
of efficient storage consumption and high security level is theoretically deducted through a
probability model, and the resulting equations, with necessary adjustments for real appli-
cation, are supported by the simulations. The other is the randomly directed exploration
protocol, which presents notable communication performance and minimal storage con-
sumption by an elegant probabilistic directed forwarding technique along with random
initial direction and border determination. The extensive experimental results uphold
the protocol design and show its efficiency on communication overhead and satisfactory
detection probability.
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Data aggregation is an inherent requirement for many sensor network applications, but
designing secure mechanisms for data aggregation is very challenging because the aggre-
gation nature that requires intermediate nodes to process and change messages, and the
security objective to prevent malicious manipulation, conflict with each other to a great
extent. To fulfill different challenges of secure data aggregation, we present two types of
approaches. The first is to provide cryptographic integrity mechanisms for general data
aggregation. Based on recent developments of homomorphic primitives, we propose three
integrity schemes: a concrete homomorphic MAC construction, homomorphic hash plus
aggregate MAC, and homomorphic hash with identity-based aggregate signature, which
provide different tradeoffs on security assumption, communication payload, and computa-
tion cost. The other is a substantial data aggregation scheme that is suitable for a specific
and popular class of aggregation applications, embedded with built-in security techniques
that effectively defeat outside and inside attacks. Its foundation is a new data structure—
secure Bloom filter, which combines HMAC with Bloom filter. The secure Bloom filter is
naturally compatible with aggregation and has reliable security properties. We systemati-
cally analyze the scheme’s performance and run extensive simulations on different network
scenarios for evaluation. The simulation results demonstrate that the scheme presents good
performance on security, communication cost, and balance.
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Advances in electronics and wireless communication technologies have enabled the devel-
opment of large-scale wireless sensor networks (WSNs) that consist of distributed, au-
tonomous, low-power, low-cost, small-size sensor nodes to collect information and coop-
eratively transmit data through infrastructureless wireless networks. The development of
wireless sensor networks was originally motivated by military applications such as bat-
tlefield surveillance, and then the progresses on miniaturization, low-cost circuit design,
simple low-power wireless communication system, and improved small-scale energy sup-
plies have enabled extensive application areas of WSNs, including environment and habitat
monitoring, health-care applications, home automation, traffic control, etc..
Security plays a fundamental role in many wireless sensor network applications. Due
to WSNs’ unique characteristics, security techniques used in conventional networks cannot
be directly applied to sensor networks. First of all, sensor nodes are very sensitive of
manufacturing cost. Consequently, most sensor nodes are resource constrained in terms of
energy, memory, computation, and communication capabilities. Normally, sensor nodes are
powered by batteries, and recharging batteries is infeasible in many circumstances. Then
energy consumption becomes a primary consideration for most sensor network protocols.
Second, sensor nodes may be deployed in public hostile locations without attendance, which
makes sensor nodes vulnerable to a variety of physical attacks by adversaries. Generally,
adversaries are assumed to be able to undetectably take control of certain portion of sensor
nodes and extract all secret data in the nodes. Subsequently, previously legitimate nodes
may turn into being malicious. Furthermore, the scale of sensor networks is considerably
large, and the network topology is dynamically adjusted, because some nodes may die
from running out of energy or failure, and new nodes need to join the network to maintain
desirable functionality. At last, sensor networks use wireless transmission channels without
infrastructure supports and most of communications are delivered in an ad-hoc, multi-hop
manner. All of them impose formidable challenges such that existing security mechanisms
1
are inadequate and new approaches are demanded.
In this thesis, we present our results on three important aspects of securing sensor
networks: lightweight entity authentication algorithms, distributed node clone detection
protocols, and secure data aggregation schemes. This chapter starts with a general discus-
sion on sensor networks architectures in Section 1.1. Then we briefly state sensor networks
applications and introduce two major standards related to WSNs in Section 1.2. After
that, we summarize influential network modeling methods of supporting sensor networks
research in Section 1.3, followed by an instructive illumination of simulations tools for wire-
less sensor networks security protocols in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 provides the research
motivations and related work. Finally, we outline the organization of the thesis and list
our contributions in Section 1.6.
1.1 Sensor Networks Architectures
Typically, a wireless sensor network is composed of a base station and hundreds and thou-
sands of sensor nodes, as depicted in Figure 1.1. Sensor nodes both collect and forward
information, and they are equipped with batteries, sensors, data processing units of re-
stricted computation capability, limited memory space, and short-range radio communi-
cation. On the other hand, the base station releases task commands, collects network
reports, and serves as the gateways to other networks or systems, with abundant data pro-
cessing/storage centers, or access points for human interface. In general, the base station
has many orders of magnitude more powerful than ordinary sensor nodes. Even though
individual nodes only possess basic processing capacities, through the collaboration of a
large scale of networked nodes by careful protocol design, sensor networks can perform ad-
vanced and sophisticated functionalities. As a common assumption in security protocols,
the base station is believed to be trustworthy and to be tamper resistant, whereas low-cost
sensor nodes are subject to a variety of attacks. WSNs are dynamic in the sense that radio
range and network connectivity change over time; some sensor nodes die due to failure or
power exhaustion, and new sensor nodes may be added to the networks.
There are different settings about wireless sensor networks architectures, which sub-
stantially shape system design and affect protocol performance.
• Hierarchical Structure vs. Distributed Structure
In many scenarios, sensor nodes are organized as a hierarchical structure. They
are grouped into a number of clusters controlled by some high-ranked nodes which
play a particular role denoted as cluster heads. Member nodes for local sensing and
intra-cluster forwarding are associated with a cluster via a one-hop or multi-hop




Figure 1.1: A wireless sensor network
information from their cluster members, the cluster heads transmit results to the
base station. This is the case of two-level hierarchy, and there may exist several
layers of clustering. On the other hand, we may think a centralized sensor network
as a one-level hierarchy, in which a base station is necessary and vital for network
management and protocol operations.
In contrast, there is no concept of cluster or rank in a distributed structure, similar to
but not completely identical to P2P (peer-to-peer) networks. Once sensor nodes are
deployed, they scan their radio coverage area to figure out neighbors and manage to
form a fully distributed network. The base station does not participate in ordinary
network management and may only play a supportive role for protocol executions,
mainly for command issuing and result retrievals. Instead, sensor nodes sustain the
network and carry out protocol procedures in an autonomous manner. From time to
time, nodes may perform different tasks, but essentially they are equal.
• Homogeneous Nodes vs. Heterogeneous Nodes
In a homogeneous system, all nodes possess the same level capacities of communi-
cation, computation, and storage. In this kind of sensor network, if there are varied
roles for senor nodes, the overall balance on protocol requirements and energy con-
sumption is an important metric of evaluating protocol applicability. By contrast,
heterogeneous wireless nodes are armed with various transport mediums providing
different ranges of coverage and distinct specifications including CPU, memory, and
power supply to meet specific needs. This extra facility may provide a more flexible
system design background for hierarchical sensor networks.
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• Multi-Hop or One-Hop Connectivity
For general sensor networks, the communication among nodes and base station are
through multi-hop: nodes need to organized an ad-hoc wireless network to deliver
messages. In some particular cases, it is assumed that the message transmission can
be achieved in one-hop. In other words, for centralized sensor networks, every nodes
has a direct link with the base station; for distributed networks, all nodes form a
complete graph. This assumption is hardly satisfied in reality, but it might be useful
in a hierarchical network for local intra-cluster nodes communication.
• End-to-End vs. Hop-by-Hop
Those two principles may apply to message transport or security services layer, with
subtly different implications. Any communications ultimately are for end-to-end data
transmission, and they are implemented by hop-by-hop buffering-and-forwarding in a
multi-hop wireless sensor networks. From the perspective of sensor network message
transport layer, it is very fragile and probably infeasible to maintain an end-to-
end connection between two communication participants. Instead, connections are
established only on demand. Therefore, it is generally preferable to mainly consider
hop-by-hop transport while end-to-end connectivity is only available intermittently.
As for security protocols, those principles reflect different achievable service layers.
Generally speaking, analogue to other networks, end-to-end security is more desired,
and hop-by-hop security mechanisms may play an auxiliary role for overall system
security. However, in some applications, it might be extremely challenging to design
acceptable end-to-end security protocols due to reality constraints; henceforth, hop-
by-hop security mechanisms may partially fulfill specific security objects and also can
serve as an enlightening starting-point for further complete approach in future.
• One-to-One, Many-to-One, and One-to-Many Communications
According to the sizes of intended senders and receivers from the high level of ab-
straction and modeling, communication in wireless sensor networks can be classified
as one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-one. One-to-one communication is the ba-
sic case for the base station interacting with an individual node and a node reporting
data to the base station, but frequent communication of many pairs of distant nodes
rarely happens in reality and usually is conceived as an inappropriate requirement
for protocol implementation.
Unlike other networks, many-to-one is a very important communication scenario
for sensor networks. One of main advantages of employing sensor networks is to
combine a great number of nodes readings into generalized, more accurate reports,
and this aggregating process probably or even preferably takes place during message
transmission. In fact, effective many-to-one message transmission and aggregation
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mechanisms have been and remain an active research topic for sensor networks. One-
to-many is also a common scenario for regular network communication, such as the
base station commanding the whole network and a node sending some information
to a set of nodes to fulfill specific protocol functionalities.
• Unicast, Broadcast, Multicast, and Anycast
Those characterizations are from the the aspect of message routing and delivery mech-
anisms on wireless sensor networks communication. Intuitively, one-to-one multi-hop
communication can be achieved by unicast routing protocols. A lot of one-to-many
transmissions in WSNs are conducted by broadcasting, especially for the base station
as the sender to communicate with all the network. In addition, routing establishment
often starts with initial flooding to pinpoint the recipient. However, this transmission
mechanism should only be casually used by nodes, since it is very energy-consuming.
Instead, multicast might be more suited for sensor nodes one-to-many communica-
tion in general cases. Alternatively for some one-to-many communication scenarios
where it is only required to ensure at least one of targeted receivers to retrieve data,
anycast mechanism can accomplish this intension.
• Stationary Network vs. Mobile Network
This division is based on sensor nodes’ mobility. Generally speaking, WSNs are data-
centric networks with emphasis on message in-network processing by a large number
of low-cost sensor nodes, and then nodes mobile capacity is much less significant
in wireless sensor networks than mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs). In addition,
frequently changing network topology due to nodes movements may consume previous
energy of nodes greatly. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that sensor nodes
remain relatively static during a period of protocol procedure, while protocols that
adapt to high mobility environments are only discussed in special cases.
1.2 Sensor Networks Applications and Standards
1.2.1 Applications
There are diverse applications of wireless sensor networks [13, 85, 44], such as Great Duck
(bird observation on Great Duck island), Cattle Herding, Bathymetry, ZebraNet, Glacier
Monitoring, Ocean Water Monitoring, Cold Chain Management, Grape Monitoring, Rescue
of Avalanche Victims, Vital Sign Monitoring, Power Monitoring, Self-healing Mine Field
and Sniper Localization, Parts Assembly, and Tracking Military Vehicles. According to
the deployment areas, the WSN applications can be categorized in the following fields:
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military, environmental, industrial, agricultural, location oriented, public safety oriented,
airport oriented, automotive, emergency handling, medical and oceanic.
Among them, military and medical solutions might be the two of the most security-
oriented application fields of wireless sensor networks. Military sensing networks are
designed to detect and gain as much information as possible about enemy movements,
explosions, and other phenomena. Typically, wireless sensor nodes are integrated with
military command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, recon-
naissance and targeting systems. Examples of military wireless sensor network applications
are battlefield surveillance, guidance systems for intelligent missiles, detection of attacks by
weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, biological, or chemical, and other monitoring
applications. Due to the nature of the military, it is apparent that those applications could
not be mounted without appropriate security assurance.
Many medical systems are equipped with a large number of tiny, non-invasive sensors,
located on or close to the patient’s body, for health monitoring purposes. Such systems
have been designed to measure diverse physiological values, including blood pressure, blood
oxygen level, heart activities, activity recognition, etc., and are available in many differ-
ent forms, including wrist wearable, ambulatory devices and as part of biomedical smart
clothes. The term of body sensor network (BSN) [154] is coined to represent this kind of
application. A number of intelligent physiological sensors are integrated into a wearable
wireless body sensor network, which can be used for computer-assisted rehabilitation and
even early detection of medical conditions. Those applications imply that outpatients can
be monitored from their homes, freeing space in hospital beds. As the physiological patient
data is legally required to be kept private, the implemented networks must invoke strong,
long living security protocols in the sense that the methods and mechanism for medical
data should guarantee the security being maintained over the life time of the individual
members.
1.2.2 Standards
A number of standards have been ratified or are under development for wireless sensor
networks communication. Among them, predominate are IEEE 802.15.4 standard [6] and
ZigBee specification [7].
IEEE 802.15.4 Standard
IEEE 802.15.4 is a standard established by IEEE 802.15 working group to define the phys-
ical and medium access control (MAC) layers for low-rate wireless personal area networks
(LR-WPAN). It is aimed to offer the fundamental lower network layers for a type of wire-
less personal area network which focuses on low-cost, low-speed ubiquitous communication
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between devices. The emphasis is on very low communication cost and low power con-
sumption of nearby devices with little or no underlying infrastructure, which makes it
particularly suited for wireless sensor networks.
IEEE 802.15.4 standard includes a link layer security protocol to address four basic
security services—access control, message integrity, message confidentiality, and replay
protection. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [52] with 128-bit key is employed
in this standard, where the CTR (Counter) mode [114] is used for encryption only, the
CBC-MAC (Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication code) mode [114] for authen-
tication only, and the CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC) mode [114] for both encryption
and authentication. However, other necessary security mechanisms, such as how to man-
age keys and what kind of authentications policies to apply, are undefined in this standard
and have to be provided by upper layer protocols, one of which is ZigBee.
ZigBee Specification
Built upon IEEE 802.15.4, ZigBee specifies a suite of high layer communication protocols
with the same application intention of using small, low-power digital radios for low-rate
wireless personal area networks. The specification is maintained by the ZigBee Alliance,
which is founded by a group of companies. Its main purposes are constructing a network
topology, providing application services, and facilitating communication features such as
encryption and authentication. The network layer (NWK) is in charge of organizing and
providing routing over an IEEE 802.15.4 multi-hop wireless network, while the application
layer (APL) aims at providing a framework for distributed application development and
communication. In accordance with the OSI model, IEEE 802.15.4 and Zigbee are layered
in Figure. 1.2.
ZigBee makes use of all the basic security components in IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
In addition, the ZigBee security specification contains mechanisms for key establishment,
key transport, frame protection, and trust management. There are three types of keys
employed: the master key, the link key and the network key. Moreover, the ZigBee spec-
ification defines the role of a trust center as a device that would be trusted by all other
devices on the network and would distribute keys for the purpose of network and end-to-end
application configuration management.
Security plays a fundamental role in many wireless sensor network applications. Due
to WSNs’ unique characteristics, security techniques used in conventional networks cannot
be directly applied to WSNs. First, sensor nodes are very sensitive of manufacturing cost
since sensor networks consist of a large number of sensor nodes. Consequently, most sensor
nodes are resource restrained in terms of energy, memory, computation, and communica-
















Figure 1.2: IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee protocol layers
are infeasible in many circumstances. Then energy consumption becomes a primary con-
sideration for most sensor network protocols. Second, Sensor nodes may be deployed in
public hostile locations, which makes sensor nodes vulnerable to physical attacks by ad-
versaries. Generally, adversaries are assumed to be able to undetectably take control of
certain portion of sensor nodes and extract all secret data in the nodes. Furthermore, the
scale of sensor networks is considerably large, and the network topology is dynamically
adjusted, because some nodes may die from running out of energy or failure, and new
nodes may join the network to maintain desirable functionality. At last, sensor networks
use insecure wireless communication channel and lack infrastructure. As a result, existing
security mechanisms are inadequate, and new approaches are demanded.
1.3 Modeling Sensor Networks
How to model WSNs properly is fundamental to sensor network protocol design and per-
formance analysis. Intuitively, we may think of a wireless sensor network as a graph, nodes
as vertices, and links as edges. Generally, sensor node are randomly deployed in a tar-
geted area, and the number of nodes in a sensor network is massive. In the literature, the
following models have been used for characterizing sensor networks.
1.3.1 Erdös-Rényi Random Graph Model
A random graph is a graph that is generated by starting with a set of n vertices and then
randomly adding edges between them. In the groundbreaking Erdös-Rényi model [57], a
random graph is denoted by G(n, pb), in which every possible edge independently occurs
with probability pb.
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Figure 1.3: Expected degree of vertices vs. number of vertices, where Pc is desired connec-
tivity of random graph
To achieve a desired probability Pc of graph connectivity, the threshold value of expected




(ln(n)− ln(− ln(Pc))) , (1.1)



















where c is a real constant.
Figure 1.3 depicts the plot of the expected vertex degree d as a function of the graph size
n for various values of desired graph connectivity Pc. This figure shows that, to increase
the probability that a random graph is connected by one order, the expected degree of
vertices increases only by 2. Moreover, the curves in the figure are almost flat when n is
large, indicating that the size of the graph has insignificant impact on the expected degree
of vertices in an almost connected random graph.
After Eschenauer and Gligor introduced the Erdös-Rényi random graph theory into
wireless sensor networks in their seminal paper [59], it is quite popular in sensor networks
and serves as a principal modeling tool for a variety of WSNs security protocols [152]. In the
basic mode of the Eschenauer-Gligor random probabilistic key predistribution scheme [59],
an offline trusted key distribution server generates a key pool and each node is preloaded
with a fix number of random keys out of the key pool before deployment such that the
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probability of every pair of nodes sharing at least one key is not less than pb and then the
connectivity of the whole network is not below Pc, based on the Erdös-Rényi random graph
theory. Chan, Perrig, and Song [41] proposed a q-composite mode of the Eschenauer-Gligor
scheme which requires that two nodes have at least q common keys to set up a link and
use all common keys instead of the first one to establish the pairwise key. Liu, Ning, and
Li [111] introduced a key predistribution scheme which combines the Eschenauer-Gligor
scheme with polynomial-based key predistribution protocol in [29]. Moreover, Du et al.
[54] independently presented a technique which is equivalent to Liu-Ning-Li’s scheme. In
addition, Traynor et al. [142] proposed a random key distribution scheme based on the
heterogeneous sensor network model. Even though Pietro et al. [125] questioned the
realistic assumption of random graph model in WSNs and proposed another geometric
random model for WSNs, Wu and Stinson [151] further investigated these models and
validated the use of the random graph model in computing the connectivity of WSNs.
1.3.2 Unit-Disk Graph
A unit-disk graph [47] is a geometric graph constructed by a collection of vertices in the
Euclidean plane and edges between a pair of vertices if and only if their distance is less
than a unique threshold. Essentially, a vertex is represented by a disk of unit radius in the
plane and is connected with all vertices within its corresponding disk. A unit-disk graph
example with 100 vertices randomly deployed in a square is given in Figure 1.4.
Since the work of Huson and Sen [86], unit-disk graph has been used to model the
topology of ad-hoc wireless networks with homogeneous nodes that have equal transmission
ranges, and many wireless sensor networks clearly comply with the classification. Even
though Breu and Kirkpatrick [33] showed that given a graph, determining whether it
is a unit-disk graph is NP-hard, many important graph optimization problems can be
effectively approximated [18]. Moreover, in many protocol proposals [128, 121], sensor
nodes are assumed to randomly deployed in a geographic area, thus a random unit-disk
graph in which nodes are uniformly deployed in a square and follow the standard unit-disk
bidirectional communication model naturally become a useful network scenario for protocol
simulations. This can be generalized as a random geometric graph, and its properties are
investigated by Avin [15].
1.3.3 Percolation Theory
Percolation theory, introduced by Broadbent and Hammersley [36], describes the properties
of connected clusters in a geographic graph. One of its applications in wireless sensor
networks is to analyze the impact of deployment errors on sensor worm propagation [156].
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Figure 1.4: A unit-disk graph
As a representative question of this theory, for a three-dimensional network of m×m×m
vertices which every pair of neighbor vertices are connected independently with probability
pg, given pg, what is the probability that an open path exists from the top to the bottom?
The main concept of percolation theory is the existence of a percolation threshold pt below
which the probability is almost 0 and above which the probability is nearly 1.
In some cases pt may be calculated explicitly. For example, for the square lattice in
two dimensions, pt = 0.5 [95]. This is the case of bond percolation. If we change to
observe open/close vertices rather that edges, it then is called site percolation, and the
site percolation threshold of the previous square lattice becomes pt = 0.593. In addition,
a limit case for lattices in many dimensions is given by the Bethe lattice, whose bond
threshold is pt =
1
z−1 where z is the coordination number [31].
A more complex continuum percolation problem, originally introduced by Gilbert [73],
can be used to find a critical density of a Poisson point process at which an unbounded
connected component almost surely appears so that the network can provide long-distance
multi-hop communication for wireless sensor networks [11].
1.3.4 Deployment Models
Generally speaking, in large-size, dense sensor networks, nodes are randomly deployed in
targeted areas. However, in many scenarios, some deployment patters can be exploited
to facilitate system design and improve protocol performance. For example, if sensor
nodes are scattered by an airplane, these nodes might be grouped or placed in a particular
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order before deployment; by careful research on those patterns, a deployment distribution
may be approximately created such that a key-predistribution protocol can estimate nodes
geographic or relative locations in advance and avoids unnecessary key assignments.
In [110], a sensor node is expected to be deployed, instead of at a specific location, within
an area with certain probability, which is modeled by a probability density function. Du
et al. [55] proposed a group-based deployment model, in which sensor nodes are divided
into equal-size groups, each group is intended to be deployed at a different point in a
grid network, and the derivation of a node actual position from its group target follows a
non-uniform probability distribution such as Gaussian distribution.
1.4 Simulation Tools
Similar to other large-scale networks, simulation is an extremely useful and vital method
in wireless sensor networks to inspire creative proposals, provide necessary abstraction to
swiftly deploy prototyping system, comprehensively evaluate protocol performance, sub-
stantiate arguments, and verify theoretical analysis.
1.4.1 Categories
There are various means to carry out simulations for sensor networks. According to the
implementation foundation, they can be categorized in three types.
• Experiments are directly realized by general-purpose programming languages: Python,
Matlab, C++, Java, etc.. Those languages are broadly grasped by researchers, and
they are quite handy and helpful to execute trials for abstract models.
• Simulations are built upon discrete event network simulators, mainly NS-2 [3, 87] and
OMNeT++ [2, 146]. NS-2 supports an assortment of network protocols and provides
interfaces through a script language to mange simulation. In contrast, OMNeT++
is an extensible, modular, component-based simulation framework, with emphasis on
an efficient event dispatcher, ample data collection gadgets, and minimalist core sim-
ulation library, while specific system architectures and network protocols are offered
by extended packages.
• Simulators use platforms that are specially designed for wireless sensor networks,
such as TOSSIM [5], which is a built-in simulator in the popular sensor network
operation system TinyOS [4]. In addition, Castalia [1], as a simulator for wireless
sensor networks, is constructed based on the OMNeT++ framework to test dis-
tributed protocols in a realistic wireless channel and radio model. Those platforms
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supply thorough sensor network protocol stacks and main-stream wireless medias,
and proposals performance can be measured in realistic metrics.
1.4.2 Selections for WSNs Security Protocol Simulations
Although the sensor network specialized simulators appear attractive for research on se-
curing sensor networks at first glance, they are rarely used in practice, because those
lower-layer details, like wireless media and MAC specifications, are in principle irrelative
to most security proposals for network and application layers. As far as those proto-
cols designers are concerned, abstract metrics are generally sufficient or even preferable to
physical readings for performance evaluation and fair comparisons in a large scale network
application scenario. For instance, to measure a family of security protocols’ energy con-
sumption on communication, instead of gauging consumed power of node transmitters for
a deliberately configured sensor networks, average number of messages sent per node in
an abstract network scenario is actually adequate and appropriate. As a matter of fact,
many security proposals present their simulation results by software programs without any
simulator’s support.
However, for our proposed security protocols of wireless sensor networks in this thesis,
the simulations are primarily conducted on the OMNeT++ framework, except for a few
Python-driven experiments for probability distribution models, due to the following consid-
erations. First, a simulation library certainly facilitates efficient protocol implementation.
Second, by means of its comprehensive data collection tools and inherent statistical sup-
ports [2], we can quickly absorb experimental results. In addition, this kind of open source
simulator will decrease the chance of implementation biases and enlarge result credibility.
For example, all our simulations results can be reproduced and verified because of the
use of its deterministic pseudorandom number generators. Finally and most importantly,
the OMNeT++ framework grants us the ability to implement general network scenarios
including the models in last section, which can serve for a broad range of security protocols
simulations. We delve into this below.
We extend the OMNeT++ framework to support main modeled scenarios of sensor net-
works: random graph, unit-disk graph with configurable network shape, two-dimensional
square lattice, tree topology, cluster-based structure, with more scenarios under develop-
ment such as different types of random trees. By standard software engineering design,
those extensions are provided as a software package, and can be reused for general security
protocols when the corresponding network scenarios are demanded.
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1.5 Motivations and Related Work
1.5.1 Lightweight Entity Authentication
In the past few years, designing lightweight, unconventional, secure entity authentication
schemes [91, 34, 76, 138] for low-cost pervasive devices, such as sensor nodes and radio
frequency identification (RFID) tags, has been a hot topic in the cryptography and secu-
rity communities due to the imperative practical demand and the formidable theoretical
challenge.
Entity Authentication in Sensor Networks
The basic function of wireless sensor networks is to collect information for authorized users.
Typically, base stations or users issue various commands of tasks to nodes; then nodes start
to work accordingly, gathering data and forwarding to base stations or users. To operate
properly, base stations and users should be authenticated to be the acclaimed entities by
nodes. This is because, without entity authentication, adversaries can easily abuse the
sensor networks to collect information maliciously or launch energy-exhaustion denial-of-
service attacks by frequently ordering nodes to perform nonsense tasks. On the other
hand, entities of nodes should also be authenticated by other nodes, base stations, and
users. Otherwise, adversaries can insert invalid nodes into sensor networks to corrupt the
result of information collection. Moreover, any further advanced access control mechanisms
require entity authentication. In a word, mutual entity authentication plays a significant
role in security of wireless sensor networks.
A number of entity authentication schemes in wireless sensor networks have been pro-
posed. Benenson, Gedicke, and Raivio [23] introduced an entity authentication scheme of
WSNs, based on elliptic curve cryptography. Jiang and Xu [89] presented a distributed
entity authentication scheme in wireless sensor networks. It is built upon the self-certified
keys cryptosystem, which is modified to use elliptic curve cryptography to establish pair-
wise keys for use in the entity authentication scheme. Wong et al. [149] proposed a
dynamic strong-password-based entity authentication scheme for WSNs; then Tseng, Jan,
and Wang [144] enhanced Wong et al.’s scheme to thwart potential replay and forgery
attacks. Tripathy and Nandi [143] utilized cellular automata based components to provide
entity authentication.
All of those approaches are based on conventional cryptographic mechanisms, symmet-
ric or public-key. Since sensor networks consist of a large number of sensor nodes, the cost
of a single node is critical to justify the overall cost of the network. In many applications
of sensor networks, the production cost of nodes would dominate the success of systems.
Akyildiz et al. [10] argued that the cost of a sensor node should be much less than one
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dollar in order for sensor networks to be feasible. Under this constraint, sensor nodes may
not be equipped with necessary hardware to perform costly standard cryptographic opera-
tions, even symmetric primitives. Therefore, innovative lightweight authentication schemes
are strongly demanded for many sensor networks applications. Interestingly, another kind
of pervasive devices: RFID tags suffer from similar or even more rigorous resource con-
straints, and a study on the identification protocols for RFID tags is surely conductive to
fulfilling the authentication challenges in wireless sensor networks.
RFID Identification
Typically, RFID systems consist of simple, low-cost tags that are attached to physical
objects and powerful readers that queue data from tags. As an revolutionary, efficient
technique for automated identification of physical entities using radio frequency transmis-
sions, RFID systems are employed in a wide variety of applications, such as supply chain
management, payment, inventory monitoring, electronic password; and new applications
are emerging every year. It is widely expected that RFID tags will inevitably replace
barcodes correctly affixed to most of our daily consumer products and RFID systems will
prevail in the physical identification mechanism market.
The low production expenditure of RFID tags is critical and essential to the appealing
of RFID systems [91]. Roughly speaking, RFID tag’s price must be below ten cents to be
considered affordable for most RFID applications [123]. On the other hand, there are a
number of security and privacy challenges which have to be addressed before the prevalence
of RFID systems. Secure and efficient entity authentication is a crucial one, because it is
a natural approach to prevent counterfeiting—the most severe attack to the identification
devices.
The HB-like authentication protocols [91, 93, 76] have gained much attention in this
field. The lightweight computation requirement of imposing only bit operations on authen-
tication participants, the solid security foundation on a well-studied learning parity with
noise (LPN) hard problem, and their elegant security reductionist proofs make them very
attractive for entity authentication in the resource-constrained devices. Unfortunately,
Ouafi, Overbeck, and Vaudenay [119] discovered an advanced man-in-the-middle attack,
which is beyond the scope of the security modes used in [91, 93, 76], efficiently breaks down
all HB-like protocols, and renders this kind of lightweight approaches like a dead end. The
detailed evolution of HB-like protocols are their attacked will be given in next chapter.
Aside from the LPN-based approaches, SQUASH proposed by Shamir [138] might be
tempting for RFID tags authentication, because of its simpleness and provable security
equivalence to Rabin’s public key encryption scheme. However, its security equivalence
argument has been challenged by Ouafi and Vaudenay [120]. They successfully mounted
an attack against a previous version of SQUASH: SQUASH-0, which uses a linear mixing
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function while SQUASH employs non-linear mapping. Even thought it is not clear how
or whether this attack can be adopted to SQUASH, they demonstrated that the security
equivalence claim between SQUASH and Rabin cryptosystem is invalid. The security of
SQUASH remains an open problem.
1.5.2 Countermeasures against Node Clone
Wireless sensor networks are subject to many physical attacks, and node clone is a severe
one. Generally speaking, nodes are randomly deployed in surveillance areas, and working
without attendance. Some nodes perish over time, due to failure or running out of power.
To maintain or enhance the network functionalities, new nodes may be deployed into the
current network. Because of production expense limitations, sensor nodes are usually short
of tamper-resistance hardware components; thus an adversary can capture a few nodes,
extract code and all secret credentials, and use those materials to clone many nodes out
of off-the-shelf sensor hardware. Those cloned nodes that seem legitimate can freely join
the sensor network and would significantly enlarger the adversary capacities to maliciously
manipulate the network. For example, those vicious nodes occupy strategic positions and
cooperatively corrupt the collected information. With a large number of cloned nodes
in command, the adversary may even gain control of the whole network. And certainly,
the node clone would exacerbate most of inside attacks against sensor networks, such as
wormhole [84], spam [49], and denial of service [150].
In general, previous approaches against node clone can be categorized into three cate-
gories: prevention schemes that inherently forbid cloned nodes to join network, centralized
detection in which there exists a central and powerful party (the base station at most of
time) that is responsible for receiving reports and making judgements of node clone, and
distributed detection where all nodes cooperatively process information and detect node
clone in a distributed manner.
Prevention
Zhang et al. [157] proposed the use of location-based keys to thwart and defend against
several attacks, one of which is node clone attack. The identity-based cryptography is used
in their protocol such that nodes private keys are bounded by both their identities and
locations. Once nodes are deployed, some trusted mobile agents travel around the sensor
network, and issue the location-based keys to sensor nodes. Since those location-based
keys cannot be used in nodes at other locations, node clone attack is inherently frustrated.
By similar arguments, we review key distribution protocols for sensor networks and it
can be claimed that some of them prevent node clone as well. For example, in schemes
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[159, 12] based on initial trust which assume that it takes adversaries a certain amount
of time to compromise nodes after their deployment, valid keys only can be established
during that safety period, and henceforth controlling nodes would not grant adversaries
extra advantages, including the ability to clone nodes. Those prevention schemes might
be useful on particular applications, but their assumptions as trusted mobile agents and
initial trust are too strong to be applicable in general cases.
Centralized Detection
In a simplest centralized detection approach, each node sends a list of its neighbor nodes
and their locations to a base station. If the base station finds that there are two far distant
locations for one node ID, then the node clone must have occurred. SET, proposed by
Choi, Zhu, and Porta [46], manages to reduce the communication cost of the approach
above by computing set operations of exclusive subsets in the network. First, an exclusive
subset maximal independent set (ESMIS) algorithm is performed by nodes to collabora-
tively form exclusive unit subsets among one-hop neighbors. As a result, each node is
grouped into one and only one disjointed subset which is controlled by a randomly selected
leader. Then those subsets, in the basic scheme, are transmitted by leaders to the base
station such that it can construct all nodes locations and detect clones. Since the subset
division procedure eliminates redundancy in the node location reports, SET lowers the
communication cost. However, in order to prevent malicious nodes in the ESMIS algo-
rithm, an authenticated subset covering protocol has to be performed, which considerably
increases the communication burden and complicates the detection procedure.
Brooks et al. [37] proposed a clone detection protocol in the context of random key
predistribution [59]. Its assumptions and application scenarios are quite different from
other approaches. In fact, it is detecting compromised keys rather than cloned nodes. The
basic idea is that the keys employed in random key predistribution scheme should follow
a certain pattern, and those keys whose usage exceeds a threshold can be thought of as
suspicious. In the protocol, every node reports its keys to a base station and then the base
station performs an abnormality-based intrusion-detection-like statistical analysis to catch
cloned keys. A common concern for this kind of approaches is their high false negative and
positive rates. Furthermore, the authors do not address how to assure malicious nodes to
honestly report their keys, which is critical to the protocol effectiveness. In addition, the
use of bloom filter to transmit keys in the scheme is inappropriate and its corresponding
analysis is flawed.
Ho, Wright, and, Das [81] discussed the clone detection in mobile sensor networks. All
nodes still report their neighbors information to a base station. By the assumption of a
maximum speed limit on sensor nodes, if some nodes exceed the upper limit, then they
would be considered cloned.
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Table 1.1: Comparison of previous distributed detection protocols, where n is network size,
d is node degree
Protocols Requirements for Nodes Comm. Cost Memory Cost
Node-To-Network Broad-
casting [121]
Neighbors information O(n) O(d)





































As pointed out in [121], centralized approaches are prone to single-point of failure, and
the nodes surrounding the base station suffer an undue communication burden that may
shorten the network’s life expectancy. In general, a distributed and balanced detection
scheme is more desirable.
Distributed Detection
The straightforward node-to-network broadcasting [121] is a quite practical way to dis-
tributively detect the node clone, in which every node collects all of its neighbors identities
along with their locations, and broadcasts to the network. When a node receives a broad-
casted message from others, it compares those nodes listed in the message with its own
neighbors and revokes neighbor nodes that have collided locations. The main problem in
this approach is its extremely high communication overhead.
Parno, Perrig, and Gligor [121] provided two probabilistic detection protocols in a com-
pletely distributed, balanced way. Randomized multicast scheme distributes node location
information to randomly-selected nodes as inspectors, exploiting the birthday paradox to
detect cloned nodes, while line-selected multicast scheme uses the topology of the network
to improve detection, that is, in addition to inspector nodes, the nodes within the multicast
path check the node clone too. Unfortunately, to obtain acceptable detection probability,
nodes have to buffer a great many of messages. Moreover, the communication cost in the
randomized multicast is similar to that in the node-to-node broadcasting. For the proce-
dure of choosing random inspectors, those schemes both imply that every node is aware of
all other nodes’ existence, which is a very strong assumption for large-scale sensor networks
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and thus limits their applicability.
A Geographic Hash Table (GHT) [132] maps a key into a geographical coordination.
Based on GHT, Zhu et al. [158] proposed a localized multicast to detect the node clone.
In the system, the inspector nodes for an examined node are chosen from nodes that are
located within a geographical limited region (named cell) which is determined by a GHT
hash result of the node identification. They presented two variants of localized multicast:
single deterministic cell, in which only one unique cell is determined for one node, and
parallel multiple probabilistic cell, in which the location claim is mapped and forwarded to
multiple deterministic cells with various probabilities. Conti et al. [48] proposed another
GHT-based clone detection approach. Those approaches rely on the nodes knowledge of
the general deployed geography of sensor networks. This prerequisite may hold in some
circumstances, but cannot be guaranteed generally.
Table 1.1 compares those distributed detection protocols in terms of assumption, com-
munication cost, and memory consumption. In summary, those distributed detection pro-
tocols either rely on an implicit assumption that every node is aware of all other nodes
existence, or require that nodes realize the general network deployment graph. Those as-
sumptions hardly hold for ordinary large scale, randomly deployed sensor networks. In
addition, their performance is not quite satisfactory on certain metrics.
1.5.3 Secure Data Aggregation
In a typical wireless sensor network, hundreds and thousands of low-cost sensor nodes
scatter within a surveillance area, receive commands from a base station, perform desig-
nated detection tasks accordingly, and collaboratively transmit results back to the base
station. In many cases, instead of forwarding every individual message to the base station,
sensor network protocols support data aggregation—the operation by intermediate nodes
that combines many messages and sends out aggregated results. As a matter of fact, from
the very beginning of wireless sensor networks development [60, 10, 130, 62, 19], it has
already been widely accepted that data aggregation plays a critical role in the practica-
bility and appealing of WSNs. Due to infeasibility of recharging nodes batteries in most
circumstances, energy becomes the most valuable resource for sensor nodes. Among all
nodes operations, data transmission consumes energy the most [10, 19]. Intuitively, data
aggregation during message transmission is an effective method to preserve sensor nodes
precious energy. Moreover, in the absence of data aggregation, sensor nodes near the base
station will suffer from heavy message transmission overhead, and then die of power ex-
haustion much sooner than other nodes, breaking down the whole network’s functionality.
As a result, data aggregation attracts a great deal of attention and many a data aggrega-
tion scheme has been proposed in recent years. Systematic surveys on this topic can be
retrieved in [130, 62].
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When sensor nodes are deployed in a hostile environment, security measurements should
be taken into consideration for network protocols. Attacks to wireless sensor networks not
only come from outsider adversaries, but also can be conducted by compromised, previously
legitimate nodes. Thus applicable secure protocols should prevent malicious inside nodes
from damaging the whole network’s functionality, or at least constrain their impacts to a
reasonable level. Unfortunately, data aggregation, which requires intermediate nodes to
process and change messages, and security objectives, one of which is preventing malicious
manipulation, conflict with each other in this regard. As a result, designing secure and
practical data aggregation schemes, which are critical to many sensor network applications,
imposes an interesting and formidable challenge.
Previous Approaches
Homomorphic primitives, besides standard cryptographic functionalities, allow users with-
out secret key to legitimately perform acceptable algebraic operations on protected data
block. Since aggregation is essentially some operation, it is intuitive to use homomor-
phic primitives for securing data aggregation, and a number of approaches [148, 39, 139]
use homomorphic encryption for this application. Generally, it is very difficult to de-
sign secure symmetric homomorphic block encryption, whereas stream ciphers naturally
support homomorphic exclusive-OR operations, which is exactly utilized in [39]. In con-
trast, public-key homomorphic encryption is an interesting topic, and there exist several
relatively practical public-key homomorphic cryptosystems, such as Unpadded RSA, El-
Gamal, Goldwasser-Micali, Benaloh and Paillier [63], though all of them only support
limited operations on ciphertexts. In 2009, Gentry [71], for the first time, presented a
fully homomorphic encryption scheme, which outstandingly allows arbitrary operations on
ciphertext. Even though the only two fully homomorphic encryption schemes [71, 145]
by now cannot provide competitive performance for most applications, practical fully ho-
momorphic encryption is expected to appear eventually. Unfortunately, sole public-key
homomorphic encryption does not suffice for secure data aggregation in sensor networks,
because then anyone can maliciously insert or manipulate results.
Hu and Evans [83] described a secure hop-by-hop data aggregation scheme, in which
every node shares with the base station a different key, from which temporary session MAC
keys will be derived, and by adopting hash-chain-based delayed message authentication,
such as µTESLA [124], intermediate modes, after the base station reveals session MAC
keys, will be able to verify the integrity of messages that they buffered. This scheme suffers
from communication penalties, as the introduction of µTESLA for distributing session
MAC keys incurs considerable communication cost. More disturbingly, in order to detect
one inside malicious node that manipulates other nodes input, intermediate nodes have
to obtain and buffer all their grandchildren’s messages and corresponding MACs, that
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is, two-hop messages buffer only being able to detect one misbehavior node. Although
Jadia and Muthuria [88] extended the Hu-Evans scheme by all two nodes in the two-hop
communication range sharing pairwise keys and then the scheme eliminates the usage of
µTESLA, the fact that both schemes are only capable of preventing a single inside malicious
node at an appreciable communication cost makes them impractical.
Yang et al. [155] presented a secure hop-by-hop data aggregation protocol for sensor
networks named SDAP, using the principles of divide-and-conquer and commit-and-attest,
which is a typical example of retroactive detection approach. In SDAP, a probabilis-
tic grouping technique is utilized to dynamically partition the nodes in a tree topology
into subtrees. A commitment-based hop-by-hop aggregation is conducted in each subtree
to generate a group aggregate, and accordingly the base station identifies the suspicious
subtrees based on the set of group aggregates. Finally, each subtree under suspect partic-
ipates in an attestation procedure to prove the correctness of its group aggregate. Those
complicated algorithms cause significant transmission overhead, and may cancel off all
communication benefits from data aggregation.
Przydatek, Song, and Perrig [129] proposed secure information aggregation (SIA) to
identify forged aggregation values from malicious nodes. In the SIA scheme, a special
node named aggregator computes an aggregation result over raw data together with a
commitment to the data based on a Merkle-hash tree and sends them back to a remote user,
which later challenges the aggregator to verify the aggregation. Later Chan, Perrig, and
Song [42] built a hierarchical data aggregation on the aggregate-commit-prove framework
in [129], but extended their single aggregator model to a fully distributed setting. Frikken
and Dougherty [66] further improved the Chan-Perrig-Song scheme. Moreover, Chan and
Perrig [40] derived several security primitives from this kind of algorithms.
In summary, when purely cryptographic mechanisms are used for securing data aggre-
gation, homomorphic primitives might be the only suitable candidates, but more research is
needed in this field. For other kinds of secure data aggregation approaches, sophisticated
protocols are designed to detect malicious behaviors/nodes. Some of those mechanisms
rely on unrealistic assumptions, while other involve heavy communication overhead, which
conflicts with the very intention of data aggregation and makes it hard to evaluate their
applicability. There are some well-designed secure data aggregation schemes, which under-
standably have different tradeoffs and are suitable for particular aggregation operations.
1.6 Overview of the Thesis
In the rest of the thesis, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 deal with lightweight entity authentica-
tion. Then Chapter 4 presents two distributed node clone detection protocols. Afterwards,
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Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 demonstrate our work on secure data aggregation. Finally Chap-
ter 7 summarizes the conclusions of our work and suggests possible directions for future
research. The chapter outlines and our contributions are described as follows:
• Chapter 2 presents an innovative, lightweight, efficient one-way authentication pro-
tocol named LCMQ and prove it secure in a general man-in-the-middle model. The
technical core in our proposal is a special type of circulant matrix name circulant-
P2 matrix, for which we prove the linear independence of matrix vectors, present
efficient algorithms on matrix operations, and describe a secure encryption against
ciphertext-only attack. By combining all of those with learning parity with noise
and multivariate quadratic problems, the LCMQ protocol not only is provably se-
cure against all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries, but also outperforms all
HB-like protocols, in terms of tag’s computation overhead, storage expense, and
communication cost.
• Chapter 3 addresses the mutual authentication challenge for extremely computation-
constrained sensor nodes that only can perform bit operations. We first provide a one-
way authentication protocol that is still based on the LPN problem and circulant-P2
matrix, but uses the HB-like structure to maintain the bit-operation-only require-
ment for both parties. This HBC protocol’s key storage is approximately half of
that in the pervious best HB-like protocol. To address inefficiencies in the HB-like
protocols, we propose two enhancements that prevent the OOV attack and improve
protocol performance. Lastly, we extend the enhanced Hb-like protocols into mutual
authentication.
• Chapter 4 proposes two innovative node clone detection protocols with difference
tradeoffs on network conditions and performance. The first one, based on distributed
hash table (DHT), presents good performance on efficient storage consumption and
high security level. The performance evaluation is theoretically deducted through
a probability model, and the resulting equations, with necessary adjustments for
real application, are supported by the simulations. The other distributed detection
protocol, named randomly directed exploration, incurs splendid communication per-
formance for dense sensor networks, by an elegant probabilistic directed forwarding
technique along with random initial direction and border determination. The exper-
imental results uphold the protocol design and show its efficiency on communication
overhead and satisfactory detection probability.
• Chapter 5 shows three secure aggregation schemes that provide provably secure
message integrity with different tradeoffs between computation cost, communication
payload, and security assumptions. The first one is a homomorphic MAC, which
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is a purely symmetric approach, and is the most computation- and communication-
efficient, but requires all data-collecting nodes to share one global key with the base
station. The other two make use of (public-key based) homomorphic hashing, com-
bined with aggregate MAC and identity-based aggregate signature (IBAS) respec-
tively. The scheme with aggregate MAC allows the base station to share a distinct key
with every node, while the scheme with a paring-based IBAS enables all intermediate
nodes beside the base station to verify the authenticity of aggregated messages.
• Chapter 6 exhibits a succinct and practical secure aggregation protocol by combin-
ing HMAC (associated with a cryptographic hash function) with Bloom filter, which
then is defined as secure Bloom filter. Unlike most previous approaches, which are
aimed to provide security mechanisms for ordinary aggregation operations, our pro-
posal firstly is an effective aggregation protocol, suitable for a specific but popular
class of aggregation in wireless sensor networks. Benefiting from secure Bloom filter,
the protocol, without any unrealistic assumptions, fulfills the fundamental security
objective of preventing outside adversaries and compromised inside nodes from harm-
ing the overall network result. We systematically analyze the protocol performance
and run extensive simulations on different network scenarios for evaluation. The
simulation results demonstrate that the proposed protocol presents remarkable per-





Secure and Efficient LCMQ Entity
Authentication Protocol
In this chapter, we present an innovative, efficient one-way entity authentication protocol
named LCMQ (standing for the combination of learning parity with noise, circulant matrix,
and multivariate quadratic), which is especially suitable for RFID systems and can be
used in wireless sensor networks. To compare with similar protocols fairly, we use RFID
systems as the protocol demonstration scenario. By a general man-in-the-middle model, we
prove that the protocol is secure against all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries. The
protocol’s security is still based on the hardness of the LPN problem, but the architecture
cannot be categorized in the HB-like schemes. Instead, the protocol greatly benefits from
the gentle properties and efficient algorithms of a special type of circulant matrix, to which
the whole Section 2.2 is devoted. Furthermore, surprisingly, the protocol performance, in
terms of computation, storage, and communication costs, outweighs all HB-like protocols,
from the viewpoint of RFID tags, while it merely requires readers to additionally perform
one extended Euclidean algorithm per authentication, which is trivial for those supposedly
powerful devices.
The chapter is structured as follows. We begin with the definition of the learning
with parity problem and the overview of an instructive journey of HB-like protocols in
Section 2.1. Then Section 2.2 is focused on the technical core of the proposal: a special
type of circulant matrix, for which we prove the linear independence of matrix vectors,
present efficient algorithms on matrix operations, and describe a secure encryption. After
that, the LCMQ protocol is specified and we prove it secure in a general man-in-the-middle
model in Section 2.3. We discuss the protocol’s performance and recommend practical
parameters in Section 2.4. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes the work. The research results in
this chapter have been presented in [107].
All vectors and matrices discussed in this chapter are binary. Subsequently, the oper-
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ations on the vectors and matrices are over the finite field GF (2). The following symbols
will be used throughout this and next chapters:
a⊕ k Bitwise exclusive-or (XOR) operation on two vectors (or matrices) a, k
a · k Inner-product of two vectors a and k
A ◦K Multiplication of two matrices A and K
a || b Concatenation of two vectors a and b
Hwt(k) Hamming weight of vector k, that is, the number of ones in the bit vector
θ≫ i Right cyclic shift operation on vector θ by i position
0m m-bit vector in which all bits are zeros
1m m-bit vector in which all bits are ones
ei m-bit vector in which only bit at position i is one
θ̄ Compliment of vector θ, i.e., θ̄ = θ ⊕ 1m
Sm Set of all m-bit vectors except 0m and 1m
Sem Set of all vectors in Sm whose Hamming weights are even
Som Set of all vectors in Sm whose Hamming weights are odd
2.1 LPN Problem and HB-Family Protocols
2.1.1 Learning Parity with Noise Problem
Suppose the tag pre-shares a secret κ-bit vector k with the reader for subsequent authenti-
cations. First the reader randomly generates a sequence of binary vectors a0,a1, · · · ,aq-1
and transmits those challenges to the tag, which responds with yi = ai ·k, for i ∈ [0, q− 1]
accordingly. The reader accepts the tag’s authentication if and only if ai · k = yi. Un-
fortunately, after observing κ linearly-independent challenge-response pairs of 〈ai, yi〉, an
adversary can readily recover the authentication key k by the Gaussian elimination.
In the presence of noise, however, where each response bit yi is independently flipped by
a noise bit one with probability η ∈ (0, 1
2
), determining k becomes much more difficult. This
problem is known as learning parity with noise, or the LPN Problem for short. Formally,
it is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (LPN Problem). View κ as a security parameter. Let k be a κ-bit secret
vector, η ∈ (0, 1
2
) be a noise level. For i ∈ [0, q − 1] (q is a polynomial in κ), let ai be a
κ-bit random vector, and vi be a noise bit that follows the Bernoulli probability distribution
of parameter η. Given η and q pairs 〈ai, yi = (ai · k)⊕ vi〉, recover k.
The LPN problem has long been studied as the following equivalent problems: syn-
drome decoding problem [113, 25] and minimal disagreement parity problem [51]. It has
been proven that the LPN problem is NP-hard [25]. Moreover, finding a vector satisfying
26
more than half of the challenge-response pairs, even though it looks like an easier prob-
lem, remains NP-hard [79]. Furthermore, Regev [134] introduced a natural extension of
the LPN problem, referring to as the learning with error (LWE) problem, by generalizing
binary field GF (2) in the LPN problem into prime field GF (p), where p is a prime number.
Impressively, Regev [134] proved the reduction from worse-case lattice problems, such as
shortest-vector problem (SVP), to the LWE problem. However, the reduction proof em-
ploys a quantum algorithm, which is, generally speaking, weaker than a classical reduction
mechanism, as there is still no practical quantum computer available by now.
In reality, the security of LPN-based authentication protocols, similar to other NP-hard
problems for application in the cryptography, still depends on the hardness of the average
case of the LPN problem, while the NP-hard allegation only guarantees the intractability
in the worse case. Intuitively, the combination of the key length κ and the noise level η
determines the security level of LPN instances. Blum, Kalai, and Wasserman [28] provided
the first sub-exponential algorithm (BKW algorithm) for the LPN problem, which requires
2O(κ/log κ) equations/operations. Fossorier et al. [64] improved the BKW algorithm. At
present, the fastest algorithm is the LF algorithm, another enhancement of BKM algo-
rithm, presented by Levieil and Fouque [100]. According to the LF algorithm, a common
parameter set for 80-bit security level is (η = 0.25, κ = 512). Should LPN-based proto-
cols be widely employed, it is highly likely that algorithms of the LPN problem can be
improved notably, then bigger key lengths are demanded, as we have witnessed the sig-
nificant increase of RSA (and discrete logarithm) public key length in the three decades.
Since typical LPN-based protocols involve (κ× κ×O(κ)) matrix multiplication, such big
values of κ would incur considerable computation and implementation costs so as to push
protocols away from lightweight. Fortunately, in our proposed protocol, LPN instances
are encrypted by a succinct secure scheme so that the protocol does not suffer from the
restriction and a practical value of key length can be as low as 163.
2.1.2 The Journey of HB-Family Authentication Protocols
HB and HB+ Protocols
In the HB protocol [82] , the tag and the reader have a secret vector k in common. They
interact n rounds of two passes for authentication. In each round, the reader generates
and sends a random binary vector a as challenge; and then the tag responds with the
inner-product of the challenge vector and the secret k, but with noise of probability η
on purpose. After n rounds, the tag is authenticated provided the number of rejected
challenge-response pairs is not greater than nη.
Assuming the intractability of LPN problem, the HB protocol is provably secure against
passive eavesdroppers [91, 93]. However, an active adversary can easily overcome the noise
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Tag (ka,kb) Reader (ka,kb)
bi ∈R {0, 1}mb bi−−−−−−−→
ai←−−−−−−− ai ∈R {0, 1}
ma
vi ∈R {0, 1|Pr[vi = 1] = η};
yi = (ai · ka)⊕ (bi · kb)⊕ vi yi−−−−−−−→
(ai · ka)⊕ (bi · kb)
?
= yi
Figure 2.1: The ith round of the HB+ authentication protocol, where ma-bit ka and mb-bit
kb are two vectors as authentication key, η ∈ (0, 12), bi is a blinding vector, ai is a challenge
vector
and then recover the secret k: If the same challenge a is repeated many times by the
adversary, he can learn the error-free value of a · k with overwhelming probability (JW
attack) [91]. To defend against the JW active attack, Juels and Weis [91] proposed the HB+
three-pass authentication protocol. HB+ still involves n rounds. One single round of HB+
is outlined in Figure 2.1. Similar to the HB protocol, after n rounds, the authentication
succeeds if no more than nη responses do not match challenges.
Juels and Weis [91] presented an elegant reduction security proof of the HB+ protocol
in a limited active model: detection-based-model, which is primarily addressing active
attacks similar to the JW attack. Originally, the security proof of HB+ in [91] demands
the sequential execution of n rounds three-pass interactions. To overcome this limitation,
Katz and Shin [93] brought an security proof of the HB+ protocol in the case of parallel
and concurrent executions. Moreover, Katz and Smith [94] extended the reduction results
to a larger range of noise levels 1
4
≤ η < 1
2
whereas the Katz-Shin proof [93] holds only
on the condition of η < 1
4
. In spite of those gentle security proofs, Gilbert, Robshaw, and
Sibert [74] discovered a simple, effective man-in-the-middle (MIM) attack (referred to as
the GRS attack), which is outside of the detection-based-model, and fully compromises
the HB+ protocol.
GRS Attack
In the second pass of every round of one HB+ authentication procedure, an MIM adversary
intercepts challenge ai from the reader, and transmits to the tag a modified challenge
ai ⊕α, where α is a constant vector for one authentication procedure. By observing this
manipulated authentication procedure outcome—acceptance or rejection, the adversary
learns the result of α ·ka, that is, one bit information of ka. The adversary simply repeats
m times of manipulating authentication procedures with linearly independent α’s, and
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completely recovers ka. Now the adversary is able to impersonate a valid tag by choosing
0m as the blinding vector; or the adversary can further determine kb by acting as a tag to
interact with a genuine reader, using a constant blinding vector b′ in one authentication
procedure, responding challenge ai with ai⊕ka, and learning the result of b′⊕kb according
to acceptance or rejection. In addition, although the original GRS attack is restricted to
the interference of challenges from the reader to the tag, the same GRS manipulation
strategy can be applied to blinding vectors to recover kb; after that, the adversary can
launch the original JW attack to retrieve ka, totally breaking the protocol.
Even after a series of HB+ enhancement protocols, such as HB++ [35], HB∗ [56], HB-
MP [117], modification of HB++ [126] and HB-MP+ [99] had been proposed, Gilbert,
Robshaw, and Seurin [75] demonstrated that those variants still could be attacked in the
linear time while increasing the computational complexity and/or reducing the practicality.
The PUF-HB protocol [78] and the Trusted-HB protocol [34] make use of a physically
unclonable circuit and a lightweight hash function family respectively, intending to thwart
the GRS attack. However, the introduction of such ingredients into HB+ might not fully
meet the motivation of designing lightweight simple-bit-operation-based authentication
protocols. Moreover, Frumkin and Shamir [67] have broken the security of Trusted-HB in
realistic scenarios.
Random-HB# and HB# Protocols
Gilbert, Robshaw, and Seurin [76] presented these two protocols, which are resistant to
the GRS attack. In contrast to secret vectors in HB+, Random-HB# employs two secret
matrices Ka and Kb. One Random-HB
# authentication consists of a blinding vector b
from the tag, a challenge vector a from the reader, and then the tag’s response vector
y = (a ◦Ka) ⊕ (b ◦Kb) ⊕ v, where v is an n-bit noise vector each bit of which indepen-
dently follows the Bernoulli distribution of parameter η. Similarly, the reader validates the
tag’s authentication iff Hwt((a ◦ Ka) ⊕ (b ◦ Kb) ⊕ y) does not exceed threshold τ . The
binding/challenge vectors rather than matrices in HB+ exceedingly reduces the commu-
nication cost, but the secret matrices in Random-HB# imposes too high storage burden
to be practical in realistic systems. In order to overcome the drawback, they proposed to
replace random matrices with Toeplitz matrices, which becomes the HB# protocol.
Gilbert, Robshaw, and Seurin [76] defined a GRS-MIM-model, in which the MIM ad-
versary is only allowed to manipulate the challenges from the reader to the tag, to prove
that Random-HB# and HB# [76] are resistant to the GRS attack. In addition, Random-
HB# is provably secure in the detection-based-model, while HB# is conjectured to be
secure [76]. The security reductionist proofs in [76] are rather impressive. However, as the
GRS-MIM-model does not simulate a full man-in-the-middle adversary, a general MIM
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attack was discovered soon, breaking down both Random-HB# and HB#, and making the
perspectives of secure LPN-based authentication protocols gloomy.
OOV Attack
At AsiaCrypt 2008, Ouafi, Overbeck, and Vaudenay [119] presented a general man-in-
the-middle attack (referred to as OOV attack) against all current HB-like protocols. The
basic OOV attack against Random-HB#/HB# is conducted as follows. The attacker first
eavesdrops on one successful execution of the protocol, obtaining a triplet (b̂, â, ŷ) satis-
fying ŷ = (â ◦ Ka) ⊕ (b̂ ◦ Kb) ⊕ v̂ and Hwt(v̂) ≤ τ . Then the MIM adversary manip-
ulates many executions of the protocol by XORing interactions (bi,ai,yi) with (b̂, â, ŷ);
thus each authentication result is actually decided by whether Hwt(vi ⊕ v̂) ≤ τ . Based
on the overall success probability, the attacker can calculate the value of Hwt(v̂) with
a high probability. After that, the adversary changes ŷ by one bit to ŷ′, uses (b̂, â, ŷ′)
to interfere with many executions of the protocol, and get the result of Hwt(v̂′) , where
v̂′ = (â ◦Ka)⊕ (b̂ ◦Kb)⊕ ŷ′. By comparing the values of Hwt(v̂) and Hwt(v̂′), one bit in
noise vector v̂ is determined. Repeating this process, the adversary eventually obtains the
noise-free result of (â ◦Ka) ⊕ (b̂ ◦Kb). The adversary collects enough equations that he
can completely recover Ka and Kb, breaking the protocol.
Ouafi, Overbeck, and Vaudenay [119] also examined the lower bounds on the parameter
sets for which the OOV attack is not effective. As concluded in [119], such parameters are
unpractical to use in the low-cost devices. One may argue that since the OOV attack would
cause many rejections, it can be relieved by setting up an upper bound of rejection number
such that an authentication key shall be revoked once the number of failed authentication
using the key exceeds the bound. In fact, this cumbersome approach counts on the outside
mechanism, and is not satisfactory.
Noise Modes and Error Rates
For the HB-like protocols with the Bernoulli noise mode, there exist two types of authenti-
cation errors. A false negative, that is, the authentication of a legitimate tag being rejected,
takes place when the number of incorrect responses exceeds the pass-threshold τ . By con-
trast, a false positive is defined that the number of unmatched responses out of random
bits is less than the pass-threshold τ . In other words, we assume that an illegitimate tag
only responses with random bits. The false negative rate PFN and the false positive rate

















Since the Bernoulli noise mode would cause a certain false negative rate in HB-like
protocols, a natural method to overcome that drawback is to demand the tag to generate
a noise vector vi of bounded Hamming weight, that is Hwt(vi) ≤ τ , as discussed in [93,
76]. We refer to it as the upper-bounded Binomial noise mode. Ouafi, Overbeck, and
Vaudenay [119] demonstrated another simple man-in-the-middle attack (referred to as
OOV2 attack) against HB-like protocols with this noise mode. For one iteration (bi,ai,yi)
of Random-HB# with this noise mode, an OOV2 attacker manipulates the response yi such
that the reader receives yi ⊕ ri rather than yi, where ri is a random vector of Hamming
weight 2. Let wi = Hwt((ai ◦Ka) ⊕ (bi ◦Kb) ⊕ yi) be the Hamming weight of the noise
added by the tag. If and only if w = τ −1 or τ and the attacker flipped two non-erroneous
bits, which come from the only two non-zero elements in ri, in the response, the reader
rejects the authentication. In other words, from one occurrence of rejection, the attackers
learn two bits of Ka/Kb. Subsequently, all bits of secret matrices can be retrieved by
conducting the process many times.
2.2 Linear Independence, Efficient Computation, and
Encryption Scheme on a Special Type of Circu-
lant Matrix
In this section, we state the main technique underlining the proposed protocol: a special
type of circulant matrix named circulant-P2 matrix. First, let us review the circulant
matrix.
Traditionally, a circulant matrix is a square matrix in which each row vector is rotated
one element to the right relative to the preceding row vector. That is, an (m×m) square
circulant matrix with first row vector θ = (θ0, θ1, · · · , θm-1) is
θ0 θ1 · · · θm−1





θ1 θ2 · · · θ0
 .
Let n be an integer in [1,m − 1], we extend a circulant matrix into non-square cases:
defining a landscape circulant matrix as an (n × m) matrix in which each row vector is
a right cyclic shift by one of the row vector above, and a portrait circulant matrix as an
(m × n) matrix in which each column vector is a right cyclic shift by one of the column
vector before it, while referring to the original one as a square circulant matrix.
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Table 2.1: List of P2 numbers below 2048
3, 5, 11, 13, 19, 29, 37, 53, 59, 61, 67, 83, 101, 107, 131, 139, 149, 163, 173, 179, 181,
197, 211, 227, 269, 293, 317, 347, 349, 373, 379, 389, 419, 421, 443, 461, 467, 491,
509, 523, 541, 547, 557, 563, 587, 613, 619, 653, 659, 661, 677, 701, 709, 757, 773,
787, 797, 821, 827, 829, 853, 859, 877, 883, 907, 941, 947, 1019, 1061, 1091, 1109,
1117, 1123, 1171, 1187, 1213, 1229, 1237, 1259, 1277, 1283, 1291, 1301, 1307, 1373,
1381, 1427, 1451, 1453, 1483, 1493, 1499, 1523, 1531, 1549, 1571, 1619, 1621, 1637,
1667, 1669, 1693, 1733, 1741, 1747, 1787, 1861, 1867, 1877, 1901, 1907, 1931, 1949,
1973, 1979, 1987, 1997, 2027, 2029
2.2.1 Definition of Circulant-P2 Matrix
Definition 2.2 (Circulant-P2 matrix and P2 number). A circulant-P2 matrix is an (m×
m) square circulant matrix, or an (n × m) landscape circulant matrix, or an (m × n)
portrait circulant matrix, satisfying the following conditions.
1. It is a binary matrix.
2. m is a prime number satisfying that 2 is a primitive element of finite field GF (m).
In this case, m is defined as a P2 number.
3. Neither 0m nor 1m is a row vector (or a column vector) of a circulant-P2 matrix.
Note that the definition above implies n < m. The second condition is central for
circulant-P2 matrices. If and only if 2i mod m 6= 1, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m− 2, then 2 is a primitive
element of finite field GF (m). We list all P2 numbers less than 2048 in Table 2.1.
Definition of Characteristic Vector
A characteristic vector of a square circulant-P2 matrix is defined as its first row vector.
As for a landscape or portrait circulant-P2 matrix, since it is actually a truncated portion
of a square circulant-P2 matrix, its characteristic vector is defined as the corresponding
square circulant-P2 matrix’s characteristic vector. For a circulant-P2 matrix with m-bit







Linear independence for vectors in a circulant-P2 matrix is the most important property
for our proposed protocol and we discuss it as follows.
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To facilitate discussions, we define an auxiliary term of a circulant-P2 matrix.
Definition 2.3 (Equivalence Class). For two vectors in Sm (recall that Sm is the set of all
m-bit vectors except 0m and 1m), say a and b, if ∃i ∈ {0, · · · ,m−1} such that b = a≫ i,
then we define that a and b are cyclically shift equivalent and they are in an equivalence
class.
An equivalence class can be represented by any one of its members.
Lemma 2.1. If m is a prime number, then there are 2
m−2
m
disjoint equivalence classes in
Sm. Each equivalence class contains m elements.
Proof. An equivalence class in Sm has at most m elements; and any two different equiva-
lence classes are disjoint—they do not share any common elements. Since 0m and 1m are
not elements in Sm, every equivalence class contains at least two elements. Suppose there
is an equivalence class  that has less than m elements. It means that there exists at least
one element θ′ satisfying θ′ ≫ i = θ′ where 1 < i < m (i cannot be 1; otherwise the
equivalence class only has one element). Due to the characteristic of equivalence class, the
relation θ ≫ i = θ holds for every element θ in . Consequently, i should be a factor of
m. However, it contradicts the fact that m is prime, since m only has two factors 1 and




disjoint equivalence classes in Sm.
A proof of Lemma 2.1 also can be found in [77]. For completeness, we present this
proof.
Lemma 2.2. If m is prime and 2 is a primitive element of finite field GF (m), then the
polynomial xm−1 + xm−2 + · · ·+ x+ 1 is irreducible over GF (2).
This lemma is proven in [108].
Lemma 2.3. If m is a P2 number, then any m− 1 elements in every equivalence class of
Sm are linearly independent. In other words, all row vectors in a landscape circulant-P2
matrix (and all column vectors in a portrait circulant-P2 matrix) are linearly independent.
Proof. Let θ = (θ0, θ1, · · · , θm-1) ∈ Sm, we may view the square circulant matrix Cθ
as a linear feedback shift register sequence θ̃ = (θ0, θ1, · · · , θm-1, θ0, θ1, · · · , θm-1, · · · ) of
characteristic polynomial xm + 1 over finite field GF (2), according to [77]. Note that
xm+1 = (x+1)(xm−1+xm−2+· · ·+x+1) over GF (2). Let g(x) = xm−1+xm−2+· · ·+x+1.
Since m is prime, according to Lemma 2.1, sequence θ̃ has period m. Thus, we only need
to consider the following two cases.
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Case 1: θ0 ⊕ θ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ θm−1 = 0
In this case, sequence θ̃ is generated by g(x). Based on Lemma 2.2, g(x) is irreducible
over GF(2) if 2 is a primitive element of finite field GF (m). Since the degree of g(x) is
equal to m− 1, then any m− 1 vectors in Cθ are linearly independent.
Case 2: θ0 ⊕ θ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ θm−1 = 1
In this case, sequence θ̃ is not generated by g(x) but by polynomial xm + 1. Since
xm + 1 has degree m, then all m vectors in Cθ are linearly independent.
In summary, if m is a prime number and 2 is a primitive element of GF (m), then any
m− 1 elements in every equivalence class of Sm are linearly independent.
The above proof explicitly concludes the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4. All m row vectors in a square circulant-P2 matrix Cθ are linearly independent
if and only if the Hamming weight of θ is odd. Consequently, Cθ is invertible if only if the
Hamming weight of θ is odd.
The inverse of a square circulant matrix, if it exists, is still a square circulant matrix.
Lemma 2.5. A landscape circulant-P2 matrix always has a right inverse. That is, for
an (n×m) landscape circulant-P2 matrix C, there exists an (m× n) matrix M such that
C ◦M = In, where In is the (n × n) identity matrix. Likewise, an portrait circulant-P2
matrix always has a left inverse.
Proof. According to Lemma 2.3, any (n×m) landscape circulant-P2 matrix has full rank:
its rank is equal to n. Therefore, it has a right inverse. The argument for left inverse of a
portrait circulant-P2 matrix is same.
2.2.3 Matrix Operations
A better way to analyze operations on circulant-P2 matrices is to convert them to polyno-
mials, as used in [135]. Every vector can be represented in a polynomial form, as described
in the following definition.
Definition 2.4 (Associate Polynomial and Associate Vector). For a vector θ = (θ0, θ1, · · · , θm-1),






Correspondingly, θ is the associate vector of polynomial θ(x).
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Algorithm 2.1 Inverse of circulant-P2 matrix multiplication
Input: m-bit vector k ∈ Sm, m-bit vector z = y ◦C[n×m]k
Output: n-bit vector y
1: calculate k−1(x) by extended Euclidean algorithm
2: t(x)⇐ z(x) ∗ k−1(x) mod fm(x)
3: if Hwt(k) is odd then
4: y ⇐ the leftmost n-bit sub-vector of t
5: else
6: y0 ⇐ t0
7: i⇐ 1
8: while i < n do
9: yi ⇐ yi−1 ⊕ ti
10: i⇐ i+ 1
Henceforth, we will freely use those two forms to represent a vector. If we define a vector
by one form, then we can use the other representation without explicit explanations.
Matrix Operations in Polynomial Forms
We define fm(x) = x
m + 1, a polynomial in GF (2)[x]. Let φ,k, z ∈ Sm. We now work
with polynomials modulo fm(x), so that the cyclic shift can be effected by polynomial
multiplication modulo fm(x). That is, the vector (φ≫ i), or equivalently φ ◦Cei , where
0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1, is associated with the polynomial
φ(x) ∗ xi mod fm(x) ;
reducing modulo fm(x) achieves the effect of the cyclic shift. Computing φ ◦ Ck com-
bines the several cyclic shifts on φ, each of which is decided by a different bit one in k.
Subsequently, the computation of z = φ ◦Ck, or Cz = Cφ ◦Ck, can be performed by
z(x) = φ(x) ∗ k(x) mod fm(x) .
It is clear from the above equation that z = φ ◦Ck = k ◦Cφ.
An efficient method of calculating the right inverse for a landscape circulant-P2 matrix
is described in Algorithm 2.1. Main technique in Algorithm 2.1 is adopted from [135], and
we develop the solution for the case of Hwt(k) being even. This algorithm applies to all
kinds of circulant-P2 matrices’ inverses if they exist.
Correctness Proof of Algorithm 2.1. Let φ = y||0m−n, thus z = φ ◦Ck.
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We can use the extended Euclidean algorithm on input polynomials k(x) and fm(x) to
find polynomials k−1(x)—the general inverse of k(x)— and w(x) such that
k−1(x) ∗ k(x) + w(x) ∗ fm(x) = g(x) ,
where g(x) = gcd(k(x), fm(x)).
If Hwt(k) is odd, then Ck is invertible, according to Lemma 2.4. In other words,
g(x) = 1. Therefore, φ(x) = t(x) = z(x) ∗ k−1(x) mod fm(x).
If Hwt(k) is even, Ck is not invertible, namely g(x) 6= 1. According to Lemma 2.2,
the polynomial xm−1 + xm−2 + · · · + x + 1 is irreducible; thus the factorization of fm(x)
is equal to (x + 1)(xm−1 + xm−2 + · · · + x + 1). Since k is neither 0m nor 1m, k(x) is not
equal to xm−1 + xm−2 + · · · + x + 1. Therefore, g(x) = x + 1. Consequently, polynomial
t(x) = z(x) ∗ s(x) mod fm(x) is associated with vector
t = φ ◦Cg .
Since φ = y||0m−n, then
yi =
{
t0 if i = 0
yi−1 ⊕ ti if 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
. (2.2)
Let t′ be the leftmost n-bit sub-vector of t. For future reference, we denote by y = Tran(t′)
the transformation in Equation (2.2). Correspondingly, t′ = Tran−1(y).
In either case, the algorithm correctly outputs y.
Demonstrated Examples with Small Parameters
Two examples with small parameters are provided to demonstrate using Algorithm 2.1. Let
m = 5, n = 4, y = 1011. Accordingly, we have φ = 10110 and φ(x) = 1 +x2 +x3, fm(x) =
x5 + 1. The following two examples are corresponding to the two cases respectively.
(i) k = 10011, a case that Hwt(k) is odd.
Then k(x) = 1 + x3 + x4; and z(x) = φ(x) ∗ k(x) mod fm(x) = x4 .
Given φ(x) and z(x), determine k−1(x) = x + x3 + x4 by the extended Euclidean
algorithm, and then
φ(x) = t(x) = k−1(x) ∗ z(x) mod fm(x) = 1 + x2 + x3 .
Thus φ = 10110 and y = 1011.
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(ii) k = 10010, a case that Hwt(k) is even.
Then k(x) = 1 + x3, and z(x) = φ(x) ∗ k(x) mod fm(x) = x+ x2 .
Given φ(x) and z(x), determine k−1(x) = 1 + x3, and then
t(x) = k−1(x) ∗ z(x) mod fm(x) = 1 + x+ x2 + x4 .
That is, t = 11101. By Equation (2.2), finally recover y = 1011.
Remark on Algorithm 2.1
Remark 2.1. In Algorithm 2.1, let t′ be the leftmost n-bit sub-vector of t. It is easy to
see that if y in Equation (2.2) is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n, then t′ is uniformly
distributed over {0, 1}n; and vice versa. Moreover, for an n-bit vector γ, if γ ⊕ y is
uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n, then γ ⊕ t′ is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n; and
vice versa.
2.2.4 Other Properties
Fact 2.1. Let m be a prime number satisfying 2 is a primitive element of GF (m). For all
vectors in Sm, with respect to matrix multiplication of corresponding square circulant-P2
matrices (or equivalently, modular polynomial multiplication of their associate polynomi-
als),
1. All vectors in Som constitute an Abelian multiplicative group of size 2m−1 − 1, with
identity element e0;
2. All vectors in Sem constitute an Abelian multiplicative group of size 2m−1 − 1, with
identity element ē0;
3. The complement of a vector in Som is an element in Sem, and vice versa;
4. If vector θ ∈ Som, then θ ◦Cē0 = θ̄; if θ ∈ Sem, then θ ◦Cē0 = θ;
5. For two vectors θ and φ in Sm, θ ◦Cφ ∈ Som if and only if θ,φ ∈ Som.
Proof. Sub-fact 3 is obvious. From the correctness proof of Algorithm 2.1, we can easily
get sub-fact 1. As for sub-fact 4, let θ′ = θ ◦Cē0 , then θ′i is equal to θi⊕ parity of Hwt(θ)
(0 for even, 1 for odd) for i = 0, 1, · · · ,m − 1. Therefore, if θ ∈ Som, θ′ = θ ⊕ 1m = θ̄; if
θ ∈ Sem, θ′ = θ, completes this sub-fact. Sub-facts 2 and 5 can be directly derived from
sub-facts 1, 3, and 4.
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2.2.5 A Secure Encryption Against Ciphertext-Only Attack
A symmetric-key encryption scheme based on circulant-P2 matrix can be constructed by:
z = θ ◦C[(m−1)×m]k , (2.3)
where plaintext θ is an (m − 1)-bit random vector and θ 6= 0m−1, encryption key k is
randomly selected from Sem, and ciphertext z is, subsequently, an element in Sem. Ac-
cordingly, the sizes of plaintext space, key space, and ciphertext space are all the same:
2m−1 − 1. The encryption operation can alternatively represented by z = Enc(θ,k); and
the corresponding decryption, denoted by θ = Dec(z,k) is performed via Algorithm 2.1.
Secure Against Ciphertext-Only Attack
It is easy to see from the properties of circulant-P2 matrix that by choosing a random
vector k′ ∈ Sem, a valid θ′ satisfying z = θ′ ◦ C
[(m−1)×m]
k′ can always be retrieved via
Algorithm 2.1; for any different θ′, a different k′ can be found to map them to any z, and
vice versa. This fact guarantees the scheme’s security against ciphertext-only attack. In
other words, given a ciphertext, an adversary cannot learn any useful information about
the encryption key and the plaintext, because each ciphertext is corresponding to 2m−1−1
distinct combinations of plaintext-key pairs. Thus every plaintext/key is equally possible
for any ciphertext. Hence the encryption is semantically secure against ciphertext-only
attack as long as plaintexts are random.
Discussions
Alternatively, we may use the encryption: z = θ ◦ Ck, where plaintext θ, key k, and
ciphertext z all belong to Som. The arguments above apply to it, and the encryption
scheme with random plaintexts is semantically secure ciphertext-only attack.
In practice, a stand-alone encryption scheme only secure against ciphertext-only attack
is rarely useful. However, coupled with the hardness of the LPN problem, this scheme can
lead to a succinct, highly efficient, and secure entity authentication scheme, which we will
describe in next section.
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Tag (k1,k2) Reader (k1,k2)




v ∈R {{0, 1}n|Pr[vj = 1] = η,
where 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1};
y = (b ◦C[m×n]k1 )⊕ v;
r ∈R {0, 1}m−n−1;
z = (y||r) ◦C[(m-1)×m]k2⊕a b, z−−−−−→
y||r = Dec(z,k2 ⊕ a);
ACCEPT iff Hwt((b ◦C[m×n]k1 )⊕ y) ≤ τ
Figure 2.2: LCMQ one-way authentication protocol, where m is a P2 number, k1
$← Sm
and the parity of Hwt(k1) is public, k2
$← Sem, n is the interaction expansion and n < m,
noise level η ∈ (0, 1
2





The LCMQ protocol with the Bernoulli noise mode is illuminated in Figure 2.2. In this
scheme, two m-bit vectors k1 and k2 are shared by a tag and a reader as a pair of symmetric
authentication keys with one condition that the parities of both keys’ Hamming weights
are known to the public. Because of the inherent requirement of circulant-P2 matrix that
the interaction expansion n should be less than the key length m, and the impact of n on
false rates according to Equation (2.1), n = m− 1 is recommended in most cases. Similar
to conventional identification schemes, one LCMQ authentication procedure consists of two
passes: a challenge a by the reader and a response pair (b, z) by the tag, rendering 3m bits
transmission payload. The computation in the tag’s side mainly involves two vector/matrix
multiplications of roughly m2 XOR operations by a naive implementation, while the reader
additionally, to calculate an inverse of a circulant-P2 matrix, needs to perform the extended
Euclidean algorithm, which is surely a trivial requirement to the supposedly powerful
reader. As we will argue later, m = 163 would suffice to provide 80-bit security, and
the LCMQ protocol achieves extraordinary performance in terms of all metrics: storage
expense, computational payload, communication cost, and implementation expenditure.
Most importantly, we will prove LCMQ secure against general man-in-the-middle attacks.




In order to prevent malicious behaviors, tag should check if a belongs to Sem, and reader
should check if b ∈ Sm and if z ∈ Sem, upon receiving them; if any of those abnormalities
takes place, the participant will terminate this round of authentication. In addition, if
y||r = 0m−1, technically, tag should repeat its procedure of generating a new y||r. Since
the probability of such an event is negligible, equal to 1/(2m−1 − 1), tag need not bother
to take this countermeasure. Note that it is impossible that k2 ⊕ a = 1m since both k2
and a are in Sem. If k2 ⊕ a = 0m, the LCMQ protocol fails, but such a case only takes
place with the negligible probability 1/(2m−1 − 1). Therefore, we can safely presume that
it would never happen and will not consider it in the rest of the chapter for simplicity.
Structure Comparisons
The proposed LCMQ protocol, thought it is still LPN-based, has a different structure
from the HB-like protocols [91, 76]. By the encryption z = Enc(y||r,k2 ⊕ a), protocol
LCMQ conceals the LPN answer y from adversaries such that it can use a smaller key
length, which is a vital factor to determine protocols computation and communication
performance. More importantly, the encryption/decryption operations provide an implicit
integrity mechanism for (a, z). Benefited from linear independence of circulant-P2 matrix
vectors, any alteration on (a, z) will render the authentication to fail with an overwhelming
probability, so does the case of manipulating b. In addition, there is no correlation effect
of simultaneously manipulating a, b, z (The error bits introduced by changing one can be
canceled off, to a notable extent, by the error bits from altering others.), thus the LCMQ
protocol overcomes the flaws in the HB-like protocols [91, 76] that leave them subject to
the OOV attack.
2.3.2 Security Models Definitions
To formally define security models, we denote an LCMQ authentication system by a pair
of probabilistic functions (Tk1,k2,η,n,Rk1,k2,n,τ ), namely a tag function Tk1,k2,η,n and a reader
function Rk1,k2,n,τ .
Definition of Adversary’s Advantage
The fundamental objective of an adversary in the entity authentication protocol is to
impersonate a legitimate tag. By replying a random vector as an authentication response,
the probability that an adversary impersonating the tag will success is the false positive
rate PFP. This is the best soundness error that we can achieve for an authentication
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protocol. Therefore, we define the advantage of an adversary A against LCMQ in a model
as its overall success probability over PFP in impersonating the tag.
DET-model
Definition 2.5 (DET-model). In the DET-model, which is identical to the detection-based-
model used in [91, 93, 94, 76], the DET attack is carried out in two phases:
- Phase 1: Adversary A interacts q times with Tk1,k2,η,n. On the ith invocation, Tk1,k2,η,n
takes a challenge vector ai from A as input, selects a random vector bi ∈ Sm,
generates a noise vector vi according to the Bernoulli noise mode, and calculates
yi = (bi◦C[m×n]k1 )⊕vi. Furthermore, Tk1,k2,η,n internally generates a random (m-n-1)-
bit vector ri, and computes zi = (yi||ri) ◦C[(m-1)×m]k2⊕ai . Then bi and zi are transmitted
to A.
- Phase 2: Adversary A receives a random challenge â from Rk1,k2,n,τ , and then outputs
(b̂, ẑ) corresponding to â, intended to pass the verification of Rk1,k2,n,τ with advantage





〈A,Rk1,k2,n,τ , Tk1,k2,η,n〉 = ACCEPT]− PFP .
MIM-model
Definition 2.6 (MIM-model). In the MIM-model, the MIM attack is conducted in two
phases:
- Phase 1: Adversary A manipulates any communications between Tk1,k2,η,n andRk1,k2,n,τ
for q executions. Figure 2.3 depicts the ith manipulation, which simulates a full
MIM attacker. We define three interference vectors: αi = ai ⊕ a′i,βi = bi ⊕ b′i and
ζi = zi ⊕ z′i.
- Phase 2: Adversary A receives a random challenge â from Rk1,k2,n,τ , and then outputs
(b̂, ẑ) corresponding to â, intended to pass the verification of Rk1,k2,n,τ with advantage




$← Sem,ATk1,k2,η,n,Rk1,k2,n,τ (1m) :
〈A,Rk1,k2,n,τ , Tk1,k2,η,n〉 = ACCEPT]− PFP .
The MIM-model is a very strong security from the adversary’s perspective and it is




ai←−−−− ai ∈R {0, 1}
m
bi ∈R Sm;
vi ∈R {{0, 1}n|Pr[vi,j = 1] = η,
where 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1};
yi = (bi ◦C[m×n]k1 )⊕ vi;
ri ∈R {0, 1}m−n−1;










)⊕ y′i) ≤ τ
Figure 2.3: The ith manipulation to the LCMQ protocol by an adversary in the MIM-model
protocol provably secure in MIM-model will naturally resist all probabilistic polynomial-
time (PPT) attacks. In the following, we first provide a concrete security reductionist
proof from the DET-model to the MIM-model for the LCMQ protocol; then we prove
its security in the DET-model based on the hardness of the LPN problem, with some
reasonable assumptions.
2.3.3 Reduction from DET-model to MIM-model
Theorem 2.1. If there is an adversary A attacking the LCMQ protocol in the MIM-model,
modifying q executions of the protocol between an honest tag and an honest reader, running
in time t, and achieving AdvMIMA (m, η, n, τ) ≥ δ, then there exists an adversary A′ attacking
the LCMQ protocol in the DET-model, interacting at most q oracle queries, running in time
O(t), and achieving AdvDETA′ (m, η, n, τ) ≥ δ − qε(PFP + δ) for some negligible function ε,
under the assumption that PFP and PFN are negligible. Hence, if protocol LCMQ is secure
in the DET-model, then it is provably secure in the MIM-model.
Proof. In Phase 1, A′ can readily simulate the honest tag for A since A′ has access to
Tk1,k2,η,n. Therefore, we only need to simulate Rk1,k2,n,τ for A. Similar to the proof method
for the Random-HB# protocol [76], A′ launches Phase 1 of adversary A, and simulates the
tag and the reader q times as follows:
1. A′ sends a random vector ai as the challenge of the simulated reader, and let A
modify it to a′i; then A′ forwards a′i to Tk1,k2,η,n.
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2. Tk1,k2,η,n faithfully responds with (bi, zi = (((bi ◦ C
[n×m]
k1
) ⊕ vi)||ri) ◦ C[(m-1)×m]k2⊕a′i ) to
A′, which relays (bi, zi) to A. Then A alters them to (b′i, z′i), and uses (b′i, z′i) as the
authentication response to A′.
3. During the interactions, if a′i /∈ Sem or b′i /∈ Sm or z′i /∈ Sem, A′ terminates the iteration
and proceeds with the next, abiding by the protocol specification.
4. If a′i = ai and b
′
i = bi and z
′
i = zi, A′ outputs “ACCEPT” to A as the authentication
result of the simulated reader; if a′i = ai and z
′
i = zi and β = 1m and Hwt(k1) is
odd, A′ outputs “ACCEPT” too; elsewise, it outputs “REJECT”.
After Phase 1, A′ launches Phase 2 of A. Since Phase 2 in the DET-model is identical to
that in the MIM-model, A′ just replicates A’s behavior with the real reader, with the same
objective of passing the authentication. Therefore, if A achieves AdvMIMA (m, η, n, τ) ≥ δ,
then the probability of A′ successfully impersonating a valid tag is equal to the success
probability of A, i.e., PFP + δ, on the condition that the reader is correctly simulated by
A′ in Phase 1.
We denote by Perr the probability of A′ wrongly simulating the reader for A in one
iteration of Phase 1. Executions in Phase 1 can be divided into four different cases:
Case 1 : a′i = ai and z
′
i = zi and b
′
i = bi.
In this case, A′ outputs “ACCEPT”, and fails at simulating the reader with a proba-
bility equal to the false negative rate PFN.
Case 2 : a′i = ai and z
′
i = zi but bi 6= bi.




)⊕ yi = ((b′i ⊕ bi) ◦C
[m×n]
k1




the authentication result in this case is equivalently decided by
Hwt((k1 ◦C[m×n]βi )⊕ vi) ≤ τ .
Let




be the error vector added by A by changing bi.




are linearly independent. Following the same argument in Theorem 2 of [93], d′i is
uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n, as the column vectors of C[m×n]βi are linearly independent.
Thus the resulting error vector d′i ⊕ vi follows the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n since
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A has no extra knowledge about the random noise vector vi. As a result, the probability
of A′ wrongly outputting “REJECT” is exactly the same as the false positive rate PFP.
If βi = 1m and Hwt(k1) is even, then d
′
i = 0n, and the probability of A′ wrongly
outputting “ACCEPT” is exactly PFN. When βi = 1m and Hwt(k1) is odd, then d
′
i = 1n.








η)iηn−i, which is always less than PFN since ηn < τ < n/2.
Overall in this case, Perr ≤ max(PFP, PFN).
Case 3 : b′i = bi and at least one of αi and ζi is not equal to 0m.
The error vector introduced by the adversary through changing zi and/or ai is denoted
by
d′′i = yi ⊕ y′i . (2.5)
Correspondingly, the authentication result is decided by





i ∈ Sem; thus αi 6= 1m and ζi 6= 1m. Let κi = k2⊕ai, κ′i = k2⊕a′i,
si(x) and s
′
i(x) be the general inverses of κi(x) and κ
′
i(x) respectively. In addition, let
λi = si ⊕ s′i. It is clear that λi ∈ Sem if αi ∈ Sem and λi = 0m if αi = 0m. Moreover, A
does not know any additional information about si(x) and s
′
i(x); otherwise, A must have
recovered some of k2.
From equations
si(x)(k2(x) + ai(x)) ≡ 1 + x mod fm(x) ,
(si(x) + λi(x))(k2(x) + ai(x) + αi(x)) ≡ 1 + x mod fm(x) ,
we have λi(x)(k2(x) + ai(x)) + si(x)αi(x) ≡ 0 mod fm(x), and then
λi(x)(1 + x) + s
2
i (x)αi(x) ≡ 0 mod fm(x) . (2.6)
If A knows λi(x), he can recover s2i (x) by the equation above, and then si(x) and k2(x)
are leaked. Therefore, even though A can freely choose αi, if k2 is unknown to him, A
should not have useful information about λi.
Let ti(x) = zi(x) ∗ s′i(x) mod fm(x) and t′i(x) = z′i(x) ∗ si(x) mod fm(x); let γi,γ ′i be
the leftmost n-bit sub-vectors of ti, t
′
i respectively. Then we have
t′i(x) + ti(x) = z
′
i(x) ∗ si(x) + zi(x) ∗ (s′i(x)− si(x) + si(x)) mod fm(x)
= (z′i(x) + zi(x)) ∗ si(x) + zi(x) ∗ (s′i(x) + si(x)) mod fm(x)





i ⊕ γi) = Tran((si ◦C
[m×n]
ζi
)⊕ (zi ◦C[m×n]λi )) . (2.7)
If ζi ∈ Sm, then si ◦ C[m×n]ζi is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}
n; if αi ∈ Sm, which
implies λi ∈ Sm, then zi ◦C[m×n]λi is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}
n. Note that si and λi
(if αi 6= 0m) are unknown to A, and A receives zi only after he has revealed his selection
of αi. Therefore, if only one of αi and ζi is in Sm, then d′′i is uniformly distributed oven
{0, 1}n, by Remark 2.1.
If both αi and ζi are not equal to 0m, since
(t′i(x) + ti(x))(1 + x) ≡ si(x)(ζi(x)(1 + x) + si(x)αi(x)) mod fm(x) ,
and A cannot choose a valid pair of (αi, ζi) satisfying ζi(x)(1 + x) + si(x)αi(x) ≡ 0 or
1 + x+ x2 + . . .+ xm−1 mod fm(x) without knowledge of si(x), then d
′′
i is still uniformly
distributed oven {0, 1}n.
As a result, in this case, A′ erroneously outputs “REJECT” with probability PFP.
Case 4 : bi 6= b′i and at least one of αi and ζi is not equal to 0m.
This case is the combination of Case 2 and Case 3, and the authentication result is
determined by
Hwt(d′i ⊕ d′′i ⊕ vi) ≤ τ ,
where d′i and d
′′
i are defined in (2.4) and (2.5) respectively. Applying the deductions in
the previous two cases, d′i and d
′′
i are uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n. Because k1 used





then d′i⊕d′′i is still uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n. Consequently, the probability of A′
wrongly outputting “REJECT” is PFP.
Summing all cases up, A′ fails at simulating the reader in one execution at most with
probability ε = max(PFN, PFP). Thus the probability of A′ correctly simulating the reader
in Phase 1 is not less than 1− qε, and adversary A′ impersonates a valid tag at least with
probability (PFP + δ)(1− qε). Therefore, A′ can achieve advantage
AdvDETA′ (m, η, n, τ) ≥ (PFP + δ)(1− qε)− PFP = δ − qε(PFP + δ) .
With properly chosen parameters such that PFN and PFP are negligible, if δ is non-
negligible, then AdvDETA′ (m, η, n, τ) is non-negligible. Thus if the LCMQ protocol is secure
in the DET-model, then it is secure in the MIM-model.
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2.3.4 Security in the DET-model
We first prove that the intractability of the LPN problem implies the pseudorandomness
of yi in the LCMQ protocol, and then use it to prove the LCMQ protocol’s security in the
DET-model.
The following probability distributions are used in the deductions.
• Bion,η: the distribution of n-bit vector in which each bit independently follows the
Bernoulli distribution of parameter η.
• Dk,n,η: for k ∈ Sm, the distribution of (m+ n)-bit string:
{b $← Sm,v
$← Bion,η : (b,y ← (C[n×m]b ◦ k
T )T ⊕ v)} .
• Um+n: the distribution of (m+ n)-bit string:
{b $← Sm,y
$← {0, 1}n : (b,y)} .
Lemma 2.6. Assuming the intractability of the LPN problem, Dk,1,η and Um+1 are indis-
tinguishable for all PPT algorithms.
Proof. Lemma 1 in [93] has proven that if b is uniformly chosen from {0, 1}m in Dk,1,η
and Um+1, and there is no restriction on m having to be a prime number satisfying 2 is
a primitive element of GF (m), then Dk,1,η and Um+1 are indistinguishable for all PPT
algorithms, assuming the intractability of the LPN problem. Apparently, the discrepancy
between b
$← Sm and b
$← {0, 1}m is ignorable. As for the requirement of m being
prime, it is trivial according to the prime number theorem, which describes the asymptotic
distribution of the prime numbers. Moreover, even though there is no deterministic number
theory result regarding the distribution of a special class of prime number m satisfying 2
is a primitive element of GF (m), according to Artin conjecture [80], the set of such primes
is infinite and its density inside the set of primes is equal to Artin’s constant, which can








= 0.3739558136 . . .
Therefore, we conclude that Dk,1,η and Um+1 are indistinguishable for all probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms.
Lemma 2.7. If there is no PPT algorithm capable of distinguishing Dk,1,η from Um+1, then
Dk,n,η and Um+n are indistinguishable for all PPT algorithms.
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Proof. For 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n, let Hi,j denote a hybrid probability distribution
{b0, b1, . . . , bm−1, r0, r1, . . . , ri−1, yi, yi+1, . . . , yj−1, rj, rj+1, . . . , rn−1},
where all b∗’s and y∗’s are corresponding to those bits with the same notation in Dk,n,η, all
r∗’s are independent and uniformly selected over {0, 1}, and the convention holds that string
(rj, rj+1, . . . , rn−1) is null if j = n. In addition, we denote by p
i,j the maximal advantage
of any PPT algorithm distinguishing Hi,j from Um+n. It is clear that H0,n = Dk,n,η.
Let δ be the upper bound of any PPT algorithm’s advantage distinguishing Dk,1,η from
Um+1, we prove p0,n ≤ nδ by the following induction.
Basic Case: Since Hi,i+1 is essentially Dk≫i,1,η inserting n− 1 random bits, pi,i+1 ≤ δ.
Inductive Step: Assuming pi,j = (j − i)η. Because yi, yi+1, . . . , yj are linearly indepen-
dent by Lemma 2.3, we have
pi,j+1 ≤ max
i<l<j+1
(pi,l + pl,j+1) = (j + 1− i)δ .
If δ is negligible, then p0,n ≤ nδ is also negligible. In other words, Dk,n,η and Um+n are
indistinguishable for all PPT algorithms if there is no PPT algorithm capable of distin-
guishing Dk,1,η from Um+1.
Theorem 2.2. If Dk,n,η and Um+n are indistinguishable for all PPT algorithms, then all
PPT adversaries are only able to attack the LCMQ protocol in the DET-model with a
negligible advantage. Therefore, if the LPN problem is intractable, the LCMQ protocol is
secure in the DET-model.
Proof. For the LCMQ protocol in Phase 1 of the DET-model, let κi = k2 ⊕ ai, and
θi = yi||ri. In Section 2.2.3, we have demonstrated that if κi is secret, then the encryption
zi = Enc(θi,κi) is secure against ciphertext-only attack as long as ciphertext θi is random.
If Dk,n,η and Um+n are indistinguishable for all PPT algorithms, then θ is random from
the perspective of any PPT adversary in the DET-model. Even though an adversary A
now can freely choose ai in the LCMQ protocol, this encryption is still secure against A.
To see this point, we can think in this way: During ith invocation of Phase 1 in the DET-
model, Tk1,k2,η,n may respond to the adversary’s challenge ai with (bi
$← Sm, zi
$← Sem);
regardless of any value of ai, the decryption result θi = Dec(zi,k ⊕ ai) follows the uniform
distribution over Sem. In this regard, it simulates the action by Tk1,k2,η,n from the point of
view of A. In other words, we here use a random oracle: the real value of yi does not come
from (bi ◦C[m×n]k1 ) ⊕ vi, but is determined by the decryption result θi = Dec(zi,k2 ⊕ ai).
Clearly, those random responses will not leak any useful information to A.
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Now A proceeds with Phase 2, required to output (b̂, ẑ) corresponding to a random
challenge â. The only solid chance that A can pass the authentication is that â appears









Otherwise, if â is different from all ai’s, as we have proven in Cases Three and Four of
Theorem 2.1, A only can pass the authentication with probability PFP.
Therefore, no PPT adversary can achieve non-negligible advantage, and the LCMQ
protocol is secure in the DET-model, assuming the hardness of the LPN problem.
Security in an Adaptive-DET-model
The LCMQ protocol can be proven secure in an enhanced DET-model—adaptive-DET-
model in which Phase 1 is identical to that in the DET-model, but in Phase 2 the adversary
A is equipped with more capacity: after receiving the challenge â and before outputting
the response, A is permitted to query Tk1,k2,η,n q2 times, only with one obvious restriction
that A cannot use â as a challenge. The MIM-model can be extended to an adaptive-MIM-
model in the same way. By similar security proofs , the LCMQ protocol is still secure in
the both adaptive models.
The relation between adaptive-DET-model and DET-model is analogue to that be-
tween adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2) and chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) [26]
for public-key encryption schemes. As CCA2 is generally more preferred than CCA, the
security guarantee of a protocol in the adaptive-DET-model is more desired in realistic
applications. As a matter of fact, those previous HB-like authentication protocols, due to
the fact that all of them are vulnerable to the OOV attack, are not secure in the adaptive-
DET-model, while they are (provably or presumably) secure in the DET-model.
2.4 Protocol Parameters Selections and Discussions
2.4.1 Hardness of LCMQ Instances in the DET-model
According to the LCMQ security proof in the DET-model, m ≥ d + 1 will suffice to
provide d-bit security (Adding one bit in the key length is due to the fact that the parities
of Hwt(k1) and Hwt(k2) are known to the public.) and the precise value of noise level η
seems insignificant as long as there are noises. Of course, this is only because we use LPN
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instances as a random oracle in the proof of Theorem 2.2. Essentially, the fundamental
problem that an adversary confronts in the DET-model is described below.
Definition 2.7 (LCMQ problem). Let m be a P2 number, n < m, η ∈ (0, 1
2
) be a noise
level, k1
$← Sm and the parity of k1’s Hamming weight is public, k2
$← Sem. Given q pairs
〈bi, zi = (((bi ◦ C[m×n]k1 ) ⊕ vi)||ri) ◦ C
[(m-1)×m]
k2
〉, for i = 0, 1, · · · , q − 1, where bi
$← Sm,
vi
$← Bion,η, and ri
$← {0, 1}m−n−1, recover k1 and k2.
If there is no noise in the LCMQ problem and suppose n = m − 1, the instances
degenerate to
〈bi
$← Sm, z′i = bi ◦C
[m×(m-1)]
k1
◦C[(m-1)×m]k2 〉 . (2.8)
Let Cκ = Ck1 ◦Ck2 , k′1 be the reverse vector of k1, k′2 be the vector that is left-rotated








$← Sm, secret k2
$← Sem, and the parity of k1’s Hamming weight is public, the
noise-free LCMQ instances of (2.8) effectively constitute a multivariate quadratic system
in 2(m − 1) variants. We define such an MQ system as an (k1,k2) circulant-P2-matrices
generated MQ system.
Example: For m = 3, an (α,β) circulant-P2-matrices generated MQ system is
bi ◦
α0β0 + α1β2 α0β1 + α1β0 α0β2 + α1β1α2β0 + α0β2 α2β1 + α0β0 α2β2 + α0β1
α1β0 + α2β2 α1β1 + α2β0 α1β2 + α2β1
 = z′i ,
where bi
$← Sm.
Those noise-free LCMQ instances are related to another hard problem—the multivariate
quadratic (MQ) problem [69].
Definition 2.8 (MQ Problem). Given a system of w quadratic equations in s variables
over a finite field, find a valid solutions satisfying all equations.
Generally speaking, the hardness of MQ problem depends on the relative values of w
and s. When w = 1, it is a trivial case and a solution can be readily retrieved. If w is
significantly smaller than s, as an underdefined system, finding a solution is fairly easy [50].
When w is much greater than t, as an overdefined system, the MQ Problem becomes easy
too. Specifically, if there are t(t+1)
2
+ 1 (for GF (2)) or t(t+3)
2
+ 1 (for all other finite fields)
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linearly independent equations available, the MQ problem can be solved by linearization
of running time O(t6) [24]. For general values of w and s, the MQ problem is known to be
NP-hard, even for quadratic equations oven GF (2) [69, 65]. This problem has been used
as the security foundation of cryptographic algorithms, such as the UOV [96] and Sflash [9]
signature schemes, and the QUAD [24] stream cipher.
It is clear that the LCMQ problem is essentially a circulant-P2-matrices generated MQ
system with noise. The name of LCMQ is exactly derived from the combination of LPN,
CM, and MQ. Because of the nice linear independence property of circulant-P2 matrices,
solving this noise-free MQ system generally needs (m− 1)2 equations. On the other hand,
in Section 2.1.1, we have learned that a little noise ingredient turns a simple solving-linear-
equation task into an NP-hard problem, for which only sub-exponential algorithms are
discovered. Since breaking the LCMQ problem requires a chain of solving the LPN and
MQ problems, its computational complexity is equal to the product of the complexity of
those two hard problems. In fact, the LCMQ problem of parameter m, with a same noise
level, should be harder than the LPN problem of parameter (m − 1)2 because noise vi in
the LCMQ problem is encrypted and then is expanded all over zi. Therefore, we are highly
confident that there is no sub-exponential algorithm solving the LCMQ problem, and an
adversary only can rely on exhaustive search (matching in the middle) to recover the two
m-bit keys.
2.4.2 Parameters Recommendation and Comparisons
As we argued above, m = d+1 with small noise level η is sufficient for d-bit security in the
DET-model. On the other hand, the security proof in the MIM-model demands negligible
false rates, ruling out too small choices of m. To be concrete, those false rates should not
exceed 2−d. In practice, the LCMQ protocol may use the upper-bounded Bernoulli noise
mode, which eliminates the false negative. Although the HB-like protocols with this noise
mode are vulnerable to the OOV2 attack (see Section 2.1.2), it can be safely used in the
LCMQ protocol, because we have proven the LCMQ protocol’s security against this kind







, thus n should
always be m − 1 in practice. Based on all those arguments, we recommend the following
protocol parameters for different security levels in Table 2.2.
Using those parameter selections, we compare the LCMQ protocol key size with tradi-
tional cryptographic primitives in Table 2.3. The key sizes of RSA and DSA are quoted
from NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key Management, 2007.
As we we see in Table 2.2, (m = 163, η = 0.08) can provide 80-bit security in the
LCMQ protocol. In contrast, the LF algorithm [100], as the best algorithm to solving
LPN instances by far, renders the HB-like protocols to take m ≥ 512 with noise level
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Table 2.2: Parameters recommendation for the LCMQ protocol with the upper-bounded
Bernoulli noise mode
Security Level 80 112 128
η 0.08 0.09 0.10
m 163 269 317
n 162 268 316
τ 18 34 45
Table 2.3: Comparison of the LCMQ protocol with traditional cryptographic primitives
Security Level 80 112 128
Symmetric Key Encryption Skipjack 3-DES AES-128
Hash Function SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-256
RSA Key Size 1,024 2,048 3,072
DSA Key Size 1,024 2,048 3,072
LCMQ Key Size 326 538 634
η = 0.25. Therefore, the LCMQ protocol outperforms all HB-like protocols in terms of
metrics of storage, tag’s computation, communication, and implementation while provably
preventing all PPT attacks. All of those make it very tempting as a lightweight, reliable,
secure entity authentication for low-cost devices.
2.4.3 Discussions
Two-as-One Variation
If the performance is ridiculously vital for some applications and thus a smaller value of
m is desired while the security level is allowed to slightly sacrifice, a variation of LCMQ
protocol, by combining two paralleled authentications as one, might be of help. In this
variation, the reader sends two vectors (a1,a2) as challenge, and then tag responds with




)⊕y1)+Hwt((b2◦C[m×n]k1 )⊕y2) ≤ τ . A parameter set as low as (m = 83, n = 82, η =
0.08, τ = 19) with the upper-bounded Bernoulli noise mode can be used. This variation
does not affect the security proofs in the DET-model, but the security proof in the MIM-
model encounters issues. Even thought it is true that PFP ≤ 2−80 for that parameter set,
ε in Theorem 2.1 is no longer equal to max(PFN, PFP), but notably bigger than it, as an
adversary may manipulate only one set of (a1, b1, z1) and (a2, b2, z2). Nevertheless, the
variation may be attractive for extremely resource-constrained systems, and we recommend
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(m = 107, n = 106, η = 0.1, τ = 30) for 80-bit security.
Different Lengths of k1 and k2
Technically, the two keys k1 and k2 can have different lengths, say m1 and m2 bits respec-
tively, as long as m1 and m2 are P2 numbers and n < min(m1,m2). However, from the
perspective of implementation, it is more convenient to make them same so that only one
dimensional matrix multiplication is required rather than two.
Embedding ID into Challenge
From the security proofs of the LCMQ protocol, we can see that challenge a does not need
to be random; instead, being unique would suffice for a. Thus a reader can use a nonce
(number used once) as a challenge. In addition, the identity of the tag to be verified can
be implicitly embedded as part of a challenge vector, which is very useful in practice.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented a lightweight, efficient, practical, and secure entity
authentication protocol for RFID systems. Built upon the learning parity with noise prob-
lem, a special type of circulant matrix named circulant-P2 matrix, and the multivariate
quadratic problem, the proposed LCMQ protocol outweighs all HB-like protocols in terms
of the provable security in a general man-in-the-middle model and the tag’s computation,
storage, and communication costs. As a technique core of this proposal, the vector linear in-
dependence, gentle properties, and efficient algorithms on matrix operation of circulant-P2
matrix may also be used to construct other cryptographic primitives and secure protocols.
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Chapter 3
Mutual Authentication in Wireless
Sensor Networks
The previously proposed LCMQ protocol is greatly suitable for low-cost RFID tags and
sensor nodes to authenticate their identities in front of ordinary devices. However, if
tags and nodes need to verify others entity authentication, the requirement of performing
extended Euclidean algorithm, as mild as it is, may not be fulfilled by some extremely
computationally-constrained devices. Generally, this is not an issue for RFID tags, since
they are mainly for one-way authentication. In contrast, mutual authentication is a com-
mon security obligation in wireless sensor networks; thus entity authentication schemes
that merely rest on bit-operations will be of help. This chapter embraces this challenge.
This work is still based on the learning parity with noise problem and circulant-P2 ma-
trices, but adopts the HB-like authentication structure to preserve the bit-operation-only
property with necessary enhancements. In order to gradually and clearly demonstrate
our proposals and for the purpose of fair comparisons, we first in Section 3.1 present
an HB-like protocol named HBC, which employs circulant-P2 matrices in the three-pass
blinding/challenge/response authentication structure to reduce key storage. However, all
HB-like protocols, including HBC, suffer from the OOV attack. In Section 3.2 we provide
two mechanisms to protect the protocols from the attack and also improve protocol perfor-
mance. Applying those techniques to an HB-like one-way protocol results in the enhanced
version of authentication, and the parameters selections are stated and compared among
enhanced HB-like protocols. Afterwards, in Section 3.3, we propose a mutual authentica-
tion framework, which may be instantiated by circulant-P2 matrices as the HBC-M mutual
authentication scheme. Its application scenarios in sensor networks are discussed in Sec-
tion 3.4. Section 3.5 draws a conclusion of this chapter. Partial contents of this work have
been published in [101, 106].
In this chapter, for one-way authentication, we remain to use RFID tag and reader
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Tag (K) Reader (K)
b ∈R {0, 1}mb b−−−−−−−→
a←−−−−−−− a ∈R {0, 1}
ma
v ∈R {{0, 1}n|Pr(v[i] = 1) = η,
where 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1};
y = ((a‖b) ◦K)⊕ v y−−−−−−−→
Accept iff Hwt(((a‖b) ◦K)⊕ y) ≤ τ
Figure 3.1: Revised HB# authentication protocol, where K is an (m× n) Toeplitz matrix,




as the two authentication participants. When we move to mutual authentication, we will
name the two parties as Alice and Bob, because they are essentially equal roles in our
proposed mutual authentication.
3.1 HBC One-Way Authentication Protocol
Among previous HB-like protocols, the HB# Protocol is the most efficient one in terms of
key storage and communication cost. However, there are still some practical and provably
secure concerns about HB#, which motivate us to propose the HBC protocol. First, we
take a brief review on HB#.
3.1.1 Review of HB# Protocol
The authentication key in the HB# protocol [76] consists of two independent Toeplitz
matrices, one (ma × n), the other (mb × n); thus the total memory cost is m + 2n − 2
bits, where m = ma +mb. We notice that it can be improved as the revised HB
# protocol
depicted in Figure 3.1 by changing to one (m × n) Toeplitz matrix. The original HB#
security proof in [76] still holds for the revised HB#. Since it reduces the memory cost to
m + n − 1 bits while maintaining all other performance (and subject to all constraints),
the revised HB# protocol is preferred to the original HB# protocol.
Gilbert, Robshaw, and Seurin [76] introduced a GRS-MIM-model, in which the MIM
adversary is only allowed to manipulate the challenges from the reader to the tag, to prove
that Random-HB# and HB# [76] prevent the GRS attack. Despite the elegant security
reduction proofs in [76], the GRS-MIM-model does not completely simulate the full GRS
attack. It is easy to see that the GRS attack strategy applies to manipulating blinding
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vectors for recovering kb in the HB
+ protocol as well. With kb, an active adversary can
easily retrieve ka by querying a tag with identical challenges. Therefore, in a full GRS
attack model, the adversary should be allowed to manipulate both blinding vectors and
challenge vectors. Unfortunately, the Random-HB# and HB# protocols security proofs
cannot be extended to such a model, because the condition necessary for Theorems 2 and
3 in [76] to hold cannot be satisfied for practical parameters. Even though there is no
realistic ground to doubt whether Random-HB# and HB# are vulnerable to the full GRS
attack, a protocol is still more desirable that can provably resist the full GRS attack. In
addition, there is a practical issue about the HB#’s key storage cost. Even for the revised
HB# protocol, a typical authentication key incorporates above one thousand bits, which is
comparable to asymmetric primitive key size, and may not be suitable for low-cost devices.
Intended to overcome these two deficiencies of HB#, we propose our HB-like approach
by replacing Toeplitz matrix in HB# with circulant-P2 matrix. The resulting HBC pro-
tocol is provably resistant to the full GRS attack except one trivial case, and consumes
roughly half of key storage as the revised HB# protocol, without degrading other protocol
performance.
3.1.2 HBC Protocol Description
The HBC protocol with the Bernoulli noise mode is illustrated in Figure 3.2. In con-
trast to the parallel HB+ protocol employing matrix challenges and vector key and the
HB# protocol requiring vector challenge and Toeplitz matrix key, the HBC protocol makes
use of circulant-P2 matrix challenge and vector key, or equivalently vector challenge and
circulant-P2 matrix key. Benefited from Lemma 2.3, the HBC protocol shows advantages
over the other two in terms of provable security against the full GRS attack and key storage
consumption.
3.1.3 Security Models Definitions
Similarly, for the sake of security formalization, we denote a tag-reader HBC authentication
system by a pair of probabilistic functions (T Ck,η,n,RCk,n,τ ), and two models are defined below.
Definition 3.1 (DET-model). In the DET-model, which is essentially equivalent to the
DET-model in the previous chapter, adversary A attacks the protocol in two phases:
- Phase 1: Adversary A interacts q times with T Ck,η,n. On the ith invocation, T Ck,η,n
internally generates a random blinding vector bi, takes a challenge vector ai from
A as input, and outputs yi = (C[n×m]ai‖bi ◦ k
T )T ⊕ vi to A. This simulates an active
adversary querying the tag.
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Tag (k) Reader (k)
b ∈R {0, 1}mb b−−−−−−−→
a←−−−−−−− a ∈R {0, 1}
ma
v ∈R {{0, 1}n|Pr(v[i] = 1) = η,
where 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1};
y = (C
[n×m]
a‖b ◦ kT )T ⊕ v y−−−−−−−→
Accept iff Hwt((C
[n×m]
a‖b ◦ kT )T ⊕ y) ≤ τ
Figure 3.2: HBC one-way authentication protocol, where k ∈ Sm, m is a P2 number,
ma + mb = m, n is the interaction expansion and n < m, noise level η ∈ (0, 12), integer
pass-threshold τ ∈ (ηn, n
2
)
- Phase 2: Adversary A interacts with RCk,n,τ , intending to impersonate the tag, achiev-
ing advantage





k,η,n(1m) : 〈A,RCk,n,τ 〉 = ACCEPT]− PFP .
Definition 3.2 (GRS-model). In the GRS-model, the GRS attack is carried out in two
phases:
- Phase 1: Adversary A manipulates any blinding vectors from T Ck,η,n to RCk,n,τ and any
challenge vectors from RCk,n,τ to T Ck,η,n for q executions. on the ith invocation, T Ck,η,n
internally generates a random blinding vector bi, and sends it to adversary A. Then
RCk,n,τ receives a modified blinding vector b′i from A, generates a random challenge
vector ai, and gives it to A. T Ck,η,n takes a modified challenge vector a′i from A,
and sends yi = (C
[n×m]
a′i‖bi




kT )T ⊕ yi) ≤ τ . If it holds, RCk,n,τ outputs “ACCEPT” to A; otherwise, it outputs
“REJECT”. This simulates a full GRS attacker. We define interference vector ψi
by (ai ⊕ a′i)‖(bi ⊕ b′i). To simplify the security proof for HBC, we rule out a trivial
case of ψi = 1m.
- Phase 2: Adversary A interacts with RCk,n,τ , intending to impersonate the tag, achiev-
ing advantage







k,n,τ (1m) : 〈A,RCk,n,τ 〉 = ACCEPT]− PFP .
In the GRS-MIM-model defined in [76], the adversary is only permitted to change the
challenges from the reader to the tag; so the GRS-model includes the GRS-MIM-model,
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and actually simulates the full GRS attack except the trivial case ψi = 1m.




◦ kT )T ⊕ y′i = ((C
[n×m]
ai‖b′i
⊕C[n×m]a′i‖bi ) ◦ k
T )T ⊕ vi = (C[n×m]ψi ◦ k
T )T ⊕ vi ,




◦ kT )T ⊕ vi) ≤ τ . (3.1)
Security Intuitions
If a GRS adversary imposes an inference vector ψi ∈ Sm on the HBC protocol without
knowledge of k, the resulting error vector (C
[n×m]
ψi




are linearly independent by Lemma 2.3; thus the manipulated authentication
will fail with an overwhelming probability, revealing no useful information—the protocol
is resistant to the GRS attack. The formal reduction proof is given as follows.
3.1.4 HBC Security in the GRS-model
Theorem 3.1 (HBC Security in the GRS-model). Let A be an adversary attacking the
HBC protocol in the GRS-model, modifying at most q executions of the protocol between an
honest tag and an honest reader, running in time t, and achieving AdvGRSA,C (m, η, n, τ) ≥ δ.
Then there exists an adversary A′ attacking the HBC protocol in the DET-model, interacting
at most q oracle queries, running in time O(t), and achieving AdvDETA′,C(m, η, n, τ) ≥ δ −
qε(PFP + δ) for some negligible function ε. Hence, assuming HB
C is secure in the DET-
model, HBC is provably secure in the GRS-model.
Proof. In Phase 1, A′ can readily simulate thetag to A since A′ has access to T Ck,η,n.
The main challenge lies on how to simulate RCk,n,τ . Similar to the proof method for the
Random-HB# protocol [76], A′ launches Phase 1 of adversary A, and simulates the tag
and the reader for q times as follows:
1. A′ obtains a blinding vector bi from the tag T Ck,η,n, and sends bi as the blinding vector
of the simulated tag; A modifies it into b′i, and sends b′i to the simulated reader.
2. A′ sends a random vector ai as the challenge of the simulated reader. A modifies it
into a′i; A′ forwards a′i to the real tag.
3. The real tag responds with yi = (C
[n×m]
a′i‖bi
◦kT )T ⊕vi to A′, which uses it as the answer
of the simulated tag to the simulated reader.
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4. Recall ψi = (ai ⊕ a′i)‖(bi ⊕ b′i). If ψi = 0m, A′ outputs “ACCEPT” to A as the
authentication result of the simulated reader; otherwise, it outputs “REJECT”.
After Phase 1, A′ launches Phase 2 of A. Since Phase 2 in the DET-model is identical
to that in the GRS-model, A′ just replicates A’s behavior with the real reader, perfectly
simulating the tag T Ck,η,n. Therefore, if A achieves Adv
GRS
A,C (m,n, η, u) ≥ δ, then the proba-
bility of A′ successfully impersonating a valid tag is the same as the success probability of
A, i.e., PFP + δ, on the condition that the reader is correctly simulated by A′ in Phase 1.
Now we need to calculate the probability of A′ successfully simulating the reader for A
in Phase 1. Consider one execution of the protocol in Phase 1, based on Equation (3.1).
• When ψi = 0m, A′ fails at simulating the reader with a probability equal to the false
negative rate PFN.




are linearly independent. Let γi = C
[n×m]
ψi
◦ k denote the error vector
added by A. Following the same argument in Theorem 2 of [93], γi is uniformly
distributed over {0, 1}n, as the row vectors of C[n×m]ψi are linearly independent. Since
the adversary does not extra knowledge about the Bernoulli noises introduced by
the tag, vi is independent of γi. Thus the resulting error vector γi ⊕ vi follows
the uniform distribution over {0, 1}n. As a result, the probability of A′ wrongly
outputting “REJECT” is exactly the same as the false positive rate PFP.
Overall, A′ fails at simulating the reader in one execution at most with probability ε =
max(PFN, PFP). The probability of A′ correctly simulating the reader in Phase 1 would be
not less than 1− qε, and adversary A′ can impersonate a valid tag with success probability
not less than (PFP + δ)(1− qε).
Therefore, A′ can achieve advantage
AdvDETA′,C(m, η, n, τ) ≥ (PFP + δ)(1− qε)− PFP = δ − qε(PFP + δ) .
If δ is non-negligible, then qε(PFP + δ) ≤ δ2 for m big enough, and Adv
DET
A′,C(m, η, n, τ) ≥ δ2
is non-negligible. Thus if HBC is secure in the DET-model, HBC is secure in the GRS-
model.
3.1.5 HBC Security in the DET-model
Similar to HB#, we cannot present a strict reduction from the LPN problem to HBC security
in the DET-model currently. Instead, we conjecture that the HBC protocol is secure in the
DET-model.
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Claim 3.1. In the DET-model, the HBC protocol is as secure as the parallel HB+ protocol.
Justification. Let’s recall the parallel HB+ protocol, which is provably secure in the DET-
model [91, 93]. The tag first generates a random (n ×mb) blinding matrix B and sends
it to the reader; then the reader selects an (n × ma) challenge matrix A at random.
Let A‖B stand for concatenation of matrices A and B (with the same number of rows),
that is, each row in the resulting matrix is the concatenation of two corresponding rows
in A and B. After receiving A, the tag computes and sends the n-bit response vector
y = ((A‖B) ◦ kT )T ⊕ v. Let ka‖kb = k, where vector ka is of ma bits and vector kb is of
mb bits. Then the response vector is equivalently computed by
y = (A ◦ kTa )T ⊕ (B ◦ kTb )T ⊕ v . (3.2)
For the HBC protocol, we define ā = a‖0mb , and b̄ = 0ma‖b. Then the response vector
is equivalently computed by
y = (C
[n×m]
ā ◦ kT )T ⊕ (C
[n×m]
b̄
◦ kT )T ⊕ v . (3.3)
In Theorem 2 of [93], to prove the parallel HB+ protocol’s security in the DET-model,
it requires 2n−ma to be negligible such that the row vectors in the random challenge matrix
A are linearly independent. Interestingly, the security proof of Random-HB# in the GRS-
MIM-model (Theorem 2 of [76]) demands 2ma−n to be negligible. In contrast, the HBC
protocol does not impose such limitations. The row vectors in circulant-P2 matrix C
[n×m]
ā
are linearly independent with the overwhelming probability of 1− (1
2
)ma , because ā ∈ Sm if




with probability 1− (1
2
)mb .
The HBC and parallel HB+ protocols are resembling except that matrix (A‖B) in
parallel HB+ is random and C
[n×m]
a‖b in HB
C is a circulant-P2 matrix. Since the major
operation in the authentication is inner product, the linear independence of the row vectors
in C
[n×m]
a‖b actually enhances the protocol’s security.
Therefore, we claim that HBC is as secure as the parallel HB+ protocol in the DET-
model.
Storage Benefit
Since HB# employs Toeplitz matrix, compared to m-bit key in HBC protocol, the keys in
HB# and revised HB# consume m + 2n − 2 bits and m + n − 1 bits respectively. As we
derive later, to achieve negligible false rate, n is usually several hundred and is at the same
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order of m, thus the HBC protocol significantly reduces the storage requirement roughly
by half.
3.2 Techniques to Enhance HB-like Protocols
Now we have three HB-like protocols that resist the GRS attack: Random-HB#, HB#, and
HBC which employ random, Toeplitz, and circulant-P2 key matrices respectively. Unfortu-
nately, those protocols are still subject to the OOV attack. We here provide two techniques
to protect HB-like protocols against the attack, and also improve protocol performance in
terms of false rates and key length. These techniques are demonstrated through the HBC
protocol later, but we stress that they can apply to any HB-like protocol.
3.2.1 New Noise Mode to Prevent OOV Attack
We propose a new noise mode for all HB-like protocols to thwart the OOV attack. A
protocol with this noise mode will naturally be false-negative-free, while robust to the
OOV2 attack. Let t = bηnc, for this noise mode, the tag generates a noise v such
that Hwt(v) is equal to t or t + 1; the reader accepts the tag’s response y if and only
if Hwt((C
[n×m]
a‖b ◦ kT )T ⊕ y) = t or t+ 1.
Let’s review the OOV attack strategy in the context of the proposed noise mode.
Algorithm 3 of [119], an important optimization for the OOV basic attack, no longer takes
effect. Thus the attacker only can launch the basic attack. If an OOV attacker uses
(b′,a′,y′) satisfying Hwt((C
[n×m]
a′‖b′ ◦ kT )T ⊕ y′) = w to interfere with the authentication of

















































Through an observation of one iteration of the protocol, the attacker obtains a tuple
(b̂, â, ŷ) such that Hwt((C
[n×m]
â‖b̂
◦ kT )T ⊕ ŷ) = w, where w = t or t + 1. As a result, for






























For specific protocols, we can carefully choose practical parameters (n, t) such that POOV
is negligible. Therefore, the OOV attack cannot succeed under polynomial bounds. As for
the OOV2 attack, in which the attacks flips k bits of y for one iteration of protocol, the




1 or 0 from the authentication result. Thus the OOV2 attack does not work either.
Technically, our proposed new noise mode is a special case of a noise mode implicitly
mentioned in [93], which we name the upper and lower bounded Binomial noise mode. In
this noise mode, there are two distinct integer thresholds µ and τ satisfying that µ ≤ ηn ≤ τ
and additionally we specify an important condition of Pr[Hwt(v) = µ] ≈ Pr[Hwt(v) = τ ]
to prevent the OOV2 attack; the tag always selects a random noise vector v with upper
and lower bounded Hamming weight, namely, µ ≤ Hwt(v) ≤ τ ; and the reader accepts
the tag’s authentication if and only if µ ≤ Hwt((C[n×m]a‖b ◦ kT )T ⊕ y) ≤ τ . It is clear that
setting µ = t and τ = t+ 1 renders minimal POOV, thus we choose this special case as our
proposed new noise mode. Even though it is not provably affirmative about the hardness
of the LPN variant with the upper and lower bounded Binomial noise mode noise model
as well as our proposed new noise mode, we believe that it is asymptotically as hard as the
original LPN problem.
After changing the Bernoulli noise mode to the new noise mode, the reduction proce-
dures for all HB-like protocols, including Theorem 3.1 for HBC, still hold. Even better,
the inherent zero false negative bridge a security proof gap in many reduction proofs, e.g.,
Theorem 2 of [76], which requires the false negative rate PFN to be negligible, while a
non-negligible PFN = 2
−40 is recommended for practical concerns in [76]. The false positive




























Insecurity of Another Node
Some may suggest a noise mode in which the Hamming weights of noise vectors are a
constant integer t. However, the LPN variant problem on this noise mode is not hard at
all. From each instance (Ai,yi = (Ai ◦k)⊕vi) where Hwt(vi) = t, an attacker, as pointed
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out in [119], can learn
n−1⊕
j=0





1 if t is odd
0 if t is even
.
After gathering enough instances, the attacker can completely recover k.
3.2.2 Masking for Increasing Noise Level
It is easy to see that the key length in LPN-based protocols is the most important parameter
because it directly affects or even determines protocols computation, communication and
storage costs. Since the key length and the noise level together dominate the security level,
the noise level is as important as the key length. Intuitively, the lower η is, the easier an
adversary can overcome noise; subsequently larger key length is required. Since smaller
key length is preferred all the time, higher noise level is desired in practice. Unfortunately,
larger η may result in unacceptable false rates. To improve protocol’s performance, we
introduce a simple but effective mechanism to substantially increase noise level from the
adversary’s perspective (and subsequently reduce key length) without undermining false
rates.
Masking
Note that in the three HB-like protocols, the bit-length of response vector y is always less
than the key size. Let kn be a vector consisting of the leftmost n bits in the secret key. The
tag uses kn to mask LPN response y in the HB
C protocol, that is, calculates z = y⊕kn =
(C
[n×m]
a‖b ◦kT )T⊕v⊕kn, and accordingly the reader checks if Hwt((C
[n×m]
a‖b ◦kT )T⊕z⊕kn) ≤ τ .
The masking mechanism does not affect the security proofs of HBC in the GRS-model and
Random-HB#/HB# in the GRS-MIM-model.
Impact in the DET-model
By masking, a DET attacker cannot directly get a valid LPN instance from one authenti-
cation. Instead, to get rid of the masking effect of kn, the adversary has to combine two
authentication interactions, say (b1,a1, z1 = (C
[n×m]
a1‖b1 ◦ k








T )T ⊕v1⊕v2), which effectively exposes noise level 32η to the adversary.
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Tag (k) Reader (k)
b ∈R {0, 1}mb b−−−−−−−→
a←−−−−−−− a ∈R {0, 1}
ma
v ∈R {{0, 1}n|Hwt(v) ∈ [t, t+ 1]};
z = (C
[n×m]
a‖b ◦ kT )T ⊕ v ⊕ kn y−−−−−−−→
? Hwt((C
[n×m]
a‖b ◦ kT )T ⊕ z ⊕ kn) ∈ [t, t+ 1]
Figure 3.3: Enhanced HBC one-way authentication protocol, where k ∈ Sm, m is a P2
number, ma + mb = m, n is the interaction expansion and n < m, noise level η ∈ (0, 12),
t = bηnc
Impact on the OOV Attack
We still need the new noise mode to thwart the OOV attack, but the marking mecha-
nism does impair the advantage of the OOV attacker, since now he prefers to combine
two interactions into one interference as well. Otherwise, if the adversary only uses one
interaction to launch the OOV manipulation, then the Hamming weight of resulting error
vector affected by kn will be greater than that in the case of two-instance combination.




◦ kT )T ⊕ ŷ) = w, where the expected value of w is roughly b3t/2c. Let
t′ = b3t/2c. Therefore, when combining masking and the new noise mode, the success
probability of an OOV manipulation authentication is bounded as























Enhanced HBC One-Way Authentication Protocol
We refer to the resulting edition of applying those two mechanisms to an HB-like protocol as
its enhanced version. The enhanced HBC one-way authentication is depicted in Figure 3.3.
3.2.3 Parameters Selections
For enhanced HB-like protocols, to provide d-bit security, the parameters should satisfying
the following conditions:
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1. ma ≥ d. As pointed out in [100], the hardness of HB-like protocols against a DET
adversary only relies on the mb-bit LPN instances, because an active adversary always
can set ai = 0ma , while ma ≥ d suffices for d-bit security.
2. The selections of η and mb jointly ensure that the best known algorithm (At present,
it is LF algorithm [100].) cannot solve mb-bit LPN instances of noise level η in less
than 2d steps.
3. Under a specified η, the selection of n guarantees that
(a) P ′FP ≤ 2−d, by Equation (3.6). This is due to the security proofs requirements
and from practical concerns.
(b) ρ ≥ 2d, by Equation (3.7). In other words, there should be more than 2d noise
instances.
(c) P ′OOV ≤ 2−d, by Equation (3.8). This is to prevent the OOV attack.
For the HBC protocol, there are two additional requirements for parameters. First,
since we exclude the case of ψi = 1m in the GRS-model, and the interference vector 1
m in
the GRS attack does reveal the parity of k, key length m in the HB-CM protocol should
be increased by 1. Second, m should be a P2 number, which we can look up in Table 2.1.
Table 3.1: Enhanced HB-like protocols parameters selections, key storage consumption,
and communication cost
Security Level d 80 112 128
Noise Level η 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667
Minimal mb 512 680 768
Minimal ma 80 112 128
Minimal n 467 656 751
Minimal ma +mb 592 792 896
Key Size
HB# 1524 2102 2396
Revised HB# 1058 1447 1646
HBC 613 797 907
Transmitted Bits
HB# 1059 1448 1647
Revised HB# 1059 1448 1647
HBC 1080 1453 1658
According to the LF algorithm [100], for noise level 0.25, mb = 512, 680, and 768
provide 80, 112, and 128 security levels respectively. Due to the effect of masking, the
actual noise level used in an enhance HB-like protocol can be η = 2 ∗ 0.25/3 = 0.1667
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Alice (K) Bob (K)
r1 ∈R {0, 1}mb r1−−−−→
r2←−−−− r2 ∈R {0, 1}
ma
v1 ∈R {{0, 1}n|Hwt(v1) ∈ [t, t+ 1]};
z1 = ((r1‖r2‖ida) ◦K)⊕ v1 ⊕ kn;
r′3 ∈R {0, 1}mb−n z1, r′3−−−−→
? Hwt((r1‖r2‖ida) ◦K)⊕ z1 ⊕ kn)
= t or t+ 1;
v2 ∈R {{0, 1}n|Hwt(v2) ∈ [t, t+ 1]};
r3 = z1‖r′3
z2←−−−− z2 = ((r2‖r3‖idb) ◦K)⊕ v2 ⊕ kn
r3 = z1‖r′3
? Hwt((r2‖r3‖idb) ◦K)⊕ z2 ⊕ kn)
= t or t+ 1
Figure 3.4: HB-M mutual authentication framework, where K is a secret (n ×m)-binary
matrix, m = ma+mb+mc, ida and idb are themc-bit identities of Alice and Bob respectively;
noise level η ∈ (0, 1
2
), and noise degree t = bηnc.
for those mb’s and security levels. We then calculate the minimal values of n that ensure
P ′FP ≤ 2−d, ρ ≥ 2d, and P ′OOV ≤ 2−d. The results of parameters and protocols performance
in terms of key storage and communication cost for different security level are showed in
Table 3.1. From this table, we can see that compared to HB#, the HBC protocol reduces
the key storage consumption almost by half, while the communication cost is only slightly
increased, due to the extra requirement of m being a P2 number.
3.3 Mutual Authentication Framework
3.3.1 Framework Description
Now we extend enhanced HB-like one-way authentication protocols to mutual authentica-
tion. Those protocols can be unified under one HB-M authentication framework, which is
illuminated in Figure 3.4. According to the different type of key matrix K, this mutual
authentication framework can be instantiated as:
1. Random-HB#-M mutual authentication protocol, if K is a random matrix.
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2. HB#-M mutual authentication protocol, if K is a Toeplitz matrix.
3. HBC-M mutual authentication protocol, if K is a circulant-P2 matrix. In this case,
n < m.
3.3.2 Analysis and Discussions
Roles of z1 and Construction of r3
In the HB-M mutual authentication framework, n-bit z1 has two roles. First, it serves as
the authentication response of Alice to Bob. Second, it is used to construct the mb-bit
challenge vector r3 from Alice. Of course, it is rare that n = mb. When mb < n, z1 should
be truncated to serve as r3. If mb > n, Alice needs to provide an (mb − n)-bit vector that
is concatenated with z1 to output r3, which is the case adopted in Figure 3.4.
According to Lemma 1 in [93], the hardness of the LPN problem implies the pseudo-
randomness of LPN instances. Therefore, if the underling HB-like protocol is secure in
the DET-model, then an adversary impersonating Bob cannot distinguish z1 with a true
random vector; thus z1 can be used to construct the challenge r3 from Alice.
As for a man-in-the-middle adversary, which inherently has the ability to change r3,
the approach of replacing r3 by z1 does show a certain advantage, since Bob will use it
only if the interactions (r1, r2, z1) pass his verification; thus the adversary cannot change
z1 as freely as manipulate r3. In this regard, z1 is like a certificated random sequence.
For an adversary that impersonates Alice, similarly, he cannot select the value of v3
freely because v3 is constructed by the certified z1. Therefore, in the second half authen-
tication of Alice verifying Bob’s response, the blinding vector can just be ma bits, rather
than mb bits.
Parameter Selections
Compared to one-way authentication, the communication cost of the mutual authentication
only increases roughly by n bits, since n ≈ mb according to Table 3.1. The parameters
determination guidelines and recommendations for η,ma,mb, n in Section 3.2.3 still hold
in the HB-M mutual authentication.
Reflection Attack
A basic requirement for mutual authentication is to prevent the reflection attack, in which
an adversary conducts two authentication procedures with one legitimate participant in
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both directions simultaneously, of which one is the adversary as Alice and the participant
as Bob, and the other is the adversary as bob and the participant as Alice, trying to
successfully complete one of the authentications. As a common approach to thwart this
attack, the participants identities are included in the HB-M mutual authentication. The
formal analysis on the HB-M authentication preventing the reflection attack is given below.
Claim 3.2. An HB-M mutual authentication protocol is secure against the reflection attack
if its one-way authentication version can prevent the GRS attack.
Justification. Suppose there is a legitimate user with identity idα and an adversary wants
to impersonate a user with identity idβ with user idα by launching a reflection attack.
During the interactions, the adversary merely forwards all the responses of user idα in one
procedure back to user idα in the other and tries to pass the verification of user idα in the
second authentication procedure with a non-negligible probability.
Suppose the first three interactions in the both procedures are (r1, r2, z1), then the
following equation holds
z1 = ((r1||r2||idα) ◦K)⊕ v1 ⊕ kn ,
where Hwt(v) = t or t+ 1; and then in the second authentication procedure the adversary
successfully impersonates user idβ if and only if
((r1||r2||idβ) ◦K)⊕ z1 ⊕ kn = t or t+ 1 .
The equation above is equivalent to
(((0ma+mb||(idα ⊕ idβ))) ◦K)⊕ v1 = t or t+ 1 .
Now it is clear that the reflection attack is, in fact, a variant of the GRS attack in the
proposed mutual authentication framework. If an enhanced HB-like protocol can prevent
the GRS attack, then the probability of that equation holding is negligible, and sub-
sequently the corresponding HB-M mutual authentication protocol is secure against the
reflection attack.
Participants Identities
In the HB-M authentication framework, the identities of Alice and Bob do not explicitly
appear in the interactions. This arrangement is due to two considerations.
• Alice and Bob may have known the identities of each other prior to authentication;
then they launch the authentication procedure to assure that the other party is really
whom she/he claims to be.
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• It is required for the privacy-preservation scenario, where one or both of the partici-
pants do not want to leak real identities to a passive eavesdropper. In this occasion,
a central server takes the role of Bob, and there are many sensor nodes that share
different pairwise keys with the server and act as Alice. Sensor nodes are aware of
the identity of the server and perform the authentication accordingly; in contrast, the
server only knows that the other party is one of sensor nodes, and then during the
verification phase of Bob, the server enumerates all possible keys of sensor nodes, and
tries the verification with each one of the keys until finding a pass. In this way, the
server can successfully locate the real identity of “Bob” and then continue the proce-
dure. Since the computation in the HB-M framework is lightweight, many rounds of
verification computation would not incur formidable burdens on a powerful server,
and thus our proposed HB-M framework provides a practical privacy-preservation
approach.
3.4 Application Scenarios in Sensor Networks
To effectively use the mutual authentication in wireless sensor networks, nodes should have
mechanisms to share authentication keys. According to different applications, there are
four scenarios for authentication key establishment.
Scenario 1: Single global key shared by all nodes
This is the simplest but very useful scenario for sensor networks due to its low memory
cost for sensor nodes. An invalid node, through receiving-forwarding transfer in two au-
thentication procedures with two legitimate nodes idα and idβ, still cannot impersonate
any other legitimate node. The main disadvantage of this case is that an adversary who
captures any node and extracts the global authentication key will compromise the security
of all other nodes. Tamper-proof memory for the global key is a solution to the physical
attack.
Scenario 2: Distinct key that each node shares with base station
This scenario is useful for authentication of users who want to query individual sensor’s
data. As a matter of fact, many proposed entity authentication schemes in wireless sensor
networks mainly consider this scenario. As a typical example of this scenario, a nurse
tries to query patients’ physical information from body sensor networks using handset
devices, which are defined as users of the sensor networks. The users, usually being high-
capability devices with enough memory to hold all keys with nodes, move around to issue
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task commands to the sensor networks and collect information. The authentication of
users guarantees the patients’ privacy, and the authentication of sensor nodes makes sure
that users retrieve data from legitimate nodes. This scenario can be combined with the
previous one to provide overall authentication for the whole sensor network.
Scenario 3: Pairwise key in every two nodes
If sensor nodes are subject to physical compromise in some application, then every two
neighbor nodes should share different pairwise keys. If the network topology can be de-
termined during the key pre-distribution stage, any two neighbor nodes can be preloaded
with a pairwise key and this is a practical approach. However, sensor nodes are randomly
deployed at most cases, then we have to ask every two nodes to be preloaded with a dis-
tinct pairwise key. Then the storage requirement in a single node is proportional to the
number of all nodes in a network. Consequently, this approach is only suitable for small
scale sensor networks.
Alternatively, we may use an initial-trust model that has been advocated in several
WSN security proposals, such as initial-trust in [159] and smart trust in [12]. Upon de-
ployment, every node explores its adjacent nodes, trusts all neighbors which are discovered,
and creates pairwise keys between neighbors by negotiating them in plaintext within a short
time slot Tmin, because it is assumed that adversaries cannot launch any attack during the
time slot Tmin. After time Tmin, any node, before any operations that would affect oth-
ers, shall launch one HB-hybrid protocol by those pairwise keys with its neighbors. As
argued in [12], due to the random employment characteristic of wireless sensor networks,
this initial-trust model is relatively practical in some applications.
Scenario 4: Random predistributed keys in nodes
Random key predistribution approaches [59, 41, 111, 54] are one of the most prevalent tech-
niques for key establishment in sensor networks. This technique can be directly applied
to authentication key distribution between nodes, in order to increase resilience against
physically compromising sensor nodes. Interestingly, we can only count on the basic
Eschenauer-Gligor scheme [59] or its q-composite mode [41] since the motivation of our
proposal is to design bit-operation-based-only approaches while other schemes [111, 54]
require more complex calculations. In this application scenario, an offline server first gen-
erates a key pool of a large number of keys. Then every node is randomly preloaded with
some keys out of the key pool before deployment. If two adjacent nodes happen to share
at least one common key (or q common keys for the q-composite mode), they can directly
verify the authenticity of the XORing result of all common keys by the proposed mutual
authentication protocol. If they do not, they can rely on other nodes to facilitate their
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authentication in a multi-hop manner. According to random graph theory [59], two nodes
will almost be able to find an authentication path through multi-hop links if any two nodes
share at least one common key with certain probability. Then these two nodes, finding
this authentication path with overwhelming probability, verify each other via one-by-one
verification relay in the path. Technically, our proposed protocol in this scenario is used
to verify the authenticity of keys, rather than to authenticate node identities. Since nodes
might be compromised and then their keys are leaked to the adversary, the success of
verification only implies that participating nodes hold claimed keys.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have proposed a concrete construction of HB-like protocol using circulant-
P2 matrices, which overcome two inefficiencies in the HB# protocol. In addition, we have
introduced two enhancement techniques to prevent the OOV attack and improve protocol
performance for HB-like protocols. Moreover, we have presented a mutual authentication
framework for low-cost devices and its application scenarios in wireless sensor networks
have been discussed at length.
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Chapter 4
On the Distributed Detection of
Node Clone
In this chapter, we present two innovative, practical node clone detection protocols with
difference tradeoffs on network conditions and performance. The first protocol is based on
the distributed hash table (DHT) [17], by which a fully decentralized, key-based caching
and checking system is constructed to effectively catch cloned nodes. The protocol perfor-
mance on security level as well as memory consumption is theoretically deducted through a
probability model, and the resulting equations, with necessary adjustment for real applica-
tion, are supported by the simulations. In accordance with our analysis, the comprehensive
experimental results show that the DHT-based protocol can detect node clone with high
security level and holds strong resistance against adversary’s attacks.
Our second protocol, named randomly directed exploration, is intended to provide highly
efficient communication performance with adequate detection probability for dense sensor
networks. In this protocol, initially nodes send claiming messages containing neighbor-list
with a maximum hop limit to randomly selected neighbors; then the subsequent message
transmission is guided by a probabilistic directed technique to both roughly maintain a line
property through the network and provide sufficient randomness for better performance
on communication and resilience against the adversary. In addition, a border determina-
tion mechanism is proposed to further reduce communication payload. During forwarding
messages, intermediate nodes explore claiming messages for node clone detection. By de-
sign, this protocol consumes almost minimal memory, and the simulations demonstrate
that it outperforms all other detection protocols in terms of communication cost, while the
detection probability is competitive.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First we discuss preliminaries on network
model, detection guidelines, performance metrics, and adversary model in Section 4.1.
Afterwards, we present the DHT-based detection protocol and analyze its performance in
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Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 respectively. Its simulation results are provided in Section
4.4. Then the randomly directed exploration protocol is detailed in Section 4.5, and its
supportive experimental results are illustrated in Section 4.6. The conclusions are given in
Section 4.7. Earlier versions of those two detection protocols can be found in [102, 103].
4.1 Preliminaries
As preliminaries of our proposals, we set up an appropriate network model, present general
detection guidelines, define critical metrics to evaluate protocol performance, and discuss
the adversary model.
4.1.1 Network Model
We consider a homogeneous sensor network consisting of n resource-constrained sensor
nodes. The number of nodes n can be the order of hundreds and thousands. Consequently,
the proposed sensor network protocols should scale to network size. In most of time,
sensor nodes operate without any supervision, and they can function correctly in a dynamic
network, where new nodes are added, or old nodes disappear. In addition to neighbor nodes,
sensor nodes may be aware of some other distant nodes. However, it is not demanded for
sensor nodes to realize the network geographic outline. The average node degree d varies
with networks.
Analogous to the previous distributed detection approaches, we assume that an identity-
based public-key cryptography facility [137] is available in the sensor network. Prior to
deployment, each legitimate node is allocated a unique ID and a corresponding private
key by a trusted third party. The public key of a node is its ID, which is the essence of
identity-base cryptosystem. Consequently, no node can lie to others about its identity.
Moreover, anyone is able to verify messages signed by a node using the identity-based key.
Let Kα and K
−1
α denote the public and private keys of node α respectively, and {M}K−1α
represent the signature of M signed by node α.
It is true that conventional public key cryptosystems can satisfy the requirements of
our protocols as well. However, the identity-based systems alleviate the heavy burden of
public key certificates. In addition, our protocols, which will be detailed later, only use
this cryptographic primitive for authentication rather than for encryption. Subsequently,
it is not necessary for the identity-based cryptosystem here to be computationally-intense
pairing-based schemes. Even though the usage of asymmetric primitives in sensor networks
might be doubted several years ago, there are more and more WSNs security protocols rely-
ing on public key systems. In fact, some applicable implementation of such cryptosystems
in typical sensor nodes platforms have been addressed in [109, 141, 118].
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We also assume that every sensor node can determine its geographic location L via a
secure localization mechanism. A number of those mechanisms have been proposed, which
can be referred to in [127]. We do not specify the particular selection of secure localization
protocols for our protocols, since it is comparatively irrelevant to our proposals. During the
node clone detection protocol procedure, we suppose the sensor network to be stationary,
where nodes locations remain unchanged.
There might be or not be a powerful base station in our modeled network, but there
should exist a trusted role named initiator that is responsible for initiating a distributed
detection procedure. Otherwise, an adversary can readily launch a denial-of-service (DoS)
attack to the system by repeatedly mobilizing the sensor network to conduct the clone
detection protocol and exhausting nodes energy. The requirement is easily satisfied in
practice as the initiator can be the base station if one exists, or can be selected among all
nodes via a distributed leader election, such as one in [45].
4.1.2 General Detection Guidelines
Relying on the identity-based cryptography and secure localization used in our network
model, node clone in the stationary sensor network can be determined by the occurrence
of nodes with same ID appearing at different locations. Specifically, at the beginning of a
round of detection protocol, the information regarding the ID and location of every node
is claimed by its neighbors for clone detection. In this sense, the neighbors of a node are
its observers. Subsequently, some nodes will be selected as inspectors to examine claiming
messages for the purpose of clone detection. If an inspector successfully finds clone, it
becomes a witness, which will broadcast necessary evidence pertaining to cloned nodes to
inform all connected nodes revoking the malicious nodes. While the initiator is presumably
trusted, the other roles (observer, inspector, and witness) might be compromised by the
adversary and behavior maliciously. The four roles in our protocols are summarized in
Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Four roles in the proposed detection protocols
Roles Trusted Duty
Initiator Yes Start a round of detection
Observer No Claim neighbors IDs and locations
Inspector No Buffer and check messages for detection
Witness No Broadcast detection evidence
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4.1.3 Performance Metrics
The following metrics are used to measure the protocol performance and evaluate its prac-
ticability.
• Detection Probability and Security Level: As a primary security requirement,
a practical detection scheme should detect the occurrence of the attack with high
probability. Thus the detection probability is the most important security metric for
a probabilistic clone detection scheme. On the other hand, if a detection protocol
is deterministic in the sense that cloned nodes are always caught by witnesses, and
it is also a fully symmetric approach in which nodes are equally likely to become
witnesses prior to a round of detection procedure, we will use the number of witnesses
to evaluate the security level, because more witnesses improve protocol resilience
against the adversary’s potential attacks to witnesses. .
• Communication Cost: In general, communication cost is always a crucial per-
formance metric for sensor network protocols, because usually energy is the most
valuable resource for sensor nodes, and message transmission consumes at least one
order of magnitude power than any of other operations [10]. For simplicity, we use the
average number of messages sent per node to represent a protocol’s communication
cost.
• Storage Consumption: Ordinary low-cost sensor nodes are only equipped with a
limited amount of memory; thus any schemes requiring high storage will be considered
as impractical. The protocol memory requirement is another performance metric for
efficiency.
• Balance: In a homogeneous sensor network, schemes are supported to consume the
energy and memory in a balanced way. It should be avoided to create hot nodes
which would be buffer-overflowed or die away quickly.
4.1.4 Adversary Model
We consider a threat model in which sensor nodes are deployed in a hostile environment and
are subject to capture and complete control by an adversary, but the adversary only can
compromise a limited number of sensor nodes and then the adversary uses the compromised
nodes to clone many nodes and deploys the replicas in places that are intelligently decided.
To be concrete, we assume that the adversary is only allowed to control up to 10% sensor
nodes and each cloned node has at least one neighbor that remains intact.
The adversary definitely wants to conceal the existence of clone. In our settings, this
enemy is allowed to interfere with a detection protocol in the following three ways.
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1. The cloned nodes may not participate in the regular detection procedures.
2. The nodes controlled by the adversary may fake, drop, or manipulate claiming mes-
sages which they forward.
3. The adversary can capture some nodes accordingly, but it would take time, and the
total number of nodes that an adversary can compromise is limited. All nodes that
are not controlled by the adversary will be referred to as integrity nodes.
Lastly, the adversary has the intention to launch DoS attacks to the sensor network by
exploiting vulnerabilities of detection protocols.
4.2 DHT-Based Detection Protocol
The principle of our first distributed detection protocol is to make use of the distributed
hash table (DHT) mechanism to form a decentralized, key-based caching and checking
system that can effectively detect cloned nodes. In essence, this kind of system shares
many common characteristics with P2P indexing services, which enormously benefit from
DHT in the recent years. Indeed, DHT enables sensor nodes to distributively construct
an overlay network upon a physical sensor network and provides an efficient key-based
routing within the overlay network. A message associated with a key will be transmitted
through the overlay network to reach a destination node that is solely determined by the
key and will buffer the data for indexing services; the source node does not need to specify
or know which node a message’s destination is—the DHT key-based routing takes care
of transportation details by the message’s key. More importantly, messages with a same
key will be stored in a unique destination node. Those properties inspire and build the
foundation for our first detection protocol.
As an initialization of our proposed DHT-based clone detection, the initiator broadcasts
an action message including a random seed. Then every observer generates a claiming
message for each neighbor node, which is referred to as an examinee of the observer and
the message, and sends the message with probability pc independently. The introduction of
the claiming probability pc is intended to reduce the communication overwork in case of a
high node degree network. In the protocol, a message’s DHT key that decides its routing as
well as its destination is the hash value of concatenation of the seed and the examinee’s ID.
By means of the DHT mechanism, a claiming message will eventually be transmitted to a
deterministic destination node, which will save the examinee’s ID-location information from
the message and check for node clone detection, acting as an inspector. In addition, some
intermediate nodes also behave as inspectors to enlarge the average number of witnesses in











Figure 4.1: Outline of the DHT-based detection
number of records, each of which contains ID-location information extracted from claiming
messages that the inspector received and examined. We emphasize that records in a cache-
table have different examinees IDs. Since the cache-table constitutes the main memory
consumption of the DHT-based detection protocol, we measure the protocol’s storage cost
by the average value of final sizes of cache-tables. The DHT-based detection is outlined in
Figure 4.1.
4.2.1 Distributed Hash Table
Before diving into the detection protocol, we briefly introduce distribute hash table tech-
niques. In principle, a distribute hash table is a decentralized distributed system that
provides a key-based lookup service similar to a hash table: (key, record) pairs are stored
in the DHT, and any participating node can efficiently store and retrieve records associated
with specific keys. By design, DHT distributes responsibility of maintaining the mapping
from keys to records among nodes in an efficient and balanced way, which allows DHT
to scale to extremely large networks and suitable to serve as a facility of distributed node
clone detection. In fact, DHT techniques have been utilized to provide data-central storage
and indexing services for distributed sensor networks, such as object-tracking in [53], and
to design DHT-driven sensor network routing protocols [68, 38, 16].
There are several different types of DHT proposals, such as CAN [131], Chord [140],
Pastry [136]. Generally, CAN has worse performance than others in terms of communi-
cation cost and scalability, and it is rarely employed in real systems. By contrast, Chord
is probably the most widely implemented DHT, and we choose Chord as a DHT imple-
mentation to demonstrate our protocol. However, our protocol can easily migrate to build
upon Pastry and present similar security and performance results.
The technical core of Chord [140] is to form a massive virtual ring in which every node































Figure 4.2: A Chord network example, where the key space is 7-bit (b = 7), and seven
records with different keys are stored in five nodes
on output, a hash function H is used to map an arbitrary input into a b-bit space, which
can be conceived as a ring. Each node is assigned with a Chord coordinate upon joining
the network. Practically for our protocol, a node’s Chord point’s coordinate can be the
hash value of the node’s MAC address. All n nodes divide the ring into n segments by
their Chord points. Likewise, the key of a record is the result of the hash function. Every
node is responsible for one segment which ends at the node’s Chord point, and all records
whose keys fall into that segment would be transmitted to and stored in that node.
For the purpose of efficient key-based routing, every node maintains a finger table of
size t = O(log n) to facilitate a binary-tree search. To be specific, the finger table for a node
with Chord coordinate y contains information of t nodes that are respectively responsible
for holding the t keys: (y + 2b−i) mod 2b for i ∈ [1, t]. A demonstration example of a
Chord system with small parameters is given in Figure 4.2. In this system, if node N8
wants to look up a record with key 97, after checking the finger table, it will contact node
N88, which serves as a Chord intermediate node to transfer this request.
4.2.2 Protocol Details
As a preparation for subsequent detection procedures, all nodes cooperatively build a Chord
overlay network over the sensor network. The construction of the overlay network is inde-
pendent of node clone detection. As a result, nodes possess the information of their direct
predecessor and successor in the Chord ring. In addition, each node caches information of
its g consecutive successors in its successors table. Many Chord systems utilize this kind
of cache mechanism to reduce the communication cost and enhance systems robustness.
More importantly in our protocol, the facility of the successors table contributes to the
economical selection of inspectors.
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One round of DHT-based node detection consists of three stages.
Stage 1: Initialization
To activate all nodes starting a new round of node clone detection, the initiator uses a
broadcast authentication scheme to release an action message including a monotonously
increasing nonce and a random round seed. The nonce is intended to prevent adversaries
from launching a denial of service (DoS) attack by repeating broadcasting action messages.
The action message is defined by
MACT = nonce, seed, {nonce || seed}K−1initiator .
Stage 2: Claiming neighbors information
Upon receiving an action message, a node verifies if the message nonce is greater than
last nonce and if the message signature is valid. If both pass, the node updates the nonce,
stores the seed, and starts to operate as an observer that generates a claiming message
for each neighbor (examinee) and transmits the message through the overlay network with
respect to the claiming probability pc. The claiming message by observer α for examinee
β is constructed as follows:
Mα4β = idβ, Lβ, idα, Lα, {idβ || Lβ || idα || Lα}K−1α .
Stage 3: Processing claiming messages
A claiming message will be forwarded to its destination node via several Chord inter-
mediate nodes. Only those nodes in the overlay network layer (i.e., the source node, Chord
intermediate nodes, and the destination node) need to process a message, whereas other
nodes along the path simply route the message to temporary targets. Algorithm 4.1 for
handling a message is the kernel of our DHT-based detection protocol. If the algorithm
returns NIL, then the message has arrived at its destination. Otherwise, the message will
be subsequently forwarded to the next node with the ID that is returned by Algorithm 4.1.
Criterions of determining inspectors : During handling a message in Algorithm 4.1, the
node will act as an inspector if one of the following conditions is satisfied.
1. This node is the destination node of the claiming message.
2. The destination node is one of the g successors of the node. In other words, the
destination node will be reached in one Chord hop.
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Algorithm 4.1 dht handlemessage(Mα4β): handle a message in the DHT-based detec-
tion, where y is the current node’s Chord coordinate, finger[i] is the first node on the ring
that succeeds key ((y + 2b−i) mod 2b), i ∈ [1, t], successors[j] is the next jth successor,
j ∈ [1, g]
Output: NIL if the message has arrived at its destination; otherwise, it is the ID of the
next node that continues receiving the message in the Chord overlay network
1: key ⇐ H(seed || idβ)
2: if key ∈ (predecessor, y] then {has reached destination}
3: inspect(Mα4β) {act as an inspector, see Algorithm 4.2}
4: return NIL
5: for i = 1 to g do
6: if key ∈ (y, successors[i]] then {destination is in the next Chord hop}
7: inspect(Mα4β) {act as an inspector, see Algorithm 4.2}
8: return successors[i]
9: for j = 1 to t do {for normal DHT routing process}
10: if key ∈ [finger[j], y) then
11: return finger[j]
12: return successors[g]
While the first criterion is intuitive for a DHT-based indexing system, the second crite-
rion is subtle and it results in an efficient protocol design. Since most of claiming messages
related to a same examinee’s ID would go through one of the g predecessors to reach the
destination, those g nodes will be much more likely to be able to detect a clone than else-
where randomly selected inspectors. As a result, this criterion to decide inspectors can
increase the average number of witnesses at a little extra memory cost. We will theoreti-
cally quantify those performance measurements later.
In Algorithm 4.1, to examine a message for node clone detection, an inspector will invoke
Algorithm 4.2, which compares the message with previous inspected messages that are
buffered in the cache-table. Naturally, all records in the cache-table should have different
examinee IDs, as implied in Algorithm 4.2. If detecting a clone, which means that there
exist two messages Mα4β and Mα′4β′ satisfying idβ = idβ′ and Lβ 6= Lβ′ , the witness node
then broadcasts the evidence, simply composed of the two messages, to notify the whole
network.
Mevidence = Mα4β,Mα′4β′
It is worth noting that messages Mα4β and Mα′4β′ are authenticated by observers α and
α′ respectively. Therefore, the witness does not need to sign the evidence message. If a
malicious node tries to launch a DoS attack by broadcasting a bogus evidence message, the
next integrity node receiving it can immediately detect the wicked behavior by verifying
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Algorithm 4.2 inspect(Mα4β): Inspect a message to check for clone detection in the
DHT-based detection protocol
1: verify the signature of Mα4β
2: if idβ found in cache-table then
3: if idβ has two distinct locations then {found clone, become a witness}
4: broadcast the evidence
5: else
6: buffer Mα4β into cache-table
7: return
the signatures of Mα4β and Mα′4β′ before forwarding to other nodes.
All integrity nodes verify the evidence message and stop communicating with the cloned
nodes. To prevent cloned nodes from joining the network in the future, a revocation list
of compromised nodes IDs may be maintained by nodes individually.
4.2.3 Security Discussions
The identity-based cryptographic system provides reliable identity authentication and mes-
sage authentication for the DHT-based protocol. As a result, the adversary cannot falsify
clone nodes’ ID; neither can he modify messages signed by integrity nodes. Moreover, a
cloned node cannot lie to its observers about its location since a forged location would
be far deviated from the communication range of the observers, which suffices to alert
observers. Therefore, the detection guidelines are robust provided observers are honest.
As we discussed before, a witness cannot forge an evidence to attack integrity nodes,
since the evidence eventually is composed of claiming messages from different observers,
and any nodes can verify them. However, if some malicious observers try to abuse the
detection protocol by claiming wrong locations for integrity nodes, those framed nodes may
be wrongly removed from the sensor network. To prevent this attack, we may require nodes
to buffer evidence messages they received. If nodes discover that an observer accounts for
disposal of more nodes than a pre-defined threshold, they simply stop trusting evidences
related to that observer. Alternatively, nodes might directly revoke both the observers
and their accused “cloned” nodes in the evidence. In fact, we can combine both into an
advance processing strategy. Nodes maintain a debit table for observers. When a node is
declared as clone in one or several evidences, assume one of its distinct locations is claimed
by q different observers, then each of those observers should be debited by 1
q
. If a node’s
balance in the debit table exceeds a threshold, it will be expelled. In this fashion, this
abuse attack is not worthwhile for the adversary.
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Technically, the hash functions used in DHT do not need to be cryptographic hash
functions. In practice, the cryptographic ones are usually employed in the DHT systems
because of their excellent uniformly random distribution of outputs for high protocol per-
formance and additional one-way property to prevent potential abuses. For our protocol,
a cryptographic hash function is indeed mandated, because it can restrain the adversary’s
abilities by its second preimage resistance on H(seed || id) as he cannot distinguish which
nodes could more likely become witnesses before a round of detection. For the specific hash
function used in the protocol, at present we recommend SHA-1. Even though collisions
have been found in SHA-1 [147], which raised serious concerns on its security, by principle
it does not damage our protocol, since its security relies on second preimage resistance of
underlying hash function, rather than the more strong requirement of collision resistance.
After disclosure of the random seed, the adversary may want to comprise witnesses
to thwart detection. However, there are g + 1 potential witnesses that are geographically
randomly distributed in the network. Determining and capturing all the witnesses will be
troublesome for the adversary. Moreover, those witnesses vary round by rounds. Conse-
quently, the adversary cannot stop the detection by trying to capture a few witnesses.
The cloned nodes may discard claiming messages that pass through them. Our protocol
is resilient against this attack, due to the characteristic of full distributiveness and balance
of the DHT-based protocol. If there are only a few clones nodes, the impact of this malicious
action will be insignificant. When the number of cloned nodes increases, more claiming
messages will assure sufficient number of witnesses. The simulations later clearly indicate
this result. In summary, the DHT-based detection protocol is secure in the adversary
model defined in Section 4.1.4.
4.3 Performance Analysis of DHT-Based Protocol
For the DHT-based detection protocol, we use the following specific measurements to
evaluate the protocol performance.
• Average number of messages transmitted by a node, which measures the protocol
communication cost.
• Average size of node cache-tables, which represents the protocol storage consumption.
• Average number of witnesses, which serves as the protocol security level, because the
detection protocol is deterministic and symmetric.
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4.3.1 Communication Cost
We denote the average path length between two random nodes by l, which varies from
O(log n) to O(
√
n), dependent on underlying sensor networks. According to the Chord’s
properties [140], the average Chord-hop of a message, that is, the number of transfers in
the Chord overlay network, is c log n, where c is a constant number, usually less than 1.
Therefore, the average path hop length of a message is cl log n. There are pcdn claiming
messages in total for a round of detection. Thus the average number of messages sent
per node is given by pcdcl log n. Since the pc, d, and c are constant, the asymptotic
communication cost of the DHT-based protocol is between O(log2 n) and O(
√
n log n).
4.3.2 Storage Consumption and Security Level
Now we theoretically analyze the average cache-table size denoted by s and the average
witness number denoted by w. For simplicity, we hereby assume that all nodes, including
compromised ones, abide by the detection protocol. Later in the next section of simulations,
we will see that the malicious behaviors such as discarding claiming messages only slightly
affect those performance measurements.
In the DHT-based detection protocol, claiming messages associated with a same ex-
aminee’s ID will be transported to one destination node. Because there are n examinees
and n potential destinations, and due to the well pseudo-randomness of the Chord system,
on average, every node stores one record in its cache-table associated with one examinee’s
ID as its destination, regardless of the number of claiming messages per examinee. In
addition, for a designated examinee, the g predecessor nodes of the destination can act as
inspectors; thus they probably hold up to one record related to the examinee.
Assume that there are m independent claiming messages for every examinee, and let
pr denote the probability of a predecessor receiving a specific claiming message, then the
probability of a predecessor holding a record for an examinee is 1−(1−pr)m. Consequently,
the average cache-table size can be calculated by
s = 1 + g(1− (1− pr)m) .
If there are δ (δ ≥ 2) cloned nodes with a same ID in the network, then their destination
node (from the point of view of claiming messages related to those nodes as examinees) will
deterministically become a witness to successfully catch the attack, while the g predecessor
nodes of the destination may become the witnesses if and only if they receive at least
two claiming messages associated with different cloned nodes. It is easy to see that this
probability is minimized as (1− (1− pr)2m) when δ = 2. Therefore, as a lower-bound for
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witness number, we only analyze the case that there are two cloned nodes. In this case,
the average witness number can be obtained by
w = 1 + g(1− (1− pr)2m) .
A Continuous Probability Model and Its Distribution
The analysis above conveys the basic idea of performance deductions. However, to achieve
practical results of s and w, we need to use a continuously probability model to quantify pr
and conduct the deductions through continuous random variables. Based on the properties
of Chord and Algorithm 4.1, a continuous probability model to approximate pr is defined
as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Random line segmentation model). We start with a line of length 1,
of which the starting and ending points coordinates are 0 and 1 respectively. Then we
randomly generate g values over [0, 1] as point coordinates, and let random variable Xi
represent the ith point, for i = 1, 2, · · · , g. Those g continuous random variables divide the
line into g+ 1 segments. We want to determine the continuous probability distributions of
segment lengths.
Since g intermediate points are randomly selected, all g + 1 segment lengths have a
same probability distribution. Let R denote the random variable of the length of the first
segment, which origins from 0. As a rule, we denote density function by f , cumulative
distribution function by F , expected value by E. Since the sample spaces of all random
variables in this section are [0, 1], then 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 is implied for cumulative distribution
functions and density functions. The following theorem states the probability distribution
of R.
Theorem 4.1. The cumulative distribution function of R is
FR(x) = 1− (1− x)g .
Accordingly, its density function is
fR(x) = g(1− x)g−1 .
Proof. According to Definition 4.1, Xi is uniformly distributed over [0, 1] (i.e., FXi(x) =
Pr(Xi ≤ x) = x) and is independent of each other. This theorem can be proved by
induction.
Basis : Assume g = 1, then R = X1, and it holds that FR(x, g) = 1 − (1 − x)g = x =
FX1(x).
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Inductive step: If FR(x, g) = 1− (1− x)g holds, then we have




















= FR(x, g) + x− xFR(x, g)
= 1− (1− x)g + x(1− x)g = 1− (1− x)g+1 .
Since both the basis and the inductive step have been proved, it has now been proved that
the cumulative distribution function of R is 1 − (1 − x)g. By differentiation, its density
function is fR(x) = F
′
R(x) = g(1− x)g−1.
Analytic Formulas for Average Cache-table Size and Average Witness Number
The g intermediate points in the proceeding model are corresponding to the g predecessors,
and the ending point represents the destination. For a claiming message, the probability of
its destination being its sender is 1
n
. Since the network size n is large-scale, we may safely
assume 1
n
≈ 0 for simplicity. In addition, due to pseudorandomness of the Chord system,
it is reasonable to assume that one claiming message randomly occurs in that line before
the final transmission to the destination. Therefore we can directly adopt Theorem 4.1 as
the probability distribution of a predecessor receiving one claiming message.
Theorem 4.2. In an ideal case where there are m independent claiming messages for each
examinee and g is the successors table size, the average size of cache-tables is




and the average witness number, when there are two cloned nodes, is
w = 1 +
2gm2
(g + 2m)(g +m)
. (4.2)
Proof. For a specific examinee’s ID, let random variable S represent the probability of
a predecessor receiving at least one claiming message, which results in one record in its
cache-table. By the analysis before, S = 1 − (1 − R)m; thus we can get the cumulative
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function of S by
FS(x) = Pr(S ≤ x) = Pr (1− (1−R)m ≤ x)
= Pr
(







= 1− (1− x)g/m ,















When there are two clone nodes, each of them incurs m independent claiming messages.
Let random variable W represent the probability of a predecessor becoming a witness.
Because W = (1− (1−R)m)2, we have
FW (x) = Pr(W ≤ x) = Pr
(







































(g + 2m)(g +m)
.
Therefore, in the ideal case, the average size of cache-tables is




and the average witness number is
w = 1 + gE(W ) = 1 +
2gm2
(g + 2m)(g +m)
.
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Figure 4.3: Storage cost and security level in the ideal case, where there are m independent
claiming messages per examinee, and the witness number is based on two cloned nodes
setting
That concludes the proof.
We implement the experiment of the ideal case on random line segmentation model by
Python, and carry out simulations to measure s and w for different values of m and g. The
experimental results statistically match the outputs of Equations (4.1) and (4.2).
Figure 4.3 depicts the plots of the average number of witnesses and the average size of
cache-tables as functions of the size of successors table with various numbers of independent
claiming messages m in the ideal case. It is worth mentioning that if m is constant, the




because by Equation (4.2),
w = 1 +
2gm2









and the non-negative denominator takes its minimum value when g =
√
2m. Consequently,






m ≈ 0.343m .
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Remarks
In the reality of the DHT-based protocol, each examinee, on average, has dpc claiming
messages, thus m = dpc. Unfortunately, the transmissions of claiming messages associated
with a same examinee’s ID are in fact not independent in the Chord key-based routing
system. It is very difficult to analyze performance for the dependent case. Fortunately,
through simulation studies, we discover that we may use those equations for the ideal case
with some necessary adjustment to approximate the protocol practical performance on
storage consumption and security level. Specifically, the message correlation impact can
be mimicked by decreasing g to a certain proportion, when we apply Equations (4.1) and
(4.2) to estimate the average cache-table size and the average witness number. In other
words, even though the actual successors-table size is g, when we calculate performance
measurements by those two equations, we use g′, which is smaller than g with respect to
a certain ratio. We will demonstrate it in the next section of thorough simulations.
4.4 Simulations for DHT-Based Protocol
We implement the DHT-based detection protocol and run simulations to evaluate perfor-
mance comprehensively on our extended framework over the OMNeT++ simulator (see
Section 1.4). We use two network scenarios: Random Graph G(n, d) as an ideal random
network testing scenario and Unit-Disk Graph as a practical one. In the latter scenario,
node communication ranges are dynamically adjusted such that the average node degree
approximates d.
4.4.1 Performance on Varying Network Sizes
The following parameters are used in the simulations: finger table size t = 16, successors
table size g = 16, and node degree d = 20. Two different values of claiming probability pc
are used as 1.0 for pro-security and 0.2 for pro-communication cost. Overall, we have four
groups: Random Graph with pc = 1.0, Unit-Disk Graph with pc = 1.0, Random Graph
with pc = 0.2, and Unit-Disk Graph with pc = 0.2.
We design and conduct the first experiment to measure the protocol’s performance on
different network sizes, ranging from 500 to 5000, with a step of 250. Since we have four
groups, we need to test 4×19 = 76 cases. In order to obtain relatively fair and comparable
results, for each case, ten different network instances in accordance with the parameter
settings are constructed. Each of those simulation executions is quoted as a run; and one
run performs 20 rounds of detection. In each of those rounds, a random seed is generated
and two nodes are randomly chosen to set the same ID, that is, those two are cloned nodes.
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(b) Chord-Hop Per Message


















































































Figure 4.4: Simulation results of the DHT-based detection on varying network sizes, where
there are two cloned nodes
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The average number of messages sent per integrity node in this experiment is plotted in
Figure 4.4a. In the graph, the communication payloads for groups of pc = 0.2 are exactly
the one-fifth of those of pc = 1.0 with the same other parameters. The distinction between
simulation results of Random Graph and those of Unit-Disk Graph results from different
average path hops l for a pair of random nodes in those two network scenarios. Indeed, the
average Chord-hop per message in the simulations, depicted in Figure 4.4b, is independent
of the network scenarios and matches the Chord system properties—it is proportional to
log n.
The average size of cache-tables for integrity nodes and the average witness number are
illuminated in Figure 4.4c and Figure 4.4d respectively, which clearly indicate that those
two performance metrics are not notably affected by network scenarios and network size n
if n is sufficiently large, and thus the detection protocol does scale to network size. Even
though the network topology for Unit-Disk model used in the simulations is square, the
protocol can effectively detect clone attack in irregular topologies, like “Thin H”, “Thin
Cross”, “S”, “Large H”, “L”, and “Large H”, which are used in the simulations of [121].
The communication payload of our DHT-based protocol for those network topologies is
proportional with the average path hop l, while the security level and storage payload stay
constant.
4.4.2 Results on Different Numbers of Cloned Node
We develop the second experiment to evaluate the protocol’s performance on the different
numbers of cloned nodes. Still using the four groups, we run simulations with one network
size n = 1000 and the cloned node number δ increases from 2 to 100. We test each case
with ten runs, and for each run we repeat 200 rounds of node detection, in each of which
a seed is randomly generated and δ nodes are randomly chosen as clones.
Figure 4.5 depicts the experimental results about the average size of cache-tables for
integrity nodes and the average number of witnesses, which support our security arguments
in Section 4.2.3. In particular, we can see that the protocol shows strong resilience against
message-discarding of cloned nodes. Even if there are 10% nodes that maliciously discard
messages, the number of witnesses is pretty high. In fact, the more cloned nodes, the less
size of cache-tables for integrity nodes as storage consumption and the more witnesses as
security level. Therefore, we really only need to consider the boundary case of δ = 2 for
performance measurements.
In Figure 4.5, when there are more than 1% cloned nodes, the simulation results for
Random Graph and Unit-Disk Graph are evidently distinct. This is because the message-
dropping by malicious nodes affects the performance to a different extent. As implied
in Figure 4.4a, the average transmission hop of claiming messages in Unit-Disk Graph
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Figure 4.5: Simulation results of DHT-based detection on different number of cloned nodes,
where n = 1000
is greater than that in Random-Graph, then messages are more likely to be dropped by
cloned nodes in Unit-Disk Graph.
4.4.3 Verification of Performance Analysis
To evaluate its applicability of the theoretical analysis on cache-table size and witness
number in Section 4.3.2, we carry out the third experiment, in which n = 2000, d = 40,
there are two cloned nodes, and the claiming probability pc increases from 10% to 100% at
an interval of 5%. Since network scenarios do not affect the results on the two performance
metrics, we only run the simulation on Random Graph. For the purpose of comparison,
we test the performance for both cases that cloned nodes drop messages and comply with
protocol (no-dropping).
We argued before that to apply Equations (4.1) and (4.2), we should adjust the successors-
table size g to balance the effect of message transmission correlation. Figure 4.6 depicts
the experimental results along with theoretical outputs by adopting 80% of original g in
those two equations. From this figure, first we can see that message-dropping strategy by
malicious nodes indeed does not affect the performance notably. Second, the theoretical
outputs do reflect the practical results after we choose a proper adjustment on g. Admit-
tedly, the specific adjustment value is related to Chord system parameters. Interestingly,
for several other testing cases, such as (n = 3000, g = 16) and (n = 2000, g = 8), the 80%
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w: Experimental, Dropping
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Figure 4.6: Simulation results for verifying performance analysis of the DHT-based detec-
tion, where g is adjusted by 80% in the theoretical calculation
appears good enough for evaluation purpose.1
4.4.4 Discussions
From the simulation results, we can see that the proposed DHT-based protocol can effec-
tively detect clone for general sensor networks with high security level and efficient storage
consumption, while its communication cost is in the same order of magnitude with previ-
ous detection schemes. One way to improve the communication performance is replacing
the Chord overlay network with some specific DHT implementations on sensor networks.
A number of such protocols, such as Scalable Source Routing [68], Virtual Ring Routing
[38], and Virtual Cord Protocol [16], have been proposed. Combinations of our protocol
with those DHT schemes might be an interesting research topic. On the other hand, if
it is very likely for the adversary to deploy many clones out of one ID, we can use small
claiming probability pc for saving communication payload, without degrading the security
level (i.e., the average witness number) dramatically.
The protocol security level, by Equation (4.2), is directly determined by message num-
ber m, which is upper bounded by node degree d. 2 If the DHT-based protocol operates in
sparse sensor networks, to achieve a desirable witness number, several independent Chord
systems by different round seeds may be used. Thus messages for one examinee would be
1In our simulations, the best selections of adjustment for (n = 3000, g = 16) and (n = 2000, g = 8) are
79% and 81% respectively, which produce similar match of experimental results and theoretical outputs.
2There is no point for pc ≥ 1. Because even if a node repeats sending claiming messages corresponding
to one examinee, all those messages will follow a same transmission path.
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indexed by a few deterministic destinations. In this case, the protocol’s communication
payload, storage consumption, and the average witness number are all multiplied by a
same order. Note that this is also a common practice in P2P indexing systems to enhance
robustness.
4.5 Randomly Directed Exploration Protocol
The DHT-based detection protocol can be applied to every kind of sensor network, and
its security level is remarkable, as cloned nodes will be caught by one deterministic wit-
ness plus several probabilistic witnesses. However, the message transmission over a Chord
overlap network incurs considerable communication cost, which may not be desired for
some sensor networks that are extremely sensitive to energy consumption. To fulfill this
challenge, we propose the second distributed detection protocol—randomly directed ex-
ploration, which tremendously reduces communication cost and presents optimal storage
expense with adequate detection probability.
The randomly directed exploration protocol is actually inspired by several key observa-
tions to the node-to-network broadcasting scheme. We notice that this approach, despite
its worst communication performance among all distributed approaches, is quite attractive
from many other aspects. It does not require any additional assumption—every node just
simply broadcasts its neighbor-list to other nodes. In addition, each node need only buffer
its own neighbor-list, so the memory requirement is pretty low, except for the additional
memory cost for preventing from receiving same broadcasting messages. For a dense sen-
sor network, suppose that there are two cloned nodes in the network, each of which has
d integrity neighbors, node-to-network broadcasting will drive all those neighbors to find
clone, but in fact one witness that successfully catches the clone and then notifies all the
network would suffice for the detection purpose. In this regard, instead of broadcast, any-
cast [153] seems a good alternative for routing claiming messages. However, we cannot
afford an infrastructure for existing anycast protocols in sensor networks, and indeed it is
unnecessary. In our proposed randomly directed exploration protocol, which is outlined in
Figure 4.7, a claiming message initially is sent towards a random direction, and then its
subsequent transmission will roughly maintain a line, while all intermediate nodes check









Figure 4.7: Outline of the randomly directed exploration protocol
4.5.1 Protocol Description
Preparation
To prepare for node clone detection, every node, upon deployed, informs all its neighbors
about its ID and location. Then each node creates its own neighbor-list including the
neighbors IDs and locations. Note that this kind of neighbor notification phase is necessary
for many wireless sensor networks. In the randomly directed exploration protocol, this
neighbor-list is used for assisting message routing and for clone detection, and indeed it
constitutes the sole storage consumption.
Detection Procedure
One round of clone detection is still initialized by the initiator, which simply broadcasts an
authenticated action command. During the detection procedure, each node, as an observer
for all its neighbors, starts to generate a claiming message containing its own ID, location,
and its neighbor-list. Formally, the claiming message by node α is defined as follows:
Mα = ttl, idα, Lα, NeighborListα, {idα, Lα, NeighborListα}K−1α ,
where ttl represents time to live, defined as the maximum number of hops for a claiming
message. Since ttl will be altered by intermediate nodes during transmission, it should not
be authenticated. The observer tries to deliver the claiming message r times. In each time,
the node transmits it to a randomly selected neighbor. Note that r can be a real number
and accordingly an observer transmits its claiming message at least brc, up todre, and on
average r times.
When an intermediate node β receives a claiming message Mα, it invokes Algorithm 4.3
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Algorithm 4.3 rde processmessage(Mα): An intermediate node processes a message in
the randomly directed exploration protocol
1: verify the signature of Mα
2: compare its own neighbor-list with the neighbor-list in Mα
3: if found clone then
4: broadcast the evidence;
5: ttl⇐ ttl − 1
6: if ttl ≤ 0 then
7: discard Mα
8: else
9: nextnode⇐ getnextnode(Mα) {See Algorithm 4.4}
10: if nextnode = NIL then
11: discard Mα
12: else
13: forward Mα to nextnode
Algorithm 4.4 getnextnode(Mα): Determine the next node that receives the message
1: determine ideal angle, target zone, and priority zone
2: if no neighbors within the target zone then
3: return NIL
4: if no neighbors within the priority zone then
5: nextnode⇐ the node closest to ideal angle
6: else
7: nextnode⇐ a probabilistic node in the priority zone, with respect to its probability
proportional to angle distance from priority zone border
8: return nextnode
of rde processmessage(Mα) to process the message. During the processing, node β, as an
inspector, compares its own neighbor-list with the neighbor-list in the message, checking
if there is a clone. Similarly, if detecting a clone, the witness node β would broadcast an
evidence message Mevidence = Mα,Mβ to notify the whole network such that the cloned
nodes are revoked by all integrity nodes. To deal with routing, node β decreases the
message’s ttl by 1, and discards the message if ttl reaches zero; elsewhere, to determine the
next node receiving the message, it will query Algorithm 4.4, which, as a technical core of
the protocol, will be discussed at length in next section.
Determination of Next Node


























(c) Probabilistic Directed Trans-
mission
Figure 4.8: Routing mechanisms in the randomly directed exploration protocol
• Deterministic Directed Transmission (Figure 4.8a): Since every node has informa-
tion about its own location and all neighbors locations, it can readily calculate all
neighbors angels. When node β receives a claiming message from previous node α,
the ideal direction can be calculated. In order to achieve the best effect of line trans-
mission, the next destination node should be node γ, which is closest to the ideal
direction.
• Network Border Determination (Figure 4.8b): This takes network shape into con-
sideration to reduce the communication cost. In many sensor network applications,
nodes are randomly deployed, and there exist outside borders of network. When
reaching some border in the network, the claiming message can be directly discarded.
In our proposal for border local determination, another parameter target range is used
along with ideal direction to determine a target zone. When no neighbor is found in
this zone, the current node would conclude that the message has reached a border,
and thus throw it away.
• Probabilistic Directed Transmission (Figure 4.8c): In the probabilistic directed trans-
mission, parameter priority range along with the ideal direction is used to specify a
priority zone, in which the next node will be selected. When no nodes are located
in that zone, the deterministic directed candidate within the target zone will be se-
lected as the next node. If there are several nodes in the priority zone, their selection
probabilities are proportional to their angle distances to priority zone border. In
this way, the desired line transmission property is reserved, while a certain extent of
important randomness is introduced.
If purely using deterministic directed mechanism for routing, except for a limited num-
ber of initial random directions, a claiming message will be transmitted in a deterministic
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manner. As a result, the adversary may remove some nodes in strategic locations to re-
duce detection probability dramatically. Moreover, transmissions of claiming messages
from a cloned node’s neighbors are highly correlated, which affects the protocol communi-
cation and security performance. By the elegant probabilistic directed mechanism, those
drawbacks are overcome, and the protocol performance is improved significantly, which is
supported by the simulations in the next section.
4.5.2 Analysis
The randomly directed exploration protocol is exceedingly memory-efficient. It does not
rely on broadcasting. Consequently, no additional memory is required to suppress broad-
casting flood. The protocol does not demand intermediate nodes to buffer claiming mes-
sages, overcoming main disadvantage of line-selected multicast scheme [121]. All memory
requirement lies on the neighbor-list. In fact, the neighbor-list is a necessary component for
all distributed detection approaches. Therefore, the protocol consumes almost minimum
memory.
The communication cost of the randomly directed exploration depends on the routing
parameter settings. On average, there are r claiming messages sent by per observer, and
each message transmits at most ttl hops. For a dense sensor network, r = 1.0 might be
a proper choice, and ttl =
√
n would be sufficient for messages to go across the network.
The choice of
√
n is also used in the [121]. For some regular network topologies and by
selecting a proper target range, the average message hop is actually much smaller than
√
n,
resulting from the border determination. Therefore, the upper-bound of communication
cost in the randomly directed exploration protocol is O(
√
n).
Because of sharing similar detection guidelines based on observer-inspector-witness
model and using same cryptographic authentication primitives, the security arguments
for the DHT-based protocol in Section 4.2.3, other than witness number, also apply to
the randomly directed exploration protocol. Differently from the previous protocol, only
neighbors of cloned node might become witnesses, thus the witness number is not a proper
security measurement in this probabilistic protocol. Instead, we directly evaluate the de-
tection probability in the following simulations to verify if the protocol satisfies the security
object.
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4.6 Experimental Results for Randomly Directed Ex-
ploration
We implement the randomly directed exploration protocol on the same simulation frame-
work as the previous protocol. Since the randomly directed exploration protocol relies on
a local network topology, the random graph model cannot be used for the simulations.
Instead, we take the unit-disk graph as the sole network scenario. As much, we choose a
constant node degree d = 20 and the node communication range is dynamically adjusted
such that the average node degree keeps the approximate d. We select π
8
as the priority
range of the protocol. As a result, there are average 2.5 neighbors in the priority zone of
a node.
Unlike the DHT-based protocol, this protocol is sensitive to network topology; thus in
order to obtain good simulation results, more than fifty network instances are randomly
generated for every testing case, and each run performs one hundred rounds of detection;
finally all results are averaged.
4.6.1 Performance on Different Network Sizes
We develop the first experiment which not only measures the randomly directed exploration
protocol’s performance on varying network sizes, but also verifies if our protocol design
really fulfills the intention. In Section 4.5.1, we present three routing mechanisms and fuse
them together to determine next node. In order to clearly demonstrate their actual impacts
on protocol performance, we mix them as the following three groups, run simulations
respectively, and compare the results for analysis.
In group I, only the mechanism of deterministic directed transmission is used. Conse-
quently, all claiming messages, if not dropped by maliciously nodes, go exactly ttl hops.
Next, group II adds network border determination into group I. As the network shape
is a regular square, two different target ranges are chosen for wider and narrower border
determination: θ = π
3
and θ = π
4
. Finally, group III combines all the three mechanism,
and indeed is our proposal. Overall, there are five testing settings: group I, group II with
θ = π
3
, group II with θ = π
4
, group III with θ = π
3
, and group III with θ = π
4
.
For other parameter selections, n ranges from 1000 to 10000, message maximal hop
ttl =
√
n, average number of claiming messages per observer r = 1.0, and there are two
cloned nodes that are selected randomly among all nodes.
Figure 4.9 depicts the main experimental results: Figure 4.9a for the average number of
messages sent per node, and Figure 4.9b for the detection probability. First of all, we can
see that the protocol’s communication overhead is quite impressive while its security level is
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(a) Communication Cost



























Group II, θ = π/3
Group II, θ = π/4
Group III, θ = π/3
Group III, θ = π/4
(b) Detection Probability
Figure 4.9: Protocol performance on different network sizes, where ttl =
√
n, r = 1.0
satisfactory for all the network sizes. Second, in accordance with the intuition, the compar-
ison between group I and group II indicates that the boundary determination mechanism
remarkably reduces the communication cost, while the detection probability is decreased in
a moderate rate. Third, compared to group II, group III only slightly increases the average
number of sent messages, but considerably improves the detected probability. This proves
that the probabilistic directly mechanism fulfills the design objective, and our proposed
priority zone candidates probability distribution both preserves the line characteristic of
directed transmission and introduces splendid randomness on message transmission. In
a word, the experimental results directly support our protocol design arguments and the
protocol can properly detect node clone with outstanding communication performance.
4.6.2 Detection Probability for Multiple Cloned Nodes
If there are more than two cloned nodes, similar to the DHT-based protocol, the randomly
directed exploration protocol shall detect the attack more easily. In the simulations for
network size n = 1000 and the cloned node number δ increasing from 2 to 100, the protocol
achieves 100% detection probability when δ ≥ 3 for θ = π
3
and when δ ≥ 4 for θ = π
4
.
4.6.3 Impacts of Adjusting Parameters
We may select different values for parameters θ, ttl, and r to achieve tradeoffs between
communication cost and detection probability. As the first experiment indicates, the bigger
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(b) Detection Probability
Figure 4.10: Protocol performance by adjusting ttl and r for n = 5000
θ, the more hops a claiming message travels, and the more likely cloned nodes are being
caught. In this experiment to evaluate the effects of modifying ttl and r, , we still use the
two values of θ, select n = 5000, and assume two randomly selected cloned nodes. First we




n, carrying out the simulation. Then
we keep ttl =
√
n and let r grow from 1.0 to 2.0. The experimental results of Figure 4.10a
and Figure 4.10b show that because the border determination mechanism under a certain
θ restrains the average message hop, the increasing of ttl after some threshold will has
insignificant impact on protocol performance. In contrast, while the transmission overhead
per node is in direct proportion with r, the detection probability is substantially improved.
Therefore, r is always suitable for performance adjustment to meet different requirements
on communication cost and security level.
4.6.4 Discussions
From the analysis and simulation results, randomly directed exploration protocol out-
performs all other distributed detection protocols in terms of communication cost, storage
requirements, while its detection probability is satisfactory, higher than that of line-selected
multicast scheme in [121]. In addition, all nodes only need to know their direct neighbors
information, and then inherent routing technique delivers messages in an efficient way to
cover a great range of the network.
Because the three mechanisms of determining next node all rely on transmission di-
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rection, the protocol performance in specific sensor networks will be related to network
topologies. In general, if we can obtain a rough picture about node deployment pattern 3,
we may adjust parameters θ and ttl to achieve acceptable detection probability at a cost of
increasing communication overhead. For example, we may use bigger θ to tolerate irregu-
lar network outside shape, while ttl is set to the estimated value of maximal hop distance
between two nodes. Of course, if a network topology is so distorted that there is no way
to achieve line transmission solely based to nodes local knowledge, the randomly directed
exploration detection becomes unsuitable and we may use the DHT-based protocol. In
addition, if security is extremely important and it is required to certainly catch cloned
nodes, the DHT-based protocol should be adopted.
4.7 Conclusions
Sensor nodes lack tamper-resistant hardware and are subject to the node clone attack.
In this chapter, we have presented two distributed detection protocols: one is based on
distributed hash table which forms a Chord overlay network and provides the key-based
routing, caching, and checking facilities for clone detection, and the other uses probabilistic
directed technique to achieve efficient communication overhead for satisfactory detection
probability. While the DHT-based protocol provides high security level for all kinds of sen-
sor networks by one deterministic witness and additional memory-efficient, probabilistic
witnesses, the randomly directed exploration presents outstanding communication perfor-
mance, minimal storage consumption for dense sensor networks.
3We stress that nodes do not require to know the network topology.
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Chapter 5
Data Aggregation Integrity Based on
Homomorphic Primitives
Many previous secure aggregation schemes in wireless sensor networks were devoted to
data confidentiality, while few practical, efficient message authentication schemes accom-
modating valid data aggregation have been proposed. In fact, resembling general security
cases in other fields, message integrity might be one of the most important objectives in
sensor networks, because invalid, undetected data alteration will cause very dangerous
outcomes. For example, in a sensor network monitoring battlefield and providing vital
decision-supported information, it would be devastating that enemies are able to manip-
ulate the sensor network outputs and trick users into accepting misleading data. In fact,
data aggregation reduces the degree of difficulty for adversaries faking false reports, as the
adversaries do not need to manipulate the readings of majority of sensor nodes, which is
difficult and impractical; instead, by compromising several nodes close to the base station,
they can easily alter the aggregated results to whatever match their interests. Therefore,
the verifiable integrity of aggregated messages is an imperative security objective in sensor
network data aggregation, and should be fulfilled by corresponding protocols. As one of
principles for the cryptography primitives, those schemes that merely provide data confi-
dentiality cannot serve as message authentication mechanisms. Message integrity objective
should be addressed by specific detection or authentication schemes.
There are three kinds of message verification approaches for data aggregation: retroac-
tive detection, abnormality-based detection, and cryptographic integrity primitives. Gen-
erally speaking, retroactive detection approaches, which involve considerable communica-
tion/interaction among the base station and sensor nodes to verify messages integrity, are
not satisfactory because their costly performance penalty directly violates the intent of
data aggregation. One may argue that the predictable data distribution can be used as a
gauge to analyze and detect the abnormality of aggregated results; but the false rates are
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generally too high to be practical, and thus it is not a dependable solution. Consequently,
schemes based on solid cryptographic primitives are usually desired. Unfortunately, con-
ventional cryptographic integrity primitives, such as message authentication code (MAC)
and signature, are not compatible with data aggregation scenarios.
Based on new cryptographic homomorphic primitives [8, 98, 70], we propose three se-
cure aggregation schemes that provide provably secure message integrity. The first one is
a homomorphic MAC scheme for data aggregation, which is a revised version of the homo-
morphic MAC proposal on secure network coding application in [8]. This homomorphic
MAC scheme, other than revisions to fit data aggregation scenarios, achieves a little bit
performance improvement, as we observe and then remove an unnecessary step in the origi-
nal scheme. The homomorphic MAC scheme is computation- and communication-efficient,
but with one inherent restriction: all data-collecting nodes share one global key with the
base station. The assumption that all those nodes are tamper-proof might be too strong
to be realistic in many sensor network applications. In order to overcome this drawback,
we further propose two secure aggregation schemes based on homomorphic hash [98, 70],
at the expense of increasing communication and computation costs. One is to combine ho-
momorphic hash with aggregate MAC [92], in which every node shares a different key with
the base station, while the other is associated with identity-based aggregate signature [72],
which enables intermediate nodes to verify the authenticity of messages. The proposed
three protocols present different tradeoffs between computation, communication, security
and can fit a wide variety of application areas.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we introduce the data aggregation network
settings, state security objective and implications, discuss homomorphic primitives, and
define homomorphic MAC as well as homomorphic hash in Section 5.1. Then we present a
concrete homomorphic MAC construction for secure aggregation integrity in Section 5.2.
Afterwards, two secure data aggregation schemes based on homomorphic hash are proposed
in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 concludes the work of this chapter. An earlier version of the
three secure integrity scheme has been published in [104].
5.1 Background
5.1.1 Network Settings
We consider a sensor network that consists of n sensor nodes which are highly sensitive
of energy consumption, and a base station that is only concerned about the statistical




Since loose time synchronization among sensor nodes is indispensable for efficient message
aggregation and the sensor network is under attacks, it is assumed that there is a secure
time synchronization scheme [127] available in the network. We do not explore a specific
secure time synchronization selection because it is independent and relatively irrelevant.
Report and Its Identifier
At a designated time, the sensor network outputs a report, which is an overall aggregated
result for a task and is uniquely identified by a report’s identifier rid. The report’s identifier
may be the task description combined with the reporting time. It is clear that all sensor
nodes should have an agreement on the report identifier specification and know how to
correctly generate rid. Otherwise, nodes cannot distinguish messages of different kinds and
data aggregation cannot be properly performed.
Roles Definitions
There are three kinds of roles in the sensor network:
• A contributor that collects environmental readings and generate a raw message.
• An aggregator that aggregates all messages that it received plus possibly its own raw
message and then produces an aggregated message.
• A verifier that verifies the authentication of messages it received.
A node may play some of or all the three roles, while the base station is definitely a
verifier.
Aggregation Mode
The data are aggregated though the network, and the base station eventually retrieves
an aggregated result (i.e., the report). In order to produce the mean of a measurement,
it suffices for the base station to retrieve the sum of the samples and the number of
contributors. If the variance is also desired, the contributors should provide the squares
of their readings and the aggregators accordingly merge the squares. By the average
value, the number of contributors and the sum of the squares, one can readily calculate
the variance as a basic statistical equation. In other words, we only need to consider an
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additive aggregation. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the sensor network is
organized as a tree structure rooted on the base station, though our proposed schemes fit
into any kind of data additive aggregation architecture.
In addition, to support advanced aggregation requirements, the concept of weight is
introduced. Specifically, we allow that the measurements of different nodes have different
weights for their contributions to the final report. In most cases, node weights are uniform;
when distinct weights are required, we assume that aggregators and the base station are
aware of the weights of messages contributors, either via an established agreement, or from
explicit indications attached to messages.
Application Scenario
As a typical application scenario of the network settings, a sensor network is employed to
routinely detect environmental information, e.g., temperature, humidity, radiation. Every
node senses data in a hourly interval, and submits the results on a daily basis. For exam-
ple, at two o’clock every day, starting from all leaf nodes, messages are transmitted and
aggregated over a spanning tree.
5.1.2 Security Objective and Implications
The primary objective of our proposals is to provide the message integrity for data aggrega-
tion in a cryptographically secure manner, thus an authentication segment that facilitates
verification shall be appended to a message. Generally speaking, it is impossible for a
verifier to validate the integrity of an aggregated message without the knowledge of its
contributors. This is because if contributors use different keys, the verifier certainly needs
knows who those contributors are before using those keys in the verification stage; if a global
key is employed and a verifier cannot retrieve contributors of messages, an adversary may
easily construct a malicious message to pass the integrity verification by aggregating a
single message from one contributor many times, say b times, which is indistinguishable
with an aggregated message resulting from b legitimate contributors. In other words, data
origin authentication is an inherent requirement for data aggregation integrity.
The simplest way of indicating data origin is to attach the list of contributors to a
message. To avoid the communication cost in this approach, we may utilize a mechanism
that allows a verifier to implicitly obtain the contributor list, such as derivation from the
network topology. This is pretty realistic for the base station as the ultimate verifier. In a
case that a verifier is capable of identifying all potential contributors, of which only a small
fraction do not really participate in a message contribution, a list of exclusive nodes rather
than the contributors may be appended to the message. Anyway, we henceforth assume
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that an aggregator knows the appropriate weights to aggregate messages, and a verifier
of a message can obtain its contributors and corresponding weights. When we discuss a
scheme’s communication cost, we do not consider the payload from contributor lists and
weights, because, as we argued, there might be mechanisms to avoid it, or it is inevitable
for message authentication.
5.1.3 Homomorphic Primitives
Homomorphic property in cryptographic operations may are very useful in a variety of
applications, and thus stimulates research on homomorphic primitives, namely homomor-
phic encryption, homomorphic MAC, homomorphic hash, and homomorphic signature.
Homomorphic encryption [63], in which a user without a decryption key can perform
algebraic operations on ciphertext to achieve designated transformation results on the cor-
responding plaintext, has been studied for decades, and recently, an outstanding result,
fully homomorphic encryption [71], was proposed, which allows arbitrary operations on
ciphertext (and equivalently on plaintext). Even though the only two fully homomorphic
encryption schemes [71, 145] by now have not provided competitive performance for most
applications, they do reveal a perspective on a powerful, widely demanded technique and
we expect that practical schemes will eventually emerge. Those homomorphic encryption
schemes shall provide a solid foundation for data confidentiality of aggregated messages.
As for homomorphic signature, current schemes [90, 32] are mainly aimed at one-sender
many-recipients secure multi-cast scenarios, with costly computation overhead (compare to
symmetric primitives), thus they may not be suitable for secure data aggregation integrity
of WSNs. In contrast, homomorphic MAC and homomorphic hash can be effectively used
to construct message integrity schemes of supporting additive aggregation with weights.
Formally, homomorphic MAC and homomorphic hash are defined as follows.
Homomorphic MAC
Definition 5.1 (Homomorphic MAC [8]). A homomorphic MAC should satisfy the follow-
ing properties:
1. Homomorphism. Given two (message, tag) pairs (m1, t1) and (m2, t2), anyone can
create a valid tag ta for an aggregated message ma = w1m1 + w2m2 for any scales
w1, w2 as weights. Typically, ta = w1t1 + w2t2.
2. Security against Chosen Message Attack. Even under a chosen message attack, in
which an adversary is allowed to query tags of polynomial number of messages, it is
still infeasible for the adversary to create a valid tag for a message other than a linear
combination of some previously queried messages.
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A homomorphic MAC consists of three probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithms (Sign,
Aggregate, Verify)
• tu = Sign(k, rid,mu, idu): node u with identity idu, as a contributor of a raw message
mu regarding report rid, computes a tag tu for mu using k as the key.
• t = Aggregate((m1, t1, w1), . . . , (mj, tj, wj)): an aggregator implements the homo-
morphic property for message-tag pairs in the absence of key k, that is, generates a
tag t for the aggregated message m =
∑j
i=1wimi
• Verify(k, rid,m, t): a verifier verifies the integrity of message m regarding report rid
by key k and tag t.
The homomorphic MAC scheme is first defined and proposed in [8], intended to provide
secure network coding. The definition above is equivalent to that in [8], with emphasis on
the data aggregation.
Homomorphic Hash
Definition 5.2 (Homomorphic Hash [98, 70]). A homomorphic hash function H is a hash
function satisfying:
1. Homomorphism. For any two messages m1, m2 and scalars w1, w2, it holds that
H(w1m1 + w2m2) = H(m1)
w1H(m2)
w2. 1
2. Collision Resistance. There is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary capable of




The homomorphic hash can be used in many applications, such as secure network
coding [70], secure peer-to-peer content distribution using erasure codes [98].
5.2 Secure Aggregation with Homomorphic MAC
Our first proposal is a specific homomorphic MAC scheme that fully complies with Defini-
tion 5.1. Basically, the scheme is a revised version of the homomorphic MAC for network
coding proposed by Agrawal and Boneh (AB Scheme) [8].
1Intuitively, the homomorphic equation should be H(w1m1 +w2m2) = w1H(m1)+w2H(m2). In fact,
that just uses a different notation on group operation and essentially they are equivalent.
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5.2.1 Scheme Description
To formally present our schemes, message m is formed as d segments of l bits. Let q = 2l,
then the message space is Fdq . In other words, message m can be represented as a vector of
d segments: (m1,m2, · · · ,md), where mi ∈ Fq, i = 1, 2, · · · , d. As the additive operation is
over finite field Fq, q should be greater than the bound of the desired data sum. We stress
that this is also an inherent requirement in the data aggregation.
To generate and verify tags, all contributors and verifiers share one global MAC key
that consists of (k1, k2). Naturally, those nodes should be tamper-proof to protect the
protocol security. Let K1 and K2 denote the key spaces of k1 and k2 respectively, I denote
the space of node identities, and R denote the space of report identifiers. Two pseudo
random functions are required: R1 : K1 → Fdq and R2 : (K2 ×R× I)→ Fq.
The three algorithms (Sign, Aggregate, Verify) are given as follows.
• Sign(k, rid,mu, idu), by node u as a contributor
1. a = R1(k1) ∈ Fdq .
2. bu = R2(k2, rid, idu) ∈ Fq.
3. tu = a ·mu+ bu ∈ Fq, where · stands for the inner product of two vectors a and
mi over finite field Fq, that is, a ·mu is equal to a1mu,1 + a2mu,2 + · · ·+ admu,d
mod q.
• Aggregate((m1, t1, w1), . . . , (mj, tj, wj)), by an aggregator
1. m =
∑j
i=1 wimi ∈ F
d




• Verify(k, rid,m, t), by a verifier with the knowledge of contributors identities and
weights
1. a = R1(k1) ∈ Fdq .
2. b =
∑j
i=1 [wiR2(k2, rid, idi)] ∈ Fq.
3. if a ·m+ b = t outputs “ACCEPT”; otherwise outputs “REJECT”.
5.2.2 Discussions and Comparisons
By the same reduction proof of Theorem 2 in [8], this scheme is probably secure against
chosen message attack based on the pseudorandomness of R1 and R2. Since the tag size is
l-bit, in order to achieve 80-bit security level, l should not be less than 80.
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To support secure network coding, the space I in the AB scheme [8] is Fcq, albeit idi is
a vector base identifier, rather than a node id, and c is the number of vector base. Since
every message in the network coding should include a vector in Fcq to indicate the combi-
nation coefficients of c vector bases, which are analogue to weights in the data aggregation,
usually q = 28 is recommended (as in the AB Scheme) to save communication cost while
maintaining high success decoding probability for random network coding. Such a small
q, however, undermines the security level, as the tag size would be 8-bit and an adversary
can fake a message’s tag at least with probability 1/256. Fortunately, the data aggrega-
tion does not suffer that limitation—the weights are not randomly chosen by aggregators.
Therefore, we can safely use q ≥ 280.
In addition, the AB homomorphic MAC scheme specifies R1 : K1 → Fd+cq , a = R1(k1) ∈
Fd+cq , and then tu = a·(mu||idu)+b. We observe that the occurrence of idu in (a·(mi||idu))
is unnecessary and then it is removed in our revision because idu has been used in the
computation of b = R2(k2, rid, idu). This modification slightly improves the computation
performance and can apply to both network coding and data aggregation scenarios.
We notice that our proposed scheme has a similar structure to the data aggregation
MAC scheme proposed by Castelluccia et al. (CCMT scheme) [39]. In their scheme, the
space of message m is limited to Fq, which means that the tag is as long as the maximal
length of messages. This approach violates a principle on MAC that a MAC scheme should
support arbitrary length of message and output short, fixed length of tags. Admittedly,
the length of messages in our scheme has to be determined beforehand, but it is a basic
requirement for data aggregation. In addition, the CCMT scheme does not supply a
reduction security proof; Theory 2 in [39] pertaining to the scheme security is more like
an argument than a proof. Nonetheless, the CCMT scheme provides a necessary integrity
scheme for data aggregation, and our homomorphic MAC scheme can be thought as the
combination of the CCMT scheme and the AB scheme.
The security of the proposed MAC scheme relies on the pseudorandomness of R1 and R2.
In principle, all provably secure pseudorandom generators are public-key based2, involving
heavy computation. As a widely employed method, we may use AES [52] to implement
R1 and R2. In this way, the proposed scheme is very computationally efficient, and the
key lengths of k1 and k2 are 128-bit. On the other hand, an 80-bit tag will suffice to allow
a verifier to check the authenticity of an aggregated message, which presents the optimal
communication overhead. One inherent drawback in homomorphic MACs is that one single
MAC key is shared by all contributors and verifiers. If sensor nodes are not tamper-proof
and one of them is compromised by an adversary, the whole system security is breached.
2A public-key based approach does not necessarily indicate that it involves public/private keys; instead,
it implies that the approach employs typical public-key cryptosystem operations, e.g., exponentiation over
a big group.
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5.3 Integrity Schemes Based on Homomorphic Hash
In order to overcome the drawback of one global MAC key in the previous scheme, we
propose two schemes based on homomorphic hash.
5.3.1 Constructions of Homomorphic Hash Function
The first step is to find a homomorphic hash function suitable for sensor networks. At
present, there are only two homomorphic hash functions: one is based on the hardness of
discrete logarithm [98], and the other is based on the intractability of integer factoriza-
tion [70].
Discrete Logarithm [98]
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p in which the discrete logarithm problem is
hard, and the public parameters contain a description of G and d random generators
g1, g2. · · · , gd ∈ G. Then a homomorphic hash on message m = (m1,m2, · · · ,md) ∈ Zdp







It is easy to verify that the homomorphic property is satisfied in this construction, and
the collision resistance is guaranteed by the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in
G.
Integer Factorization [70]
Let N be the product of two safe primes3 so that the group QN of quadratic residues
modulo n is cyclic, and let g1, g2, · · · , gd be generators of QN . Then a homomorphic hash






gmii mod N . (5.2)
Finding a collision is computationally equivalent to factoring N , which is generally
believed to be intractable.
3A prime number p is a safe prime if (p− 1)/2 is also a prime.
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Comparison
The homomorphic hash function (5.2) can use the form of HN(m) = 2
m mod N by choos-
ing a proper N such that 2 is a generator of QN and converting message m to one single
integer. Subsequently, it eliminates the requirements of multi-generators and presents
some computational advantage over hash function (5.1) by fast exponentiation. However,
its hash value size is the same as the size of N , which is at least 1024-bit to provide
80-bit security, while by using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), the hash value size of
function (5.1) can be approximately as low as 160-bit. Moreover, the practicability of im-
plementing ECC in low-cost sensor nodes has been successfully demonstrated in [109, 141].
Therefore, we select function (5.1) as the homomorphic hash for secure data aggregation
integrity in WSNs.
5.3.2 Aggregation Integrity by Homomorphic Hash
Since we choose the homomorphic hash function (5.1), the message space is Fdp, where p is
a prime number and p ≥ 2160 for 80-bit security. For a raw message mi, node i computes
a raw hash value hi = H(mi), and uses a mechanism to sign hi, which will be specified
later, in a way that allows verifiers to check the authenticity of hi. When a verifier receives
an aggregated message m =
∑j
i=1(wjmi) along with j pairs of (raw hash value, weight)
(hi, wi), it first determines whether the hash values are legitimate, and then verifies the






This scheme is proven secure in the standard model via reductionist from the discrete
logarithm problem [98, 32], when raw hash values are authenticated by a secure mechanism.
In the following two subsections, we describe two communication-efficient mechanisms to
authenticate hi.
5.3.3 Authentication by Aggregate MAC
Aggregate MAC [92] presents the property that multiple MAC tags, computed by different
contributors on multiple raw hash values, can be aggregated into a single tag that is verified
by a verifier who shares a distinct key with each contributor. The construction of aggregate
MAC has been long known. In fact, an aggregate MAC which is provably secure [92] can
be constructed from essentially any standard message authentication code as follows.
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For simplicity, we assume that the base station is the sole verifier. Let ki be the
symmetric key shared by node i and the base station, Mac be a standard deterministic
MAC, for example: CBC-MAC [21], HMAC [20]. To authenticate a raw hash value hi,
node i generates a tag: ti = Macki(rid, hi). Any aggregator can aggregate j tags by simply
computing the XOR of all the tag values: t =
⊕j
i=1 ti. Then the base station uses the







5.3.4 Authentication by Identity-Based Aggregate Signature
Aggregate MACs, like all other symmetric-key MACs, demand verifiers to comprehend
contributors keys. In many circumstances, it would be much appreciated that all interme-
diate nodes can verify the authenticity of raw hash values (and then aggregated messages).
In terms of communication cost, the best scheme providing such a property is an identity-
based aggregate signature (IBAS), in which different raw hash values produced by many
different contributors, whose public keys are their identities, can be authenticated by one
single aggregate signature.
As far as we know, there are three IBAS schemes which are provably secure: GR
scheme [72], BN scheme [22], and BGOY scheme [30]. The BN scheme [22] requires inter-
actions of all signers, and the BGOY scheme demands a sequential signature aggregation
procedure; thus both are not suitable for secure aggregation in WSNs. One presumably
too strong assumption in the GR scheme [22] is that all signers must use a same unique
string during the period of signing, which, fortunately, is not a problem at all in the sen-
sor network aggregation application, because a unique rid for every report is known to all
nodes.
GR Paring-Based IBAS Scheme [72]
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of some large prime order q which support a bilinear
mapping ê : G1 × G1 → G2. That is, ê(aQ, bR) = ê(Q,R)ab for all Q,R ∈ G1 and all
a, b ∈ Z. The GR IBAS scheme works as follows.
• Setup: To set up the scheme, a private key generator (PKG)
1. generates groups G1 and G2 of prime order q and an admissible pairing ê :
G1 ×G1 → G2.
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2. chooses an arbitrary generator P ∈ G1.
3. picks a random s ∈ Z/qZ as the master key of PKG and sets Q = sP .
4. chooses three cryptographic hash functions H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H3 :
{0, 1}∗ → Z/qZ.
• Private key generation: Node i receives from the PKG the values of sPi,α as its
private key for α ∈ {0, 1}, where Pi,α = H1(idi, α) ∈ G1.
• Signing : To sign hi, node i
1. computes Prid = H2(rid) ∈ G1.
2. calculates ci = H3(hi, idi, rid) ∈ Z/qZ.
3. generates random ri ∈ Z/qZ.
4. computes signature (Si, Ti), where Si = riPrid + sPi,0 + cisPi,1 and Ti = riP .
• Signature Aggregation: Signatures (Si, Ti) for 1 ≤ i ≤ j can be aggregated into (S, T ),
where S =
∑j
i=1 Si, and T =
∑j
i=1 Ti.
• Verification: Any node can verify the signature by checking whether
ê(S, P )
?







This scheme is proven secure in the random oracle model, on the assumption of hardness
of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
Generally speaking, paring is a highly computation-intense operation and more costly
than ordinary public key based operations. Considering the fact that identity-based
schemes eliminate the cost of transmitting nodes public keys and most of practical identity-
based encryptions are paring-based, the use of the GR paring-based IBAS scheme in the
secure WSN data aggregation is justifiable. In addition, the work on TinyPBC [118] which
implements and measures paring operations in typical sensor nodes hardware gives an af-
firmative answer to the question of whether paring is feasible in the sensor networks, albeit
their paring implementation is understandably slow.
5.3.5 Discussions
To verify the integrity of an aggregated message, a verifier should retrieve the raw hash
values of the contributors, which constitutes considerable communication payload and is an
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instinctive downside for homomorphic-hash-based approaches. When the message size in
an application does not exceed the homomorphic hash result size (160-bit typically), then
the homomorphic hash is redundant, and directly applying aggregate MAC/signature to
raw messages is preferred. If the message size is substantially greater than the hash value
size, which is quite common for WSNs, then using homomorphic hash would significantly
reduce the communication cost, as in the application scenario described in Section 5.1.1.
To provide 80-bit security, the signature of the GR scheme is roughly 320-bit, while
a typical aggregate MAC tag is 80-bit. The third scheme, which combines homomorphic
hash function (5.1) with the GR identity-based aggregate signature, provides the most
promising security for data aggregation integrity. Since all intermediate nodes are capable
of verifying the integrity of (raw or aggregated) messages in that scheme, a malicious
node that tries to inject invalid messages into the sensor network can be easily caught.
It is worth noticing that this is achieved at the computational cost of paring operation
by intermediate nodes. By contrast, the second scheme (with aggregate MAC) does not
require paring operation and is useful in practice. If detecting an invalid (message, tag)
pair in the second scheme, the base station can require the corresponding child to submit
its aggregation record, and then interacts with grandchildren until reaching leaf nodes. In
this fashion, the base station can determine which nodes should be responsible for faking
messages and then expels them from the network.
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented three secure aggregation schemes that provide provably
secure message integrity with different tradeoffs between computation cost, communication
payload, and security assumptions. The first proposal is a concrete homomorphic MAC
scheme for sensor network data aggregation integrity, and the other two are combining
homomorphic hash with aggregate MAC and identity-based aggregate signature respec-
tively. We have detailed on the selections and constructions of those three cryptographic




Data Aggregation with Secure Bloom
Filter
In this chapter, we propose a secure data aggregation protocol which fits a specific but pop-
ular class of aggregations in wireless sensor networks. Unlike most previous approaches,
which are aimed to provide security mechanisms for ordinary aggregation operations, our
proposal, in the first place, is an effective and succinct aggregation protocol, which is
equipped with built-in security mechanisms, fulfilling the fundamental security purpose of
preventing compromised nodes as well as outside adversaries from harming network ag-
gregated results. The security technique backing up our protocol is to combine HMAC
(Hash-based Message Authentication Code), a conventional and provably secure crypto-
graphic primitive, with the popular, space-efficient data structure Bloom filter [27]. The
resulting data structure is defined as secure Bloom filter, and its security implications are
addressed at length. Then we use it to construct a secure aggregation protocol for sensor
networks. The theoretical analysis and extensive simulation results demonstrate that the
proposed protocol presents remarkable performance on security, communication cost, and
energy consumption balance degree among sensor nodes.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, we describe the application scenarios, and
define network and adversary models in Section 6.1. Then, we present secure Bloom filter
as the technical core at length in Section 6.2. Afterwards, we provide the proposed secure
aggregation protocol and corresponding analysis in Section 6.3. The simulation design and
results are elaborated in Section 6.4. Lastly, we conclude this work in Section 6.5. An
earlier version of the proposed secure data aggregation scheme appeared in [105].
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6.1 Preliminaries
6.1.1 Network and Adversary Models
Homogeneous Sensor Network
We consider an ordinary, homogeneous sensor network that consists of n low-cost sensor
nodes which are resource-constrained in terms of computation, communication, storage,
and power supply. Those sensor nodes are especially sensitive to energy consumption and
thus data aggregation is desired. As a rule, there exists a central, powerful base station
that is responsible for collecting sensor network results.
Adversary Model
Sensor nodes are not equipped with tamper-proof hardware, and the adversary is capable
of compromising and fully controlling arbitrary number of sensor nodes, but we assume
that the base station is immune to all physical attacks and it is trustworthy. Moreover,
the adversary can eavesdrop and alter any messages from integrity nodes. In a word, the
adversary is granted the full-scale attack capacity against the sensor network except the
base station.
Multi-hop Data Aggregation
In our network model, sensor nodes may be densely deployed, or nodes may only have a
few neighbors. Intuitively, the network size n should not be small and most of communi-
cations between nodes and the base station are multi-hop; otherwise, there is no point for
introduction of data aggregation. Our protocol does not rely on specific data aggregation
modes; any effective aggregation organization, no matter it is cluster-, chain-, tree-, or
grid-based [130], suffices for the proposed protocol. We do not address the problem how to
construct a specific aggregation organization, because it is quite irrelevant to our proposal.
Similar to other data aggregation schemes, we define two kinds of roles for sensor nodes:
• A contributor that detects events and generates raw messages.
• An aggregator that aggregates all messages that it received plus possibly its own raw
messages 1 and then forwards aggregated messages.
Messages are aggregated though the network; and the base station eventually retrieves
a number of aggregated messages, which are defined as reports.
1In such a case, the aggregator is also a contributor.
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Base Station Authenticated Broadcast
It is helpful for final data analysis if the base station is aware of all nodes’ positions;
but it is not mandatory for the proposed protocol. We assume that there is a secure
broadcast message authentication scheme available for the base station, which is pretty
natural for securing sensor networks. Otherwise, it is infeasible for the base station to issue
reliable, integrity commands to sensor nodes and manage the sensor network. This simple
requirement can be easily satisfied for wireless sensor networks. We may use the popular,
lightweight, symmetric-key hash-chain-based µTESLA authentication protocol [124] for
this purpose. Alternatively, all nodes are preloaded with the base station’s public key, and
then messages from the base station are signed and verified through classical signature
schemes. For simplicity, we ignore specific choices on broadcast message authentication.
Simplistic Key Predistribution Requirement
Every node shares a distinct long-term key with the base station. Those keys are pre-
distributed into sensor nodes prior to deployment. No pairwise keys between sensor nodes
or any other kinds of keys are demanded. Sensor nodes are equipped with a cryptographic
hash function. Those constitute all security primitive requirements of the proposed pro-
tocol. As a general method to reduce its key storage, the base station may employ a
pseudorandom generator (PRG) along with one main key, which generates a node’s key
using the node’s ID and the main key as the input of PRG.
6.1.2 Application Scenarios
As a typical data aggregation application scenario of our proposal, a wireless sensor network
is employed in a hostile environment to detect a number of predefined, basic events with two
states: ON and OFF. For most of time, these events stay OFF: they did not occur. When
sensor nodes detect an event taking place, they notify the base station about their discovery.
Since there are many nodes simultaneously detecting same events, data aggregation is
desired to reduce communication costs and to balance nodes energy consumption. The
base station may be tolerant of a little inaccuracy on final aggregated results, as long as
the majority of nodes event reports are recovered such that it is able to figure out that
specific events happened in a certain region.
Even though this scenario looks like relatively simplistic, it is fairly popular for wireless
sensor network applications. For instance, an intrusion-detection sensor network [112]
successfully triggers an alarm for a perimeter intrusion event. Moreover, sophisticated tasks
can be decomposed into many basic events. In such cases, sensor nodes are responsible for
simple event detection, which significantly reduces their production expenditure, while the
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base station performs advanced data analysis. Other application scenarios are voting and
counting mechanisms for sensor networks. For example, in many secure sensor network
protocols, malicious nodes are determined by majority results from nodes voting; and under
many circumstances, the base station may need to frequently count the number of nodes
that match some standards.
6.1.3 Security Objectives
Data confidentiality is not a concern for the application scenarios at which our proposal
is targeted. For simple event detection networks, if an adversary is physically close to
sensor nodes, he can easily sense those simple events on his own. Certainly, some extent of
message privacy is appreciated. Barely given a message and without any other knowledge,
should an adversary not tell which nodes have contributed to the message and what events
are reported.
Generally speaking, the main security goal of secure aggregation is to strictly restrain
adversary’s influence only on those compromised nodes. First, even with collusion of all
other sensor nodes, an adversary cannot fake a specific node’s event report with more than
a low, theoretically-limited probability. Second, other than compromised nodes’ input
on an event report, the adversary is only able to affect accumulative results in a trivial
way. Otherwise, the scheme should detect the abnormality and discard related results. If
intermediate nodes manipulate or drop integrity nodes’ event-report messages, the secure
aggregation scheme should be able to effectively detect the attacks.
6.1.4 Native Solution without Data Aggregation
There exists a straightforward, native solution to fulfilling the aforementioned security
objectives, which does not engage data aggregation and then incurs heavy communication
cost. When node u detects an event e, it generates a raw message composed of Mac(Ku, e)
and sends to the base station, where Ku is the symmetric key shared by node u and the
base station, and Mac denotes a tag by a standard deterministic MAC. When the base
station receives a message, it may try all combinations to figure out which node claims
which event. In order to prevent message-dropping by malicious nodes, the base station
broadcasts all messages it received through the broadcast authentication mechanism. If a
node does not obtain the authenticated acknowledgment of its raw message in a reasonable
time slot, it will notify the base station about a potential of the attack.
It may seem tempting to use aggregate MAC [92], which aggregates multiple MAC
tags by different contributors into a single tag that can be verified by the base station,
to reduce the communication payload of the native scheme. Unfortunately, in such an
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application, an aggregate tag has to list all contributors and associated events such that
the base station can verify the tag. Consequently, the size of an aggregated message is still
proportional to the number of contributors and events. Moreover, it violates the message
privacy objective.
6.2 Secure Bloom Filter
The technical core of our proposal is a variant of Bloom filter, for which we coin the term
secure Bloom filter.
6.2.1 Foundation: Bloom Filter
Bloom filter, conceived by Bloom [27], is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure that
succinctly represents a set in order to support membership queries. Due to its distinguished
space advantages and excellent distributed properties, Bloom filter has been widely used
in numerous areas, such as web cache sharing [61] and distributed storage system [43].
Typical Implementation of Bloom Filter
Typically, a Bloom filter is implemented as a bit-array of m bits associated with h different
hash functions, each of which maps an element to one of them array positions in a uniformly
random manner. All bits in an initial Bloom filter are set to 0, standing for an empty set.
To insert an element e into a set represented by a Bloom filter BF, h array positions
are calculated by hash functions on e and the bits at those positions in BF are set to 1.
Correspondingly, when it is required to check the membership of an element v within the
Bloom filter BF, supplying v to hash functions outputs h array positions; if any of the bits
at the h positions is 0, then element v does not belong to the set; otherwise, the element
is claimed to be a member of the set.
Properties of Bloom Filter
It is easy to see that there is no false negative in the Bloom filter membership verification—
an element which tests negative within a Bloom filter definitely is not a legitimate member
of the set. On the other hand, Bloom filter may yield false positive: a member outside
the set passing the membership verification on the Bloom filter. The probability of a false
positive for an element not in the set, or the false positive probability, can be calculated in
a straightforward manner.
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Let ζ be the probability of a bit being 0 in a Bloom filter, the false positive probability
is then
PFP = (1− ζ)h . (6.1)
After inserting t elements in a Bloom filter, assume that the hash functions outputs are
























ln 2 ≈ 0.6931m
t
.
In such a case, ζ = 0.5, and the false positive probability is 2−h ≈ (0.6185)m/t. Hence, the
optimal results are achieved when each bit of the Bloom filter is 0 with probability 1/2.
In a typical parameters determination procedure of Bloom filter, users specify desired
false positive probability PFP and predicted inserted element number t, then h and m can
be calculated via
h = d− log2 PFPe
and
m = dht/ln 2e .
6.2.2 Specification of Secure Bloom Filter
Suppose that the Bloom filter is used in a distributed environment and each element is
associated with a specific user claiming an event. It is easy to see that the original Bloom
filter data structure does not support a necessary security property—A malicious user or
an adversary which is allowed to manipulate the data can forge other users’ inputs. We
introduce the secure Bloom filter to prevent this attack. Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 6.1 (Secure Bloom Filter). Suppose that every user is allocated with a random,
secret key. A secure Bloom filter is a data structure that not only maintains all properties of
the original Bloom filter, but also guarantees the infeasibility of an adversary constructing
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a valid input associated with a user claiming an event, without the knowledge of the user’s
key. The probability of a successful forging is defined as the advantage of an adversary
against the secure Bloom filter, and is denoted by Adv.
Secure Bloom filter can been constructed by deploying a cryptographic hash function,
through HMAC, to substitute a family of hash functions for the Bloom filter.
Definition of a Standard HMAC
We use the cryptographic hash function by means of HMAC because it is provably secure
[20] and has been standardized [97]. Let H(∗) denote a cryptographic hash function.
According to RFC 2104 [97], to authenticate a message e with a secret symmetric key K,
HMac(K, e) is defined by
HMac(K, e) = H ((K ⊕ opad) ‖ H((K ⊕ ipad) ‖ e)) ,
where ‖ denotes concatenation, ⊕ denotes exclusive-OR (XOR), opad is the one-block-size
outer padding (0x5c5c. . . 5c), and ipad is the one-block-size inner padding (0x3636. . . 36).
Construction of Secure Bloom Filter
Now we make use of HMAC to construct secure Bloom filter that efficiently supports event
reporting and message aggregation in wireless sensor networks. Suppose there are c pre-
defined events (e1, e2, . . . , ec), and each event is associated with an event identifier, which
is a nonce and may be refreshed by the base station on a regular basis. When node u with
identity idu detects event ei, whose current event identifier is Nei , the node creates a secure
Bloom filter BFu,ei as follows.
For simplicity and computational efficiency, we assume that the size of a secure Bloom
filter is a power of two, say m = 2d, where d is an integer. We stress that in principal
m can be any positive integer. Recall that node u shares a distinct symmetric key Ku
with the base station. The node calculates HMac(Ku, idu‖Nei) and the output is divided
into h equal size pieces of d bits each 2 such that each piece indicates a position on the
Bloom filter array. We denote this processing by BFu,ei ← HMac(Ku, idu‖Nei). Based on
the pseudorandomness assumption of the cryptographic hash function H(∗), it effectively
performs as k distinct hash functions with uniformly-distributed output, and all theoretical
analysis on the classical Bloom filter still holds for the secure Bloom filter.
2If the output block size of HMAC is greater than dh, it can be truncated. When the size is less than
dh, we may conduct several rounds of HMAC operations with different salts to obtain sufficient output.
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Selection of Cryptographic Hash Function
For the specific choice of the cryptographic hash function, at present we select SHA-1.
Even though collisions have been found in SHA-1 [147], which raises serious concerns on
its security, virtually it does not damage the secure Bloom filter, since its security, same as
HMAC [20], relies on second preimage resistance of underlying hash function, rather than
the more strong requirement of collision resistance. By now, there is no published result of
second preimage attacks against SHA-1. Of course, when SHA-3 is finalized in the future,
SHA-1 may be replaced by SHA-3 in the protocol for the purpose of higher security level.
6.2.3 Security Property of Secure Bloom Filter
We now show how to select appropriate parameters to achieve a desired security level of a
secure Bloom filter. The following theorem states the analytic formula of the adversary’s
advantage against a secure Bloom filter.
Theorem 6.1. The advantage of an adversary against secure Bloom filter with parameters
(m,h) is
Adv(m,h) = m−h max
1≤i≤h











τ(h, j) if i > 1
1 if i = 1
. (6.4)
Proof. Based on the security of HMAC and the pseudorandomness of cryptographic hash
function, we derive the advantage of an adversary against secure Bloom filter with param-
eters (m,h). Without loss of generality, we suppose that adversary A is required to output
a secure Bloom filter BFA which should be identical to BFu,e for node u claiming event Ne.
Let p1(i) be the probability of the number of bit ones in BFu,e being i. Obviously p1(i)










where τ(h, i) is equal to the output of the following problem: How many distinct words we
can get if we use i different letters to construct words of length h while it is required that
all i letters are used.
If the underlining HMAC algorithm is secure, then the adversary only can output
random BFA with the number of bit ones that he selects. When the bit one number of
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for maximal τ(h, i) for Adv ≤ 2−80 for Adv ≤ 2−100
6 5 1,800 35,999 362,838
7 5 16,800 11,066 80,176
8 6 191,520 4,684 26,495
9 7 2,328,480 2,417 11,278
10 8 30,240,000 1,434 5,733
11 8 4.79E+08 952 3,356
12 9 8.08E+09 680 2,159
13 10 1.43E+11 514 1,492
14 10 2.73E+12 406 1,093
15 11 5.91E+13 334 842
16 12 1.32E+15 282 671
BFu,e is i, the probability that a random BF













Consider τ(h, i) in the context of the word-counting problem. When i = 1, τ(h, i) = 1.
If i > 1, by recursion, we can get








This completes the proof.
In practice, h is relatively small, thus we just explore all values of τ(h, i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ h
by Equation (6.4), and then retrieve max1≤i≤h τ(h, i). Subsequently, Adv(m,h) can be
computed by Equation (6.3), or we can determine the minimal m satisfying a desig-
nated security level. Intuitively, for 80-bit security, the selections of (m,h) should satisfy
Adv(m,h) ≤ 2−80. To facilitate parameter selections, we calculate and form Table 6.1 as
secure Bloom filter parameters lookup table for h = 6, 7, . . . , 16.
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which may be further approximated as
p2(h) ≈ h! e(h
2−0.5h)/mm−h ≈ h! m−h ,
when m h. In other words, even if an adversary is aware that a particular secure Bloom
filter has h bits of ones, the probability that he successfully forges it is roughly h! m−h.
6.3 Proposed Protocol
6.3.1 Protocol Description and Analysis
An interesting property of Bloom filter is inherently supporting aggregation by bitwise-
ORing Bloom filters of a same kind together to generate one Bloom filter such that the set
represented by the output Bloom filter is the union of the sets of input Bloom filters. Let
∨ denote the bitwise-OR operation on Bloom filters. This desired aggregation property
perfectly applies to secure Bloom filters generated by sensor nodes with different keys, and
thus we take advantage of it in the proposed protocol, which consists of the following four
stages.
Stage 1: Initialization
To activate sensor nodes detection on selected events (e1, e2, . . . , ec), the base station broad-
casts to all nodes an authenticated task message, including fresh nonces (Ne1 , Ne2 , . . . , Nec)
as event identifies, along with events specifications if necessary. For dynamic parameter
settings, the task message contains the selected values for the parameters.
Stage 2: Event Claiming and Aggregation
When node u detects that event Nei occurs, it generates a new Bloom filter
BFu,ei ← HMac(Ku, idu‖Nei) ,
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Algorithm 6.1 ProcessReport(BFj): A verifier processes a report BFj
1: if the bit one percentage of BFj exceeds ρ then
2: ALERT: BFj is corrupted, discard it
3: return false
4: create an empty BFtest for testing
5: for each BFu,ei do
6: if BFu,ei ∧ BFj = BFu,ei then
7: assert that node u has claimed event ei
8: BFtest ⇐ BFtest ∨ BFu,ei
9: if BFtest 6= BFj then
10: ALERT: BFj is corrupted, discard it
11: cancel off all previous assertions
12: return false
13: return true
which constitutes the raw message by node u as a contributor to claim event Nei .
The aggregation on messages is straightforward and efficient. Suppose an aggregator
node v receives j messages of BFvi , where i = 1, 2, · · · , j, some of which might be contributed
by node v itself, it calculates an aggregated message by
BF′ = BFv1 ∨ BFv2 ∨ · · · ∨ BFvj ,
To maintain a reasonably slow false positive probability of Bloom filter, aggregators cannot
aggregate messages without a limitation. As we see now, the way that we use Bloom filter is
quite different from most of other applications. As the message carrier to traverse networks,
Bloom filter should not use large m for the sake of communication cost. In fact, m ≤ nc
for most cases. As result, in addition to m and h for Bloom filter settings, our protocol
requires a third parameter: bit one percentage upper-bound ρ. Accordingly, aggregator v
tries its best to output one or several aggregated messages with respect to the threshold ρ.
In that way, there would be no legitimate Bloom filter whose bit one percentage exceeds ρ.
Recall that the false positive probability is optimized when the probability of a bit being
0 in a Bloom filter is 1/2 (see Section 6.2.1), thus threshold ρ is set to be 50% for most
circumstances.
After aggregating messages with respect to ρ, aggregator v sends the aggregated mes-
sage(s) to next node according to the underlying data aggregation organization.
Stage 3: Processing Reports
Eventually, the base station receives l reports BFj, where j = 1, 2, · · · , l. Using its dis-
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tinct keys shared with nodes, the base station calculates all nc Bloom filters corresponding
to node-event pairs beforehand. For each report, the base station conducts Algorithm 6.1
to proceed it, intended to discover which nodes claimed which events and to detect attacks.
Let ∧ denote bitwise-AND operation, during the processing procedure, if
BFu,ei ∧ BFj = BFu,ei ,
that is, all bit one occurrences in BFu,ei appear in BFj, the base station determines that
node u has claimed event ei. Certainly, false positives may occur for this verification as an
inherent downside of Bloom filter. We define the false positive rate RFP as the ratio of the
count of false positives over the node-event pair number (i.e., nc).
In the ideal case where all l reports are independent and have ρ proportion of bit
1, the false positive probability within a report is ρh by Equation (6.1). Suppose nc is
much greater than the raw message number, then the number of false positives roughly
follows a binomial distribution of parameter (nc, 1− (1−ρh)l), and then its expected value
approximates nc(1− (1− ρh)l). Therefore,
R
(ideal)
FP ≈ 1− (1− ρ
h)l ≈ 1− e−lρh . (6.5)
In reality, most of reports have less than ρ fraction of bit one, and the expected value of
false positive number is related to l as bigger l may indicate more number of raw messages.
Therefore, R
(ideal)
FP is an upper bound of RFP.
If compromised nodes misleadingly claim events with their own keys, clearly there are no
effective methods to prevent this attack except for designing and conducting complicated
and expensive detection protocols. We are not concerned about that issue; instead the
proposed protocol is supported to detect message manipulation attack. The steps related
to BFtest in Algorithm 6.1 carry out that mission.
Recall that by selecting proper (m,h), it is infeasible for the adversary to construct
a legitimate secure Bloom filter associated with integrity nodes. During transmission,
messages may be maliciously altered by adding or deleting some bits. To detect this kind
of attack, actually we only need to consider the case that some bits in reports are randomly
flipped by the adversary. We stress that the base station is solely responsible and capable
of processing messages and those effective manipulations shall eventually reflect on reports;
if the adversary replaces a message by another message, in fact it is an interception rather
than manipulation, and the countermeasure will be addressed later. If the adversary adds a
valid message to an unrelated report, that is not a manipulation attack either, and merely
it slightly increase the false positive rate, which is still bounded by Equation (6.5).
We evaluate the probability Pdet of the base station detecting that a random bit zero
in a report is flipped to bit one, which might be the manipulation case that is detected
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Stage 4: Verification by All Nodes
To detect whether malicious nodes intercepted messages related to intact nodes, the base
station broadcasts those l reports throughout the whole network. In addition, in order to
prevent the message replay attack, the base station should notify all sensor nodes to update
event identifiers with new nonces. Surely this stage can be twisted with the initialization
stage to add/update/delete events. All those messages are still authenticated by the base
station’s broadcast authentication scheme.
As long as an intact node is not isolated by compromised nodes from the base station,
the node can receive those reports and verity the authenticity of messages. Therefore,
the node that claimed the event can determine whether its report is included in the final
results. If not, the node notifies this abnormality to the base station in any available secure,
uni-cast means by its node key. In addition, if nodes find that there are some false positives
related to them, they may report to the base station. If the base station determines that
the number of missing raw messages exceeds a reasonable threshold, it may conclude that
there exists a message interception attack in the network and further security mechanisms
can be conducted.
6.3.2 Discussions
Compression on Bloom Filter
The entropies of raw messages are pretty low—most of bits are zero because there is
only one element in a set that the a raw message Bloom filter represents. As a natural
way to reduce the transmission sizes of messages, this kind of Bloom filters should be
compressed in our protocol. The problem of compressed Bloom filter has been researched
by Mitzenmacher [116], who demonstrates that a better compression rate can be achieved
by utilizing smaller h and bigger m while maintaining the same level of false positive
probability.
However, that rationale does not fit the case of our protocol. First, the selection of h
matters to the security level of secure Bloom filter. Second, there are many Bloom filters
with varying entropies during the protocol procedure, one pre-determined parameter set
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hardly can provide overall desired transmission savings. Therefore, we does not make use of
the results in [116]. Instead, a succinct compression mechanism is employed in our protocol:
one additional bit b attached to a Bloom filter indicates that the filter is normally stored as
before when b = 0, and if b = 1, then the filter is expressed as a list of all bit one positions.
Since the number of bit ones is dynamical, such a list should contain a number-indication
segment of bit length w = dlog2(m/d)e, where m = 2d. Before transmitting a Bloom filter,
a node chooses the coding which leads to smaller transmission size. Specifically, the list
expression is used only if the number of bit ones is less than (m− w)/d.
Parameters, Computation and Storage Costs
For sensor networks of size n varying from hundreds to thousands, and to provide 80-bit
security level, we recommend m = 1024, h = 11 according to Table 6.1. Because we use
SHA-1, whose output size is 160 bit, performing one HMAC function that consists of two
SHA-1 calculations would suffice for nodes to construct one raw message. This is the major
computation burden on nodes; other calculations such as bit one percentage checking and
aggregation are simple bitwise operations and are relatively trivial. We assume that the key
length is 160-bit, so the primary storage cost of our protocol is merely 20 bytes. Therefore,
our protocol is computation- and storage-efficient.
6.4 Simulations
To verify the theoretical analysis above and evaluate the protocol performance, we im-
plement the proposed data aggregation protocol and run simulations on our extended
framework over the OMNeT++ simulator (see Section 1.4). By design, we implement




We run simulations in two network scenarios. The first one is a hierarchical network
represented by a Tree rooted on the base station, which fairly emulates many wireless
sensor networks. We generate a tree topology in a way that the number of a non-leaf
node’s children is uniformly selected from four, five, and six. In our experiments, the
network size for the Tree Topology increases from 200 to 2000 at a step of 200.
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The other one is the Unit-Disk Graph, under which we run simulations for network
sizes ranging from 500 to 5000 with a space of 500 between. Likewise, we adjust the node
communication range such that the average node degree keeps the approximate 20.
Mechanisms of Claiming Events
On each network scenario, we specify two different levels of workload to activate nodes
claiming events, one for mild work burden, and the other for relatively heavy turnover.
For the Tree Topology, in each round of protocol procedure, 20% and 50% of sensor nodes,
respectively for two levels of workload, are randomly chosen as contributors to claim an
event. For the Unit-Disk Graph, we designate that nodes are capable of detecting events
taking place no farther than a distance of 100, and at the beginning of each round, an
event occurs at two and six positions (respectively for two workload levels and analogue
to 20% and 50% contributors settings in the Tree topology) that are uniformly selected in
the square.
Simulation Arrangement
Overall, there are four test cases: Tree Topology with mild workload, Tree Topology with
heavy workload, Unit-Disk Graph with mild workload, and Unit-Disk Graph with heavy
workload. Each case is associated with ten different network sizes, requiring 40 experi-
ments. Similarly, in order to obtain relatively fair and comparable results, ten random
networks in accordance with the parameter settings are constructed for each experiment,
each of whose simulation executions is quoted as a run. In each run, we perform 100
rounds of protocol processing with new events and randomly selected contributors/event-
locations. For the purpose of communication cost comparison, in addition to our proposed
protocol, the native scheme described in Section 6.1.4 is also conducted under the identical
conditions. We assume that the message length is 128-bit in the native scheme. Since the
last stage is needed for both our protocol and the native scheme, the experiment results
on communication cost do not consider that stage. To evaluate the protocol’s detection
probability Pdet, we imitate the manipulation attack by randomly flipping a bit zero of a
report and then measure whether the base station subsequently detects that the report is
illegitimate. For each report, this procedure is repeated by twenty times. The final runs
outputs are averaged to create the corresponding experiment results.
6.4.2 Experimental Results
In figures of this chapter, “Proposal”, “Native”, “(M)”, and “(H)” respectively stand for
our proposed data aggregation protocol, the native scheme, mild workload, and heavy
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Figure 6.1: Simulation Results on Protocols Communication Performance
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Figure 6.2: Simulation Results Related to Protocol Security
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workload. The protocols communication performance along with their comparison are
depicted in Figure 6.1. Similar to many sensor network protocols, the communication
cost of the proposed protocol is evaluated by average transmission bits per node, and the
experimental results on communication cost are depicted in Figure 6.1a and Figure 6.1b.
For a data aggregation scheme, the energy consumption of aggregators and the balance
among them are critical performance metrics; so we also measure the means (Figure 6.1c
and Figure 6.1d) and the standard deviations (Figure 6.1e and Figure 6.1f) of bits sent
by aggregators (intermediate nodes for the native scheme). The simulation results clearly
demonstrate that for all four test cases, our protocol remarkably outweighs the native
scheme on all three metrics; not only the protocol reduces the overall energy consumption
and reserves previous energy of aggregators, but also it achieves splendid balance among
aggregators, which is highly desired for data aggregation scheme. Moreover, as those
measurements for our protocol gently grow with n, it proves that the proposed protocol
scales to network size well, which is quite appreciated for large-size sensor networks.
The simulation results regarding the protocol’s security are illuminated in Figure 6.2.
Specifically, Figure 6.2a and Fig 6.2b depict the protocol false positive rates; Figure 6.2c
and Fig 6.2d show the average report numbers; Figure 6.2e and Figure 6.2f exhibit the
detection probabilities. The false positive rates of our protocol are fairly small, compared
to typical Bloom filter applications. By applying the experimental results of report number
l to Equation (6.5), we verify that the previous theoretical analysis on RFP holds as all
false positive rates are indeed bounded on Equation (6.5). Lastly, the high detection
probabilities, all of which are greater than 98% in the simulations, exemplify the strong
security of our protocol.
6.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have proposed a practical secure data aggregation protocol for wireless
sensor network based on Bloom filter, and conducted thorough theoretical analysis on the
related topics. The extensive simulation results sufficiently demonstrate that the proposal





This chapter summarizes the research contributions of the thesis and provides recommen-
dations for future work.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
Efficient Entity Authentication for Low-Cost Devices
Our contributions on entity authentication for low-cost devices are three-fold.
1. Circulant-P2 Matrix. As the foundation for our entity authentication proposals,
we have introduced a special type of circulant matrix with the name of circulant-
P2 matrix, derived from the matrix dimension m that is a prime number satisfying
integer two is a primitive element of GF (m). We have proved the linear independence
of matrix vectors, present efficient matrix operation algorithms, and explored other
important properties.
2. One-Way Authentication Protocols. Based on the learning parity with noise problem
and circulant-P2 matrix, we have developed two unilateral authentication protocols.
• The first one is the innovative LCMQ protocol, which is provably secure against
all PPT attacks and provides excellent performance on almost all metrics except
for the requirement that the verifier should have the computational capacity to
perform extended Euclidean algorithm.
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• The other one is the HBC protocol, which utilizes the conventional HB-like au-
thentication structure to preserve the bit-operation only computation require-
ment for both authentication participants. Compared to previous HB-like proto-
cols, the HBC protocol substantially reduces the key storage consumption, while
other performance measurements as well as the vulnerability to the OOV at-
tack remain. Two enhancement mechanisms are provided to protect the HB-like
protocols from the OOV attack and to improve performance.
3. Mutual Authentication. We have proposed a framework to incorporate enhanced HB-
like protocols, including HBC, into mutual authentication, which is communication-
efficient and especially suitable for extremely computation-constrained sensor nodes.
The application scenarios in sensor networks have been discussed at length.
Sensor Node Clone Distributed Detection Protocols
We have proposed two distributed protocols to detect node clone with different tradeoffs on
network environment, communication cost, and security level. One is based on the popular
distributed technique: distributed hash table, while the other utilizes our proposed prob-
abilistic directed exploration mechanism along with initial random direction to facilitate
efficient detection.
• The DHT-based protocol can deterministically detect node clone in general sensor
networks, and it is accompanied with robust, theoretically analytic formulas to eval-
uate protocol performance on storage consumption and security level.
• In contrast, the randomly directed exploration protocol presents extraordinary com-
munication performance and minimal storage consumption with high detection prob-
ability in dense sensor networks.
For both protocols, the extensive simulations provide thorough performance measurements,
and verify the system design and analysis.
Secure Data Aggregation Schemes in Sensor Networks
To fulfill different challenges for securing data aggregation in sensor networks, we have
proposed two kinds of schemes. The first is to provide cryptographic integrity mechanisms
for general data aggregation, whereas the other is a substantial data aggregation scheme
that is suitable for a specific and popular class of aggregation applications, armed with
built-in security techniques that effectively defeat outside and inside attacks.
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• Data integrity mechanisms that are compatible with general message aggregation are
important in sensor networks. Based on recent developments of homomorphic prim-
itives, we have presented three integrity schemes purposely for WSNs data aggrega-
tion: a concrete homomorphic MAC construction, homomorphic hash plus aggregate
MAC, and homomorphic hash with identity-based aggregate signature. They provide
different tradeoffs on security assumption, communication payload, and computation
cost.
• By applying HMAC to Bloom filter, we have developed a new data structure: secure
Bloom filter, which has inherent aggregation compatibility as well as reliable security
properties, and builds the foundation of our proposed secure data aggregation scheme
for designated applications. The theoretical analysis and comprehensive simulations
indicate that the protocol has competitive performance on security, communication
cost, and energy consumption balance among homogeneous nodes.
7.2 Future Work
Providing reliable security mechanisms for large-scale sensor networks of low-cost nodes
is an interesting and challenging research area. While many issues have been addressed
successfully, other problems still remain open and need further study. On the other hand,
many techniques behind our work in this thesis may be extended to other new rising
application areas with added efforts.
Extended Applications of Circulant-P2 Matrix
With the attractive properties of circulant-P2 matrix, we believe that it has broader appli-
cations on cryptographic algorithms, especially combined with the presence of noise. In the
recent years, the learning parity with noise problem has been generalized into the learn-
ing with error problem [134], and inspired many lattice-based public-key cryptosystems
[115, 122] with promising features, such as provable security reduced to the worse case of
a hard problem [134] and fully homomorphic encryption [71]. Unfortunately, those algo-
rithms performance is not satisfactory for practical applications. By means of circulant-P2
matrix, we may achieve substantial improvements in this field. On the other hand, there
exist possibilities that some efficient algorithms purely relying on circulant-P2 matrix can
be constructed. We will study both of the directions.
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Computationally Efficient Cryptographic Primitives
Computationally efficient entity authentication is the starting point of our research on a
family of cryptographic primitives for low-cost devices. In the future, we intend to develop
message authentication code, symmetric encryption, and hash functions that only require
bit-operations. The learning parity with noise problem is surely a main tool that we can
count on, but we also need to explore more other techniques.
Homomorphic Algorithms
Homomorphic cryptographic algorithms are the most reliable mechanisms to ensure secu-
rity for general data aggregation in wireless sensor networks. Even though many homomor-
phic approaches have been proposed, they suffer from certain restriction that limits their
applications in sensor network. In particular, there is no practical homomorphic mechanism
that enables any user to verify aggregate messages’ integrity in a communication-efficient
fashion. This formidable task will be in our study domain.
Secure Cloud Computing
Security is one of the most important and urgent concerns in the cloud computing. Even
though the application environment of secure cloud computing is quite different from wire-
less sensor networks, some techniques may still be useful in this new area. Specifically,
cryptographic primitives based on circulant-P2 matrix, homomorphic algorithms, and se-
cure Bloom filter will facilitate our research on secure cloud storage [14, 58] and anonymous
search in cloud databases [133].
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[58] Chris Erway, Alptekin Küpçü, Charalampos Papamanthou, and Roberto Tamassia.
Dynamic provable data possession. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on
Computer and communications security (CCS’09), Full version available at: Cryptol-
ogy ePrint Archive: Report 2008/432, pages 213–222, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 2009.
ACM. 136
[59] Laurent Eschenauer and Virgil D. Gligor. A key-management scheme for distributed
sensor networks. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security, pages 41–47, Washington, DC, USA, 2002. 9, 17, 69, 70
[60] Deborah Estrin, Ramesh Govindan, John Heidemann, and Satish Kumar. Next
Century Challenges: Scalable Coordination in Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of
the 5th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking,
pages 263–270, Seattle, 1999. IEEE Computer Society. 19
[61] Li Fan, Pei Cao, Jussara Almeida, and Andrei Z. Broder. Summary cache: a scalable
wide-area web cache sharing protocol. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking,
8(3):281–293, 2000. 119
[62] Elena Fasolo, Michele Rossi, Jorg Widmer, and Michele Zorzi. In-network aggregation
techniques for wireless sensor networks: a survey. IEEE Wireless Communications,
14(2):70–87, 2007. 19
[63] Caroline Fontaine and Fabien Galand. A survey of homomorphic encryption for
nonspecialists. EURASIP Journal on Information Security, 2007(1):1–10, 2007. 20,
105
142
[64] Marc Fossorier, Miodrag Mihaljevi, Hideki Imai, Yang Cui, and Kanta Matsuura. An
Algorithm for Solving the LPN Problem and Its Application to Security Evaluation of
the HB Protocols for RFID Authentication. In Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT
2006, pages 48–62. LNCS 4329, 2006. 27
[65] Aviezri S. Fraenkel and Yaacov Yesha. Complexity of solving algebraic equations.
Inf. Process. Lett., 10(4/5):178–179, 1980. 50
[66] Keith B. Frikken and Joseph A. Dougherty I. V. An efficient integrity-preserving
scheme for hierarchical sensor aggregation. In Proceedings of the first ACM conference
on Wireless network security (WiSec’08), pages 68–76, Alexandria, VA, USA, 2008.
ACM. 21
[67] Dmitry Frumkin and Adi Shamir. Un-Trusted-HB: Security Vulnerabilities of
Trusted-HB. In The 5th Workshop on RFID Security (RFIDSec 09), 2009. 29
[68] Thomas Fuhrmann. Scalable routing for networked sensors and actuators. In Pro-
ceedings of IEEE SECON 2005, pages 240–251, 2005. 76, 91
[69] Michael R. Garey and David S. Johnson. Computers and Intractability: A Guide to
the Theory of NP-Completeness, volume Chapter 7.2 The Polynomial Hierarchy. W.
H. Freeman, 1979. 49, 50
[70] Rosario Gennaro, Jonathan Katz, Hugo Krawczyk, and Tal Rabin. Secure Network
Coding Over the Integers. In Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2010, pages 142–160.
LNCS 6056, 2010. 102, 106, 109
[71] Craig Gentry. Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. In Proceedings of
the 41st annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 169–178, Bethesda,
MD, USA, 2009. ACM. 20, 105, 135
[72] Craig Gentry and Zulfikar Ramzan. Identity-Based Aggregate Signatures. In Public
Key Cryptography - PKC 2006, pages 257–273. LNCS 3958, 2006. 102, 111
[73] E. N. Gilbert. Random Plane Networks. Journal of the Society for Industrial and
Applied Mathematics, 9(4):533–543, 1961. 11
[74] Henri Gilbert, Matt Robshaw, and Herve Sibert. An Active Attack Against HB+ - A
Provably Secure Lightweight Authentication Protocol. Technical report, Cryptology
ePrint Archive: Report 2005/237, 2005. 28
[75] Henri Gilbert, Matthew J.B. Robshaw, and Yannick Seurin. Good Variants of HB+
are Hard to Find. In Financial Crypt 2008, 2008. 29
143
[76] Henri Gilbert, Matthew J.B. Robshaw, and Yannick Seurin. HB#: Increasing the
Security and Efficiency of HB+. In Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT 2008,
Full version available at: Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/028. 2008. 14, 15,
29, 30, 31, 40, 41, 42, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61
[77] Solomon W. Golomb and Guang Gong. Signal Design for Good Correlation: For
Wireless Communication, Cryptography, and Radar. Cambridge University Press,
2004. 33
[78] Ghaith Hammouri and Berk Sunar. PUF-HB: A Tamper-Resilient HB Based Au-
thentication Protocol. In Applied Cryptography and Network Security, pages 346–365.
LNCS 5037, 2008. 29
[79] Johan H̊astad. Some optimal inapproximability results. In Proceedings of the twenty-
ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, El Paso, Texas, United
States, 1997. 27
[80] D. R. Heath-Brown. Artin’s conjecture for primitive roots. Quarterly Journal of
Mathematics, 37(1):27–38, 1986. 46
[81] Jun-Won Ho, Matthew Wright, and Sajal K. Das. Fast Detection of Replica Node
Attacks in Mobile Sensor Networks Using Sequential Analysis. In INFOCOM 2009,
pages 1773–1781, 2009. 17
[82] Nicholas Hopper and Manuel Blum. Secure Human Identification Protocols. In
Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2001, pages 52–66. LNCS 2248, 2001. 27
[83] Lingxuan Hu and David Evans. Secure aggregation for wireless networks. In Proceed-
ings of the 2003 Symposium on Applications and the Internet Workshops (SAINT’03
Workshops), pages 384 – 391, 2003. 20
[84] YihChun Hu, Adrian Perrig, and David B. Johnson. Packet Leashes: A Defense
against Wormhole Attacks in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of IEEE
Infocom 2003, San Francisco, 2003. 16
[85] Yueh-Min Huang, Meng-Yen Hsieh, and Frode Eika Sandnes. Wireless Sensor Net-
works and Applications. In Sensors, Advancements in Modeling, Design Issues, Fab-
rication and Practical Applications, pages 199–219. 2008. 5
[86] Mark L. Huson and Arunabha Sen. Broadcast scheduling algorithms for radio net-
works. In IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM ’95), volume 2,
pages 647–651, 1995. 10
144
[87] Teerawat Issariyakul and Ekram Hossain. Introduction to Network Simulator NS2.
Springer, 2008. 12
[88] Pawan Jadia and Anish Mathuria. Efficient Secure Aggregation in Sensor Networks.
In High Performance Computing (HiPC 2004), pages 40–49. LNCS 3296, 2004. 21
[89] Canming Jiang, Bao Li, and Haixia Xu. An Efficient Scheme for User Authenti-
cation in Wireless Sensor Networks. In 21st International Conference on Advanced
Information Networking and Applications Workshops, pages 438–442, 2007. 14
[90] Robert Johnson, David Molnar, Dawn Song, and David Wagner. Homomorphic
Signature Schemes. In Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2002, pages 204–245. LNCS
2271, 2002. 105
[91] Ari Juels and Stephen A. Weis. Authenticating Pervasive Devices with Human Pro-
tocols. In Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO 2005, pages 293–308. LNCS 3621, 2005.
14, 15, 27, 28, 40, 41, 59
[92] Jonathan Katz and Andrew Lindell. Aggregate Message Authentication Codes. In
Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2008, pages 155–169. LNCS 4964, 2008. 102, 110,
118
[93] Jonathan Katz and Ji Shin. Parallel and Concurrent Security of the HB and HB+
Protocols. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2006, pages 73–87. LNCS
4004, 2006. 15, 27, 28, 31, 41, 43, 46, 58, 59, 61, 66
[94] Jonathan Katz and Adam Smith. Analyzing the HB and HB+ Protocols in the
“Large Error” Case. Technical report, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/326,
2006. 28, 41
[95] Harry Kesten. Percolation theory for mathematicians. Birkhauser, 1982. 11
[96] Aviad Kipnis, Jacques Patarin, and Louis Goubin. Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar
Signature Schemes. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT’99, pages 206–222.
LNCS 1592, 1999. 50
[97] Hugo Krawczyk, Mihir Bellare, and Ran Canetti. RFC 2104 - HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
for Message Authentication. IETF, 1997. 121
[98] Maxwell N. Krohn, Michael J. Freedman, and David Mazières. On-the-fly verification
of rateless erasure codes for efficient content distribution. In IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy 2004, pages 226–240, 2004. 102, 106, 109, 110
145
[99] Xuefei Leng, Keith Mayes, and Konstantinos Markantonakis. HB-MP+ Protocol:
An Improvement on the HB-MP Protocol. In IEEE International Conference on
RFID, pages 118–124, 2008. 29
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